

Preschool of aesthetics

by

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Part I

translated by

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Table of Contents

Preface	4
I. Aesthetics from Above and from Below	7
II. Preconceptions	13
1) Liking and Disliking, Pleasure and Displeasure.....	14
2) Aesthetic, practical and theoretical categories. Beauty, Truth, Value, Interest.	19
3) Aesthetic, Aesthetics.....	41
4) Eudemonistic principle	47
III. Aesthetic Laws or Principles in General	51
IV. Principle of the aesthetic threshold	58
V. Principle of aesthetic aid or enhancement	60
VI. Principle of coherent connection of variety	63
1) Declaration of the principle	63
2) Examples	68
3) Objective conflicts and aids	81
4) More accurate determinations	83
5) Generality of the principle.....	87
VII. Principle of consistency, unanimity, or truth	90
VIII. Principle of clarity. Summary of the three highest formal principles	94
IX. Aesthetic principle of association	96
1) Introduction.....	96
2) Examples	97
3) Claim of the principle	103
4) Association by similarity.....	107
5) Ancillary association.....	108
6) Temporal Associations, Cognitive and Emotional Judgments	109
7) Associative Character of Simple Colors, Shapes, Layers.	111
8) The Person as the Center of Associations	119
9) Analysis of associative impressions. Remarks on the creative capacity of phantasy.	122
10) Gradual generation of the associated impression	125
11) The principle of higher use	127
12) A few more general observations	133

<i>X. Explanation of the landscape impression through the principle of association.....</i>	<i>136</i>
<i>XI. Relation of poetry and painting from the perspective of the principle of association</i>	<i>150</i>
<i>XII. Physiognomic and instinctive impressions</i>	<i>164</i>
<i>XIII. Representation of the direct factor of aesthetic impressions towards the associative one</i>	<i>172</i>
1) Preliminary remarks.....	172
2) The direct factor in music	173
3) The direct factor in the visual arts.....	192
<i>XIV. Different attempts to posit a basic form of beauty. Experimental aesthetics. Golden section and square.....</i>	<i>199</i>
1) Attempts to posit a normal or basic form of beauty	199
2) Objections that can be raised against the usefulness of experimental-aesthetic investigations and their undoing.....	202
3) Methods of empirical aesthetic investigations. Example of a performance of the method of choice. Results especially regarding the golden section and square.	205
<i>XV. Relation of purposefulness and beauty</i>	<i>218</i>
<i>XVI. Commentary on a few sentences by Schnaase regarding architecture.....</i>	<i>226</i>
<i>XVII. Of witty and funny comparisons, puns and other cases that have a character of delightfulness, funniness, ludicrousness.</i>	<i>237</i>
<i>XVIII. On taste</i>	<i>249</i>
1)Terminology	249
2) Dispute of taste.....	253
3) Predisposition, education of taste	266
4) Principles of good or right taste.....	274

Preface

The notion of a preschool of aesthetics is a fairly undetermined one, as follows from the comparison of the works that have been published with this title before, like by Jean Paul (1st edition 1804, 2nd edition 1813, etc.), by Ruge (2nd edition 1837), by Eckhardt (1863-64), and by Egger (1872). Without attempting to explain this uncertainty or to fix it, I will use the same name here to give this writing a short appealing title with the following meaning.

It will offer a series of essays with aesthetic content without systematic order and with a free approach, as is suitable for a system of aesthetics. But this should be suitable to introduce the reader to a more general interest for the field. So, the essays will address fairly general questions but with regular application to special circumstances and will go deeper into these special cases in dedicated sections and will always hold on to the purpose of being easily understandable.

In the first two sections, that serve as an introduction, I will explain the principles that build the foundation of this work. To summarize them in advance in a few words: This work renounces the attempt to terminologically record the objective nature of beauty or to develop the system of aesthetics from here. Instead, it makes do with using the term beauty as an auxiliary term, as used in everyday language, as a shorthand for those things that unify the predominant circumstances of immediate liking. It seeks to pursue the empirical conditions of this liking. Therewith, it lies the emphasis on the laws of liking rather than on the terminological development emerging from the definition of the beautiful and replaces¹ the term of so-called

¹ *Translator's note:* references to other pages of the original book have been removed from this translation

objective beauty with the term of that which *shall* be liked immediately considering its relation to the good.

The question is, of course, whether I find myself tempted to follow this path that, against the otherwise predominant way, leads more up from below than down from above, and more into the clear than to the high, as steadily as it has started here. It shall be granted to me that not everything can be achieved with this what one might wish for from an aesthetic; however, I will try to prove with the following that one can achieve quite something that an aesthetic with a lead from the opposite direction leaves to be desired. One may thus, if nothing else, search for a complement to such an aesthetic and bear in mind that it is not a fault of a work to miss some things that can be found in other works.

Even though the following essays are designed to complement each other, their content does overlap here and there. This, along with the fact that they partially evolved independently of one another, has resulted in a few repetitions. But those repetitions should not be too annoying, and I did not want to spare them everywhere by means of references so as not to break the connection between accounts.

The *content* of the first part of this writing is concerned with the more general terminological and lawful conditions of the aesthetic field. Among those are specifically the implementation and application of two principles who are discussed in detail in the 6th and 9th section as well as with the general principles of taste; the second part will go into general views on art, different disputes about art, another series of aesthetic laws, and a few special objects.

Some who have only taken note of my works on other topics will find it odd that, after so many years of activities on other subjects, I finally started to address aesthetics. As age renders one ever less seasoned to new pursuits the more seasoned the self is. By now this work has

grown more from the end than the beginning of an engagement with aesthetic things and this engagement has not always been spare-time work. To prove this, to so to say show off my aesthetic business log, I will here briefly register what has been published so far on this topic by me, without in its scattered nature having ever truly reached the public.

In 1839, I handed in a work under a pseudonym (Mises) in the style of other Mises writings “On a few pictures of the second Leipzig art show (Lpz. Voss)”² mainly in conflict with a wrong direction of idealization that has recently (1875) appeared in a collection of “small writings”³ of Mises. – Against the exaggeration of the principle of the golden section I have claimed a few experimental facts in my essay “On the question of the golden section”⁴ in Weigel’s archive 1865. 100. – In general, the idea of an experimental aesthetic has been advocated by me in the article “On experimental aesthetics”⁵ (Lpz. Hirzel 1871), of which a sequel shall be delivered. Here, I provide an excerpt of it in the 14th section. – “On the aesthetic principle of association”⁶ is an essay of mine that appears in the Lützow journal 1866 which one will find mentioned with quite some extensions in section 9. – I have partaken in the mainly historical debate, that does, however, contribute to the aesthetic one, about the two exemplars of the commonly so-called Hohlbeinian Madonna in the essay “The debate about the two Madonnas of Hohlbein”⁷ in Grenzbl. 1870. II, in the little writing “On the question of the Hohlbeinian Madonna’s authenticity”⁸ (Lpz. Br. U. H. 1871), and in a few essays in Weigel’s archive 1866 until 1869. – I have conducted a public aesthetic experiment on the comparison of these

² *Translator’s note:* Original title “Ueber einige Bilder der zweiten Leipziger Kunstausstellung”

³ *Translator’s note:* Original title “Kleine Schriften”

⁴ *Translator’s note:* Original title “Ueber die Frage des goldenen Schnittes”

⁵ *Translator’s note:* Original title “Zur experimentalen Aesthetik”

⁶ *Translator’s note:* Original title “Ueber das ästhetische Associationsprincip”

⁷ *Translator’s note:* Original title “Der Streit über die beiden Madonnen von Hohlbein”

⁸ *Translator’s note:* Original title “Ueber die Aechtheitsfrage der Holbein’schen Madonna”

exemplars on the occasion of the Hohlbein exhibit in 1871 about which I have written in the small report “Report on the album presented in Dresden’s Hohlbein exhibition”⁹ (Lpz. Br. U. H. 1872).¹⁰ – Finally, I have given different talks at the Leipzig art club about single aesthetic questions and at the university about aesthetics in general.

I. Aesthetics from Above and from Below

The double way in which human knowledge aims to reason and to develop is also evident in the aesthetic, the science of the beautiful. One treats it in a short expression *from Above* by starting from the most general ideas and terms and descending to the individual. One treats it *from Below* by ascending from the individual to the general. *There* one puts the aesthetic empirical domain in an idealized framework that is constructed from the highest points of view; *here* one builds the entire aesthetic on the basis of aesthetic facts and laws from below. *There* it is foremost and with supreme authority about the ideas and terms of beauty, the arts, style, and their position within the system of general terms, especially about their relationship with the true and the good; and one readily rises with this up to the absolute, to the godly, the godly ideas and the creational activity of god. From the pure heights of such generalities one then descends into the earthly-empirical field of the individual, of the temporally and spatially beautiful, and measures the individual on the scale of the general. *Here* one starts from the experience of what

⁹ *Translator’s note:* Original title “Bericht über das auf der Dresdener Holbein- Ausstellung ausgelegte Album”

¹⁰ In multiple public reviews of the above experiment, the experiment has been correlated with the question about authenticity rather than the aesthetic question in sheer contradiction to its purport, partially due to a lack of attention on the side of the reviewers, partially because one has copied from the other, against which I want to protest here once more, since these reviews are absolutely suitable to question my power of judgment and are probably more widely distributed than the above, indeed little known, article that describes the facts of the experiment.

is liked and what is disliked and supports all terms and laws that deserve a place in aesthetics with them. One searches for them while considering the general laws of what one ought to do, to which all laws of liking need to be subordinated to. One generalizes more and more and like this, one gets to a system of preferably most general terms and laws.

Both regimes can also be differentiated as philosophical and empirical. Per se, they do not stand in opposition to each other, given that the right and complete knowledge of the highest principles of being, of godly and human things, needs to include the principles of the right viewing angle on aesthetic conditions, and conversely that the correct generalization of the empirical facts and laws of the aesthetic field needs to tread into this knowledge. Both cover the same field but in opposite directions; and everywhere the possibility to move in one direction is complemented by the one to move in the other. Yet, both ways have their special advantages, difficulties, and dangers.

The first path sets us off from the goal that needs to be strived after on the second one first. From there, it grants the most general view, the highest viewpoints; but one has trouble to achieve clear alignment of the reasons for liking and disliking in the individual case that we also need to be concerned about; it stops at more or less undefined, floating terms that do not sharply capture the individual case in its generality. What is more, this path has the perquisite of the right starting point, if it shall guide correctly, and this, one can in principle only find in a purely philosophical and even theological system, both of which we do not have at the moment. We only have many attempts of those, and likewise we have many attempts to set aesthetics in relation to them which all leave much to be desired. Nonetheless, they accommodate the need for most general and highest viewpoints and even if they do not completely satisfy it, they keep it busy and awake. Also, both of these paths have made themselves tangible in all the many

accounts of aesthetics and the treatment of aesthetic questions of Schelling, Hegel, and even of Kant who have chosen the direction from above.

The other path, however, the path from Below, gives or at least immediately promises a clear orientation, not only in the realm of terms, to which the fields of liking and disliking are subordinated, but also with regard to the reasons for liking and disliking in the individual and closest cases; but one reaches the most general viewpoints on it only with difficulty, one easily remains caught by details, one-sidedness, viewpoints of subordinate value and subordinate scope, as it has namely been shown by the English (like Hutcheson, Hogarth, Burke, Hay, etc.) who have preferentially chosen this path.

After the above, the attempts that have since been made to treat the aesthetic in the first sense will rather satisfy one who sees his primary interest in the subordination of things under general terms or ideas and who finds satisfaction in some kind of design of these without making higher demands for clarity and objectivity because those are then fulfilled; while an attempt at treating aesthetics along the second path is rather suited to satisfy the one who is most interested in clear orientation along the most obvious and who does not claim bigger heights or generality than the ones from which he¹¹ has started to approach. In general, one can say that an aesthetic from Above asserts a higher claim from the start whereas the aesthetic from Below fulfills those lower ones that are posed to it more easily.

If an aesthetic from Above, that does fulfill what has until now been more aspired to by previous attempts than achieved, shall ever come about, then, in my opinion, we will come to the

¹¹ *Translator's note:* The generic masculine is used here to retain the original character of Fechner's writing and shall in no way imply greater focus on the male gender. Wherever possible, the generic masculine used by Fechner was, however, replaced by the more neutral "one".

highest and last principles, from which one starts off, only by means of a careful ascent not only through the aesthetic field but through all individual fields of human knowledge under consideration of practical demands. From there then, one will be able to descend to and through the different branches of knowledge. Not only will every circle of knowledge by itself return to be dependent on higher viewpoints than those at which one could have arrived through the ascending way alone by this. Also, its content, through the relation with other branches of knowledge, will appear to be motivated and explained in yet other ways than can be illuminated on the ascending way. Such an aesthetic from higher viewpoints remains a matter of the future and as of now, attempts at it remain rather suited to denote and hold the per se justified demands on it than to fulfill them.

So, it is possible in this sense that there is a philosophical aesthetic of higher style above the empirical one, as there can be a natural philosophy above physics and physiology, if there is not one already. Just like the true natural philosophy, that one hopes for, cannot replace or, for an aphoristic reason, give birth to these sciences, rather, it will need them as perquisite and basis, without losing itself in its specificity, so does the philosophical aesthetic of higher style relate to the empirical one. Now, there is still too great of a lack of an empirical basis and therefore all philosophical systems of aesthetics seem giants with clay feet to me.

From this, one can clearly see that I deem an aesthetic from Below to be one of the most crucial perquisites for postulating an aesthetic from Above; and as I could take the path from Above, given the so far unsatisfying realization of this as well as other perquisites, as little clear, safe and successful as I see it being taken so far, I will rather aim to make my little contribution to its fulfillment by strictly adhering and following the path from Below. With this, I will make

use of all of its main advantages without being able to circumvent the disadvantages that lie in its nature. The efforts shall be directed at avoiding its sheer dangers.

Of course, one can ask whether the advantages and disadvantages of both paths cannot be united such that one illuminates the path from Below with the ideas from Above. That indeed sounds beautiful and really, the path from Below has been taken in this way many times, or the way from Above has been understood in this way. Now, the general formal principles of aesthetic thinking and research from Below as well as from Above stay common to all fields of research; besides, it is the same for aesthetics as for physics, that has by now been confused and mistaken by all light with which natural philosophy has tried to illuminate or guide it. Who searches for light, and the path from Below is such a search, cannot want to illuminate this path with ready-made light.

In my opinion, the main tasks of a general aesthetic are: clarification of the terms that subordinate themselves to aesthetic facts and conditions, and determination of the laws that they obey that have their most important application in the theory of art. But the treatments of aesthetics from Above have preferentially only looked at the first task by seeking to replace instead of supplementing the explanation of empirical facts made of laws with an explanation by means of terms or ideas.

Indeed, if one looks at most of our textbooks and general essays on aesthetics – yet, most follow the path from Above – the main content of their accounts are the discussions and debates about the correct determination of the term beauty, transcendence, ugliness, the agreeable, graceful, comic, tragic, ludicrous, humor, style, manner, art, beauty of art and beauty of nature, subordination of the individual to these terms, division of the whole aesthetic field from its own viewpoint. But this does not exhaust the tasks of aesthetics. Since with all that concerns us

aesthetically, the question will not only be: Which term do they subordinate themselves to, which position does it take in the system of our terms – alas, one needs to ask this. It belongs to the clear orientation in our field of knowledge; - but the question of utmost interest and importance will always stay this: Why do we like it or dislike it. And in how far does it have the right to be liked or disliked; and the answer to this can only be the laws of liking and disliking accompanied by the laws of what one ought to do, just as the answer to the question: Why does a body move like this and that and what do we need to do to move it, does not lie in the term and a division of the different kinds of movement, but in the laws of movement and the observation of their purposes. And as long as the terminological explanations of aesthetics are not fulfilled by explanations by means of laws, they remain an empty frame. The path from Above and the path from Below can also be distinguished by the way in which they determine the terms itself. On the latter path, the determination of terms reduces itself to assessing linguistic practice, and to explain the choice and breadth where it wavers, so that one knows what one is concerned with in one's objective studies, but without forestalling the results of these investigations by determining the terms or by determining their nature from the start through which it is easy to accomplish clarity and popular understanding; meanwhile the path from Above seeks to answer the question about the nature of terms out of and with the term but with this it transmits the difficulties of clearly determining the highest terms to all derived terms.

Among the Germans, the treatment of aesthetics from Above has received and until now maintained predominance over the treatment from Below based on Kant, Schelling, Hegel. Recently, the influences of these philosophers start to blend more and more with the ones of Herbart, Schopenhauer, Hartmann; yet, they also steer aesthetics into the direction of the path from Below, be it still under philosophical influences or more in independent direction and

development (Hartsen, Kirchmann, Köstlin , Lotze, Oersted, Zimmermann); and even though this is partially not the pure execution that I had in mind, it can partially only occur in limited execution, I cannot say anymore that this path has been abandoned in our place. On top of this, there are the valuable empirical investigations of the modern day in aesthetic specialty fields such as Brücke, Helmholtz, Oettingen and others¹²; finally, abundant critical art observations that do not lean more or less to one side, but I do not intend to elaborate on this here, and according to primary historical relations I point the reader here to the historical accounts of the history of aesthetics of Lotze and Zimmermann.

II. Preconceptions

We have avowedly little to gain from difficult philosophical and theological preconceptions in which the aesthetic from Above seeks its rationale, nor will the following lead us there; what we do need from explanations in our sense for the following, the following will bring. In the meantime, there are a few terms and words to describe terms without whose use one cannot take a single step in the discussion of aesthetic conditions and without whom one cannot clarify the term aesthetic itself. So, it will be good to start with a few explanations as the use of these terms is not entirely settled in either real life or science. We thus need to address how we want to use them. The close connection between basic aesthetic terms and the practical and ethical ones below them, by connecting explanations of the first with ones of the last, will automatically lead, up to a point, to a consideration of the relation between ethics and aesthetics.

¹² Zeising, even though primarily revering the direction from Below, cannot be omitted insofar as he sought to complement and support the philosophical explanation of the golden section with an empirical one.

1) Liking and Disliking, Pleasure and Displeasure

In general, we say that we like or dislike something depending on whether, when presented to our observation or imagination, it gives them a pleasurable or displeasurable character. The pleasure that we experience in response to a tasty meal, the feeling of pleasure of strength and health is not yet the pleasure of it but it is the pleasure of the imagination that we taste, have tasted, or will taste something agreeable, like imagining that we are healthy and well. In these cases, it is the pleasure of the concrete imagination of inner states that determines the term pleasure: - and at least the linguistic use allows to apply the term liking to these cases – in other cases the concrete imagination, upon which the pleasure of liking rests, can immediately be awakened by the external reality, as with the pleasure taken from a painting, music.

According to this, the term of liking and disliking critically depends on the terms pleasure and displeasure and the investigation of the requirements for liking and disliking partially coincides with those for pleasure and displeasure and partially leads us back to them.

Heibart (Lehrb. z. Einl. in d. Philos. § 82, ges. W. I. 122) sets himself above an explanation of the terms of liking and disliking by ascribing it a native evidence, which does not seem compelling to me, insofar as those terms still allow for tracing them back to other terms for which one needs to first supply such evidence. At the same time, he excludes inner states from the realm to which the term liking is applicable by articulating himself among other things like this: “The use of language is confused if someone says: I like the smell of the hyacinth more than the smell of the lily. Because with the expression I like it, it is required that the something that is liked is something distinct that can be visualized. But nobody can communicate or point the smell of a flower, which is a sensation inside him, out to others as an object of observation.”¹³ –

¹³ *Translator's note:* Original quotation »Der Sprachgebrauch wird verwirrt, wenn jemand sagt: der Geruch der Hyacinthe gefällt mir besser als der Geruch der Lilie. Denn bei dem Ausdrucke

With this, it seems to me that the use of language is less clarified and more restricted without motivation or effect. Indisputably, there is something common to the kind of pleasure that is present during the observation of an inner state and an external object and this commonality calls for a common label. As the use of language has introduced the expression liking for it, there is no reason to limit it to one side. Also, Herbart will not be able to prevent that one will still like not only the smell of a flower, the taste of a meal, but also the contemplation of any pleasant imagination.

Pleasure and displeasure themselves, pure and abstracted from all co-determinants, are simple determinants of our soul that cannot be further analyzed but that do not occur so abstractly in reality as they can be apprehended by us with our ability for abstraction, but only as co-determinants or results, if you want functions, of other determinants of the soul to whom they give character and through which they receive a character themselves. One distinguishes different kinds of pleasures and displeasures depending on the co-determinants or causing moments. The pleasure obtained from the good taste of a meal is insofar a different one than the one from an agreeable smell as the pleasure from looking at a beautiful painting is a different one as the one from listening to beautiful music, and the pleasure from the feeling of knowing to be loved a different one than of knowing that one is being honored, the pleasure from any one active occupation a different one than from a receptive impression. In and by itself, pleasure stays pleasure, just as gold stays gold; but it can, like gold, form different coalescences and be excreted terminologically from most diverse coalescences.

es gefällt wird etwas das da gefällt, als etwas bestimmt vor Augen zustellendes vorausgesetzt. Niemand aber kann den Geruch einer Blume, der eine Empfindung in ihm ist, Andern mittheilen noch darauf als auf ein Object der Betrachtung hinweisen.«

Indeed, if it was not like this – though here and there one has denied that there is one identical essence of pleasure everywhere – where would the need for a common label for it in all those cases come from if there would not be something identical to denote. Yes, confront the present and any other cases of occurrences of pleasure with the just as frequent occurrences of displeasure. You will find that for all differences that occur on either side, you still feel that each side has something in common with the other that we abstract from it as pleasure and displeasure and that we can contrast with each other.

The simplicity and refinedness with which one grasps the term pleasure is linked to the breadth of its applicability. It behaves in this sense like a pure distillate. Everything that the distillate takes on from the beginning determines its usability meanwhile it only becomes palatable and useful in its applications. So one should in a way distill the term pleasure for its most general use from the start, pure from everything that it is adopted for and take it general and pure, disconnected from any special or ancillary relation according to source, effect, kind, height, strength, quality. Differentiations, specializations of it will emerge automatically as one goes into the co-determinants and relationships and therewith come to talk about *concrete* kinds or cases of pleasure and displeasure.

What pleasure and displeasure are in their pure form in and by themselves cannot be clarified by descriptions but only by their inner demonstration. Feel them and you know it: there is no more to say about their final clarification; that depends on their simple nature. In contrast, one can say much about their causes, effects, relations and possibly one can also give explanations based on these that still achieve their final clarity through inner demonstration of the things that we immediately feel as pleasure and displeasure from all concrete events. But that

such a demonstration of them is possible in something internally clear or in the former way easy to be clarified also gives all terms that can be made dependent on them a clear core.

We call pleasure and displeasure, and therewith the liking and disliking that they contribute to, the higher in nature or give them a higher character the more spiritual the place in which they take place or the higher the connections, relations, conditions that they are bound to; the lowest are those that are bound to simple sensuous impressions. As such, the pleasure from a harmonious accord is higher in nature than the one from a simple pure tone, one from a musical movement higher than from a simple accord, one from the unitary convergence of an entire musical piece higher than from a simple movement.

In everyday life, it is easy to confuse height and strength of pleasure. One is tempted to merely take pleasure in its lower sense with the side notion of a certain strength or vividness and to only imagine concrete kinds of pleasure as they so present themselves in life. But higher pleasure in the sense outlined above is not always the stronger or greater one; because someone can find greater pleasure in a simple sensuous pleasure than in a true insight; however, the joy of a correct insight is also as good of a pleasure as the pleasure of sensuous pleasures and the weakest feeling of satisfaction and of contentment is just as well brought under the term pleasure if one wants to have a common term for the commonality in all this that one does indeed need. Even if in ordinary life, the need to go beyond concrete versions of pleasure and displeasure is not big, here, one cannot escape from this fully; science has been even less able to escape it according to which the term of pleasure is used without hesitation in its full breadth and generality in psychology, which depends on its capacity to be abstracted in its purest version, and the highest kind of pleasure subordinates itself to it along with the lowest pleasure because there

is a need for such a version to create the most general viewpoints, for which the need in everyday life.

Some have proposed or preferred the more general use of other words, such as *welfare*, *well-being*, *happiness*, and *bliss* to avoid the limitations of ancillary meanings that the term pleasure brings along easily. This does not change the point; but these words do not fit into the linguistic use as well as pleasure does and cannot serve to denote the most generally usable term without explicit explanation or even much less so. This does not prevent their use there where it is linguistically appropriate, as it will often happen, as they at least depend on the term pleasure.

¹⁴But the term pleasure does not resist its use in this broadest sense and one can very well speak of the pleasure in godly things, pleasure in the search for truth, in doing good, etc., in everyday life; but how can one speak of a well-being or bliss in it. This linguistic inconvenience of using some surrogates for the term pleasure and its broadest use as it has been accepted in psychology leads me to altogether prefer it to other expressions without foreclosing their use everywhere.

Insofar something identical can be abstracted from all the different kinds of pleasure and displeasure according to the above, one can posit that there is something identical in all different sources of pleasure and displeasure that is a final general crucial reason for pleasure and displeasure. But be it that we look for it on the physical, psychological, or psychophysical side, it has not yet been found, or at least not a clear expression for it, even though one has made different attempts (such as harmony, inner promotion of character) that denote the sought for

¹⁴ *Translator's note:* Three sentences were omitted from the English version here because they do not apply to the English language. In German, Fechner explains there, many words are derived from the word "Lust" (pleasure) and these derived words are more clearly linked to simple humorous and sexual enjoyments. Fechner sees in these connections one reason for the inclination to use the word "Lust" in a lower sense.

rather than the found. Herbart aims to go deeper; I need to leave it to his school, however, to which I do not belong, to be satisfied with that. I do not deem it necessary to speak here of a psychophysical hypothesis that I have posited and deem possible because this here will not be psychophysics. Of course, the final reason for pleasure, whatever it is, can only be sought in us and what shall elicit it in us from the outside can only do it insofar as it brings this inner reason into play.

Even if we knew this most general and final inner reason, this would not mean that we could be spared the investigation of the special external sources of pleasure and displeasure, to visit the laws of their emergence under special circumstances; as one knows about the warmth, that it is based on the quick oscillations of body particles, but cannot yet ignite a match with this knowledge.

Both pleasure and displeasure are summarized under the name *feelings (Gefühle)*. In so far as this name is otherwise applied to many states or determinations of the soul, that cannot be brought to a clear imagination or term without considering whether pleasure or displeasure play a role there, one can call pleasure and displeasure *aesthetic feelings* to differentiate them distinctly.

2) Aesthetic, practical and theoretical categories. Beauty, Truth, Value, Interest.

In general, humans strive for happiness, be it that one understands pleasure or the perquisites for pleasure as happiness; as a consequence, one in general prefers pleasure to displeasure, the bigger to the smaller pleasure, the smaller displeasure to the bigger displeasure and carried this over to the perquisites of pleasure and displeasure; by means of more or less thinking about the consequences while thinking of the present. Given the great interest that one has in the effect of pleasure and displeasure that things and conditions have, one finds reason to construct terms and expressions that refer to them.

Now, there are quite some terms and therefore expressions that refer to the things and conditions that grant a *current* or *immediate* effect of pleasure or displeasure respectively, so as for the side of pleasure agreeable, graceful, appealing, lovely, enjoyable, cute, pretty, beautiful, etc., for which there are just as many equivalents on the side of displeasure. We summarize both as *aesthetic* categories and differentiate them as *positive* and *negative*. There are others that refer to the effect of pleasure and displeasure of things and conditions *with regard to the context and consequences* of these, as far as these can themselves bear a pleasurable or displeasurable character, not excluding a concern for the present effect, as for the side of pleasure: advantageous, useful, suitable, thriving, healing, beneficial, valuable, good, etc., and for these *positive* ones there are again no fewer *negative* equivalents. We summarize both as *practical* categories, in so far as they are predominantly relevant for the direction of our actions.

From the start, without already having the above classifications of the two main categories present, one could find something puzzling about their relationship. Certainly, the positive aesthetic categories seem more closely related to the positive than to the negative practical ones based on premature views, and equivalent for the permutation of positive and negative. One would rather place agreeable and beautiful on the same side as useful and good than on the same side as harmful and bad, and yet something agreeable can be bad and something unagreeable can be very good. How does that go together? Very easily if one gets back to the definitions above. The present effect of pleasure can in consequence be surpassed by a greater effect of displeasure and the present effect of displeasure can be surpassed by a greater effect of pleasure. The common relation of both categories with pleasure and displeasure reveals itself already from the start in that both provide an equivalent in the positive and in the negative, just as pleasure and displeasure do: it is completely clarified by the definitions above. So we do

have good reason to trust these terminological determinations from the most general point of view.

Indisputably, the two categories can also be explained in terms of their relation to our conscious drives and counter-drives instead of in terms of pleasure and displeasure, or, this also occurs, but ends up being the same thing, in terms of a relation to a notion of the term love that extends beyond its everyday use, as an aspiration and worth to be aspired, as love-provoking and love-deserving. According to the psychological basic relation between pleasure and displeasure on the one hand, conscious drives and counter-drives on the other hand, a few more words on this in section 4, the two explanations come objectively together, and will always allow a translation from one to the other, based on which one unconvincingly deemed one excluded based on the other. For us, there was a double reason to prefer the relations of the practical categories of pleasure and displeasure to the relations of drives and counter-drives in the basic explanation. First, it was necessary to immediately and clearly point out the relation of these categories to the aesthetic categories which could only happen by means of a common intermediary term and thus only by means of pleasure and displeasure, in so far as these already build the core of the aesthetic categories. Second, it seems to me that the general consciousness of language and terms indeed sets the practical categories in more direct relation to pleasure and displeasure than to drive and counter-drive. Because one does not find something advantageous, good, if one strives for it or shall strive for it, but because one finds it advantageous, good; to not make this result an identical sentence, one needs to think of advantageous, good, to be determined by a different term than drive; and it is now a matter of clear analytics to recognize the term pleasure in our sense in it. If I have thus admitted with the above that the practical categories can be explained by their relation to drive and counter-drive as well as to pleasure and

displeasure, this only holds true as long as one does not look at these categories in isolation; yet, I cannot admit that a system of terms that one constructs with the aid of the first kind of explanation is as easily accessible to understanding as that which rests on the latter kind of explanation or that it is just as free of hidden or openly circular explanations.

The most general term, i.e., the one under which all others are subsumed, or the topmost, i.e., understood in a preferred meaning before the other, the main concept among the aesthetic categories is the term beautiful, among the practical categories it is good. We here mostly deal only with the first one without being able to leave the relation of it to the second one aside completely.

To conceive of the term beautiful as the main concept of aesthetics meets the general consensus; some even explain the entire field as the science of beauty. Beauty itself, however, is explained differently according to its source (from God, phantasy, enthusiasm), its nature (sensory appearance of the idea, perfection of sensory appearance, unity in variety, etc., etc.) or its accomplishment (in liking, pleasure). For us, it is not only the principle to always terminologically start from the explanation of linguistic use that is bound to the result of the latter mode of explanation but it is also the consequence of our general definitions of aesthetic categories that go back to such explanations only in general terms themselves.

According to this, beauty is in the *broadest* sense, which is at the same time the most general one, all that bears the trait to elicit liking immediately and not just through contemplation or its consequences, especially if it possess this trait not to a little extent and if it does so in a relatively pure way, whereas we prefer phrases like agreeable (often with a sensuous side meaning), appealing, pretty in the case of little or relative possession, and we express this or that nuance of the liked with these or those other phrases like graceful, cute, sublime, superb, etc. In

the broadest sense, something can taste beautiful just as well as it can look beautiful, there are beautiful souls as well as beautiful bodies, beautiful ideas as well as beautiful statues. The use of language does not only endure all of that, it is also good that it endures it, as we would otherwise not have the common label that we need. In a *narrower* sense of aesthetics and the appreciation of art, something is only called beautiful insofar it is suitable to create a higher pleasure than the merely sensuous directly from the sensuous, which is possible either through the apprehension of the inner relations of the sensuous or through imaginative associations with the sensuous. There will be plenty of opportunities to go deeper into this. But even in this narrower sense, an object uses the expression beautiful the sooner the fuller and purer its pleasure effect is, and nuances of it are covered by special aesthetic categories, the discussion of which is what most textbooks on aesthetics tend to seek their main task in. But when some want the term beautiful in the narrower sense to only be applied to artworks (as creations of the mind), this is an arbitrary limitation that is not shared by the common use of language and against which the beauty of the living human and of landscapes is allowed to fight. This does not hinder the recognition of differences between natural and artistic beauty; but that is why one has both words for – to differentiate both. The only thing that is certain is that the term beauty in the narrower sense is more often fulfilled by artistic beauty than by natural beauty, the closer inspection of which belongs in a different place.

But one still has to talk about a term beauty in the *narrowest* sense. With the aforementioned definitions, we cannot transcend the subjectivity of beauty; one can find something beautiful that another excludes from this realm. But not everything shall be liked that is liked, there are not only laws that liking and disliking comply with, that we need to talk about later, but there are also *laws of demand* of liking and disliking, rules of good taste that relate to them, and according rules of educating taste that do not oppose the first laws but rather need to

make use of them in the right direction. To define the term beauty in the narrowest sense, the *veritable beauty*, the *true beauty*, that is not only liked from a higher point of view but has the right to be liked, one has to consider the value of pleasure that contributes to liking, thus the term true beauty is co-determined by the term good upon which the term value depends in a way that we will look at later. In brief, one can say: the general terms beauty and good cross in the term beauty in the narrowest sense whereas they reach above each other otherwise. The potential to immediately elicit liking and therewith pleasure always stays central for the term beauty also in its narrowest conception in contrast to the term good; but not all liking, all pleasure is equivalent in light of the consequences and relations and thus equivalently good. We will discuss this in the later sections of taste.

After this, nothing prevents us to derive true beauty, that which is worth eliciting liking, with supreme authority from God from which in the end we need to derive everything and in whom everything has to complete and culminate in the end, to set it in relation to the most valuable highest ideas as an expression of it in the earthly, sensuous; only we cannot start with such explanations after our approach from Below and need to use the word beautiful from the start for brevity to point out an achievement that one is used to outside of aesthetics and theory of art, too.

There is no simple characteristic that makes things beautiful in the broadest or narrowest sense but there are many attempts to appropriately denote the nature or the core of beauty from this or another viewpoint by a simple phrase. The systems of aesthetics from Above maintain proceeding from such an attempt, surpass each other in that and do not come to an end. The aesthetics from Below only have explanations and clarifications of the linguistic use, as has been said about its character above, that enable it to clearly talk about the laws according to which

something is liked and should be liked and that claim to remain correct for any terminological definition of beauty.

It is certain that the term beauty does not refer to the source or fundamental make-up but to the special achievements of beauty with regard to pleasure, no matter how broad the active linguistic and terminological use of the term beauty is; and it is explanatory to in that sense place the term beauty together with salubrity. This one has formed itself only in relation to a certain achievement of means, too, and can only be determined clearly and appropriately in relation to these which are comprised of the ability to make people healthy. If one wanted to relate the term salubrity of means to a particular general trait or source of the means, and thus make medicine depending on that, it would be just as unconvincing as to determine the term beauty equivalently and to make aesthetics dependent on that. After determining the term salubrity based on the achievements that its means have to accomplish, the question how things become salubrious is only a question about the laws of salubrity that cannot be answered directly with the term; and thus, after determining the term beauty in relation to the achievements it accomplishes, the question of what makes things beautiful is a question about the laws of beauty or liking that cannot be sufficiently answered with the term either; as there is no general trait known that makes things pleasing just as much as there is none that makes them salubrious; and only then, when it should be accomplished to denote the reason for the achievements of beauty just as clearly and easily as the achievements itself, one could base a fundamental explanation of beauty on it.

Nonetheless, and in denial of its impossibility, explanations of beauty that preferentially refer to the source or the nature have stood at the top of aesthetics; and therefore, they have remained unsatisfactory for a successful development of aesthetics. It is not so much that all

aestheticians would have admitted or even demanded that the achievement of beauty for one who is able to recognize it as beautiful is higher pleasure, it is rather that the fact that all, deviations granted, agree on this proves itself that this achievement is crucial for the term beauty. But one thought that this does not suffice to define the term beauty and that one has tried to replace it by also including the *conditions or the principle* of it instead of the *statement of the achievement* alone. But then the achievement in terms of pleasure is considered non-crucial or incidental or secondary. All of these explanations do harm in that they do not provide what is needed to clarify the general linguistic and terminological use that can be given as working point and introduction of objective investigation but instead seem to provide what cannot be provided by a general explanation and therewith distract from the right way to study it.

Of course, there are aestheticians like Kant, Bouterweek, Fries, and others, have based their definition of beauty on its achievement of pleasure or its ability to be liked but instead of taking the path of investigating the laws of liking and disliking from there, they have stopped with the formal definitions of the nature of liking beauty or have gone back on the path of trying to satisfactorily determine the source or reason for the trait to be liked in the terminological definition.

But now let us turn from the central concept of the aesthetic categories to the one of the practical ones to clearly point out their differences and commonalities.

The term good is explained in terms of its source, nature and achievement – like beauty. And again, we are bound to the relation to achievement, no less to join the most common use of the term than to keep the relation to beauty as it is based in the general relation between the aesthetic and practical categories. Thus, good to us in the broadest sense, which is at the same time the most general, is everything that we can talk about with regard to a considered or

undefined circle of relations and results of presumed conditions of more pleasure than displeasure or of a means to prevent or extinguish more displeasure rather than creating it, which can be good weather, a good harvest, as well as a good human, a good public institution; - whereas good in the narrower sense of ethics and religion, insofar the so-conceived term concerns attitude, behavior, writing and striving of conscious beings, with supreme authority of the Godly being; according to this, a human is only to be called good insofar as he acts according to an attitude and to rules through which presumably more happiness than misery, with this more pleasure than displeasure, comes into the world and also God is only called good insofar one presumes that he placed events for the well-being of humankind, i.e., their bliss from highest and final viewpoints, yes even turns misfortune in that sense.¹⁵

Advantageous, useful, appropriate, and other practical categories subordinate themselves to the term good under definitions only in accordance with a more or less determined circle of relations and consequences and much more in relation to external things and conditions than to such that fall in the circle of good in the narrow sense, the ethically or morally good, whereas for special definitions of the latter, the ethical categories, such as honest, lawful, faithful, conscientious, charitable, generous, noble, etc., in short all notions of virtue are valid.

If the morally and godly good is brought under one common category with so many other goods, and with this it seems only *subordinated* to this whole commonality, this *terminological*

¹⁵ Of course, one gets oneself into unsolvable antinomies with the way in which one tries to theologially make the almightiness and benevolence of God, both at the same time, compatible with the evil in this world. I personally believe that the evil in the world exists neither due to God's will nor due to His allowance but due to a metaphorical necessity of existence that just as necessarily and in the context of a tendency in the world to always raise the same thing even more, to better, to reconcile, and that above all conscious human tendency in that direction, there is a more general higher Godly one that reaches into the infinite in which just the benevolence of God rests; this is not the place to further explain or justify this as this is not a matter of proving thing of benevolence but to explain the term beauty in relation to it. If there is a God and a Godly benevolence, it will only be understood as above if fit shall be understood at all.

subordination does not take anything away from its factual height; as a highest level objectively always remains the highest even though she is terminologically subsumed under a common term with the lower levels; yes, without this it could not even rate highest.

If one wants to explain the ethical good as that part of human attitude and will that accords to the Godly will, this explanation does not contradict the above objective one but can only be appropriate in religion. One will still always have to ask: What does accord to the godly will? And even if one deems this question essentially answered from above with the 10 commandments and the word of the bible: “love God above all and you neighbor like yourself”, one could still ask for a connecting viewpoint of these commandments and for a clear interpretation of these words for which the principle of the good needs to be defined from somewhere else.

The goodness of a thing does not necessarily determine its beauty but it can contribute to it insofar as the pleasure effect of relations and consequences that determine the goodness of a thing are a source of delight, that will be discussed in more depth later (under IX.), by means of imaginative associations that have become familiar and are transferred to the immediate impression of the thing. Conversely, beauty is not needed for goodness but beauty can, if it is there, help to substantiate goodness insofar the immediate pleasure effect does belong to the total pleasure effect on which the term good rests but which it does not determine alone and against a predominating displeasure effect of the consequences. The ugly can also be said to be good, like an ill-tasting and ill-looking medication under the premise that its immediate displeasure effect is surpassed by the elimination of greater displeasure consequences.

Insofar after the above beauty as well as good can be used in very different ways, the rule of use for us will be the following: We will define it narrower or broader according to the

expansion or reduction of the circle of investigation and we will define it in the broadest sense as long as no limiting conditions are asserted or explicitly claimed.

The following remarks can further explain and reinforce the fact that the broadest terminological definitions of beauty and good, as they have been posited above, are really nothing else than the explication of the broadest active linguistic and terminological use.

Common man uses after all only the term beautiful out of all aesthetic categories because he does not feel like getting involved with finer differentiations of the immediately pleasing in his little developed terminological system; so, beautiful in its broadest sense stands in for all other aesthetic categories for him. Indeed, one never hears him say: this is agreeable, appealing, graceful, lovely, cute; he always only says: this is beautiful.

But also the more educated, who know about the finer differentiations, like to use the term beautiful in its greatest breadth in many cases that are not about the explicit assertion of these differentiations, and say accordingly: that tastes beautiful, smells beautiful, talk of a beautiful tone, beautiful weather, a beautiful idea, a beautiful proof, all of which does not suit the narrower definition of beauty that is adhered to by the aesthetic of higher style and according to which neither the merely sensuously pleasing nor the things that fall completely under the inner mental realm are subsumed under the term beautiful.

The case of the *good* is very equivalent to the case of beauty. The expressions useful, advantageous, appropriate, valuable, salubrious are not heard by the common man, he has for all practical categories only the same expression good as for all aesthetic ones the expression beautiful; like *blessing* for great abundance of the good; the most general meaning is in both cases the most common. The educated use of language and terms has the differentiation between the practical and aesthetic categories, too, but often cannot escape the broadest version of the

term good just as little as the one of beauty because a general label for the things that give pleasure under consideration of the relations and consequences are often just necessary and since the differentiation of the minor terms and nuances is of no interest there.

One can say equivalent things about the relation between the two primary categories beauty and good as one can say about the relation of the primary categories to the subordinate categories. In ordinary life, they are distinguished just in the sense described above.

Thus, one says in daily conversation to another: “it is beautiful that you came”¹⁶ if one wants to give expression to the immediate pleasure that the coming of the other elicits; “it is good that you came” if one thinks about the consequences of his coming in the sense of pleasure or the prevention of displeasure. – One talks of beautiful weather or good weather, depending on whether one wants to denote its immediately enjoyable impression or the enjoyable consequences that it promises. – One calls the same painting beautiful that another calls good. Basically, they want to express the same thing, but one focuses on the immediate pleasure that the presence of the painting gives, the other focuses on its ability to bring pleasure under the required circumstances without implying any of its present pleasure effect, - One calls a house beautifully built if it is built under such conditions and is adorned in such a way that it immediately grants pleasure by looking at it. But such a house could be built in a way that makes it collapse over our heads one day or another or that its use would cause discomfort that is greater than the pleasure that its looks grant. But then we would not be able to call it well built; but we would also not find it beautiful if its bad construction was apparent from the immediate impression because we would transfer the displeasure of the consequences to it by association. – I once heard someone say “If one curls the grapevine, the grapes ripen earlier and become

¹⁶ *Translator’s note:* this phrase was literally translated and is as such commonly used in German

bigger.” “That may all be beautiful,”¹⁷ replies the other; “but I do not think it good; it will suffer from this unnatural treatment and one will lose more than one gains in the end.” With the expression beautiful he denoted the immediate pleasure gain, with the expression good the total gain including the consequences. – If a thing that has caused us difficulties for a longer period of time is finally set right, is finally resolved, or an evil that has tortured us for a longer period of time is finally eliminated, one will still not say: “now it’s beautiful” despite the immediate pleasure but “now it’s good”; insofar as the relation between the success and the process, if elimination and the consequence of the resolved difficulties or evils becomes even more tangible than the present and enjoyable success.

As the immediate pleasure effects come into consideration for goodness wherever they are present, they will of course also be the *only* consideration where they are present alone or where there is no reason to think about the consequences in the sense of pleasure and displeasure apart from them. And so one uses good and beautiful with the same meaning in such cases and says that tastes good, smells good just as often as that tastes beautiful, that smells beautiful; that works well as often as that works beautifully.

On the other hand, one can, according to the above-mentioned remarks, find an institution or action that one calls good according to its presumed consequences also beautiful insofar one imagines its relation to its consequences in such a way that it generates an immediate impression of pleasure. To retain terminological clarity, one needs to keep in mind from which point of view one calls the same thing once beautiful, once good, and one will always find the given distinction between the two terms confirmed.

¹⁷ *Translator’s note:* again, the translation is literal and in German, the term beautiful is naturally applied here whereas the term well would be the one used in English here

The term goodness stands in closest relation to the term value. In brief, value is the measure of goodness. As such it is a measure of the pleasure effect that we apply to the things, actions and events also considering that prevented or elevated displeasure is equal to created pleasure. In other words: We ascribe a certain value to things and events according to the contribution they make to human happiness or the prevention of unhappiness.

The fact that we cannot mathematically gauge the pleasure effect¹⁸ does not change the term value; we also cannot simply gauge the value of things mathematically, both deficiencies of measurement, if one wants to consider them as such, are not only parallel, they come down to the same thing. But we can achieve a certain guess of value within the limits of certainty in art after sensible contemplation, in part through the feelings that result from the collective experiences and lessons which is in general much more determining and often much more secure than the former, and we need to be satisfied with this insofar we cannot push certainty any further. One practices daily, by the hour, looking at everything that he encounters with regard to its proportional contribution to the proliferation, conservation, or reduction of human happiness, in brief to its pleasure and displeasure effect. Pleasure and displeasure consequences are calculated for the total of successes in his feelings without his knowledge, such that this results in the determination of these things' values, he himself does not know how, and often his intellect does not seem to have contributed to it; meanwhile the latter does not need to be idly present everywhere nor should it. In the meantime, the means that the individual has to achieve these correct valuations do not go far and thus he relies mainly on valuations that have emerged

¹⁸ An actually mathematical (undoubtedly a psychophysically possible) measure of the intensity of pleasure and displeasure should only be found in the context of an insight into the general root cause for pleasure and displeasure. Until then, there can only be estimates of more or less

through experience and contemplation of an aggregate throughout history; to this, he can himself contribute to make them rest on firmer ground or to change them.

Whether one wants to refer the term value to the perquisites for pleasure or to pleasure itself is objectively indifferent as one pits the perquisites only against their pleasure effect. The value or non-value of a pleasure, however, based on which it deserves to be strived for or not, is according to the general principle of goodness not to be pitted against its own size alone but also against the size of the pleasure or displeasure of which it can be considered the source. Accordingly, we say that a pleasure is a source of pleasure or displeasure as far as its existence is tied to conditions that cause pleasure or displeasure, like e.g., the pleasure of doing well is tied to drives that are suitable to heighten the pleasure in the world, the pleasure of cruelties to drives that are suitable to lower them; the pleasure of modest pleasures with a conservation of the human that enables him to enjoy and create pleasure in the future, the pleasure of immodest pleasure to a disorder of health through which even greater displeasure is elicited. We have to declare a pleasure bad, of negative value even, insofar the requirement is met that it, according to its perquisites and conditions, creates greater displeasure than pleasure or hinders greater pleasure from being realized than it carries itself. These consequences, however, if one truly wants to understand value in its most general sense, relate not only to the pleasure state of the human in question but the pleasure state of humankind. Like this, displeasure can gain a greater value than pleasure if it can surpass itself by greater pleasure consequences or by preventing greater displeasure consequences. And if an exact estimate of it is, as admitted, not possible, the estimated value needs in principle to be taken from this point of view because every other guess will be at least as imprecise and less clear.

The pleasure of the evil and the pleasure from the evil have, according to this, not the same value given the same size than the one of the good and the pleasure from the good, insofar as each pleasure according to the nature of evil and good itself is mainly connected with displeasure and pleasure consequences respectively. The happy state of evil preserves it in its evil inclinations, and thus strengthens, a source of general displeasure. In contrast, the punishment of the evil, godly and manmade, gains value, even though it causes direct displeasure, not according to the empty principle of retaliation or the dogmatic principle of atonement, where a question about the why always remains backward-oriented, but insofar as it betters, prevents, deters the evil, in short it controls the evil as source of displeasure; and the more of these conditions it unites, the greater will its value be.¹⁹

Even higher pleasure (pleasure of a higher character) only has greater value as lower ones insofar it is at the same time the source of more pleasure. The child's pleasure of its innocent game, the pleasure of the diligent worker of his simple meal, however, even though lower, are still more valuable than the pleasure of a bad intrigue or from an indecent romance.

In general, the breadth of the term value follows the different breadths under which the term good falls and vice versa; according to this, value is often only determined by a limited circle of relations and consequences that one is aware of at the moment, including the immediate pleasure effect. If one conceives of pleasure not only in the lower and common sense, if one does not only gauge the conditions of pleasure and displeasure by its presupposed effect in individual egoistic momentary pleasure and displeasure, but also by its presupposed total effect on the whole, one will have the true and full value of these conditions from the highest and most

¹⁹ I think one will only be able to go beyond the currently prevalent on-sidedness regarding the interpretation of its principle when one will have learned to grasp the value of the punishment according to the above aspect.

general point of view. An absolute estimate of the true value of things and conditions is certainly an ideal; but it is easy to say that virtue is truly more valuable than vice and relative judgments are easier made than absolute ones in any case.

We can attribute greater value to the agreeable and the beautiful in the narrower sense than to that which is useful due to its consequences, first, because the immediate pleasure effect of the agreeable and the beautiful surpasses the total pleasure effect of the useful, which according to its definition is only of limited consideration, second, because the term beauty in the narrow sense, true beauty, includes the additional consideration of the pleasure in consequences as co-determinants. True beauty can be more useful by means of the stimulation it provides in a good sense than that which is or is called useful. In contrast, the good in a narrower and higher sense, the morally and godly good, to humans seems to be that which has and awards the highest value compared to anything because it contains the most general and firmest conditions for conserving a thriving state of humankind altogether. Without intellectual contemplations, humans feel the guarantee for this relationship in the attitude and conduct of the moral human, insofar as it depends on human will and action and accordingly the contrary in the immoral.

We see, for example, someone who is funny, witty, smooth-mannered, intelligent, beautiful; who does not want to be like this human, who does not envy him all the pleasure that he gathers and distributes so effortlessly. But now there is this: he is a bad human, wanton, hard against his own, disingenuous; and he is lost to our opinion and respect; even when he entertains us, hosts, an eerie feeling creeps up on us. We very well feel that all pleasure that his humor, his mind, his smooth manners immediately give to him and the others do not weigh as much as the displeasure that his wantonness will cause for himself by its consequences, as much as the sad hours that he creates for his wife and his cohabitants, as much as the unhappiness that he brings

to other through his disingenuousness. All that pleasure to us seems only like the white foam on top of a dark puddle of displeasure. We do not tell this to ourselves in the individual case, of course: but a feeling that was educated by uncounted experiences and lessons has the power to unite all that intellect could say individually in one result.

Now let us imagine in comparison a dry, settled, even pedantic man with plain appearance who does not know how to entertain well but who does fulfill his duties, maintains his office orderly, furthers community and useful institutions to the best of his ability, lives peacefully with his wife and educates his children well, who does not contribute to others enjoyment with intellectual means, which he does not possess, but with material ones as much as he can, of course we do not want to be as dry and pedantic as he is; but when comparing his value with the former, we will not hesitate a moment to put him above the former, we will think more highly of him than that one; thinking highly is but valuing; - as we do well feel how much more pleasure results from his behavior in the end than from the one of the former.

But we do not only value a man's characteristics insofar as they can be summarized under the term moral; the world holds all that in high esteem which, coming from a human, brings a wealth of pleasure of higher character into the world; and yet, the right feeling knows how to place the higher still above the high. How highly esteemed is Goethe, despite the fact that he was not bigger than so many unimportant minds morally speaking. How highly valued is a female singer if she is beautiful and sings beautifully even if one does not know a thing about her morals. And even if one knows that she is a bit careless, one forgives her many a thing because of her beauty and her beautiful singing and would rather be this careless, just not bad, being than a so-called moral oil can. Why? Because the former is a vivid gusher of pleasure and the other is a dry puddle. The measure of pleasure extends to everything. But when the same singer that

charms us with her singing and grace seems at the same time demure and noble in character, how unspeakably higher do we place her then than the careless one who throws herself away and than the oil can. We feel that the world will herewith gain endlessly more pleasure than through a single licentiousness of the one and the good stupid will of the other.

Consciousness which ascertains one of one's own goodness gives one a feeling of security beyond all that at first comes out of one's actions and is the most valuable feeling due to its immediate quality as well as due to its consequences. There is nothing similar neither in the feeling of one's own beauty nor in the beauty of something else. What we have of it now, we have; the rest remains undecided; unless a character of goodness develops in me.

If some people struggle against the eudemonistic basic feature that runs through the entire terminological system above and that is necessarily tied to an ethic system of equivalent character, they should think about whether they would not come to the same ethical inferences with another terminological system, just on a less clear path, and about whether their reluctance against the introduction of the term pleasure into the practical and therewith ethical categories is not simply tied to a limited interpretation of that term that one is always tempted to transfer from real life into science despite opposing claims according to which he then of course makes room for ethically impermissible conclusions. In any case, the terminological system above does not carry such; and as the following will essentially not be concerned with it, with ethics, I can circumvent justifying this system for ethics, too; but one will find a few discussions along these lines at the end of this section (see 4). So we could not totally leave the discussion of practical categories aside here because they, even though they do not provide the highest viewpoint on aesthetics, still convert themselves into aesthetic categories in the above briefly mentioned and

later (see IX.) to be elaborated way and therewith they can engage in aesthetics even though the term good contributes as co-determinant to the narrowest version of beauty.

Lotze, whose views share their eudemonistic basic feature with ours²⁰, puts the terms pleasure, beauty, good, value in completely different relations to one another than has been described here. He makes beauty dependent on the morally good to begin with instead of looking at both in their common dependence on the term pleasure, as we have done, by declaring that beautiful is²¹ what mirrors the rhythm (the structure of the process) and the relationships in which the morally good develops and moves in us and beyond us in the godly world order and guidance. He views the pleasure effect of external things and events, through which they gain their pleasing impression, so to say merely the stamp of their “own perfection”, which stems from the fact that they bear something of that rhythm, those relationships, reflect them in us, without therewith needing to carry the real content of the morally good.²² He only grants a fundamental value to this moral good itself, only a value that is derived from it. He ties the pleasure term of highest potential (the one of bliss) to the term good as the one of the valuable per se, that we herewith find ourselves confronted with, by means of the following explanation (Mikrok. III. 60S)²³: “The enjoyed bliss is good by itself; the goods that we call such are means to achieve this good but not the good itself before they are transformed into their enjoyment;

²⁰ Decisive expressions in this regard can be found, amongst others, in Mikrokosm. II. 304.

²¹ Abb. üb. d. Begr. d. Seh. 15 or Gesch. 97.

²² Gesch. 100. 23-2. 234. 265. 286. 293. 487.

²³ If there is another decisive explanation of this in Lotze, as one needs to presume, I have missed it in my searches.

good, however, is only the active love that wants the bliss of others.”²⁴ I cannot go deeper into the explication of this here.

There is a term that is often used for the consequence that, viewed from one side, rather bends towards the aesthetic and, viewed from the other side, rather bends towards the practical side. We can find many things interesting that we do not want to call either pretty or beautiful. Undoubtedly, one will tend to count this category much rather as positive than as negative; and yet even something ugly can be interesting; how is that right? – The answer is this: finding something interesting means nothing more than that we like to engage with something from this or that angle while we do not need to like it like the pretty or the beautiful. Rather, depending on the circumstances, interest can be linked to this or that characteristic; and even the allure of novelty can make a thing interesting as it is new to us, like the ugly Pastrana²⁵. But also the benefit or harm that a thing provides or promises from any one viewpoint can spur our interest; and in sayings like: someone has his own interest in mind, the term interest coincides with the benefit or advantage itself.

The term truth along with the terms beauty and good is summarized as a kind of trinity everywhere. Let us here go into its relations to these terms briefly.

Plainly, absolutely, objectively true is a notion that co-exists uncontradicted with every other real or possibly imaginable notion or which belongs to the total circle of uncontradicted notions; it is called sure in the knowledge that the perquisites of truth are met. According to the

²⁴ *Translator’s note:* Original quotation “Gut an sich ist die genossene Seligkeit; die Güter, die wir so nennen, sind Mittel zu diesem Gut, aber nicht selbst das Gut, ehe sie in ihren Genuss verwandelt sind ; gut aber ist nur die lebendige Liebe, welche die Seligkeit Anderer will.”

²⁵ Julia Pastrana (1834 – 25 March 1860) was a performer and singer during the 19th century and thus likely known to Fechner’s readers. He here refers to her as “ugly” because her face and body were covered in hair due to a genetic condition, hypertrichosis terminalis, and her ears and nose were unusually large, and her teeth were irregular.

fact that the term of the plainly true and certain suffers some limitations or is only grasped conditionally, like just applied regarding certain areas of imagination or imagining beings, more or less relatively valid categories of truth and certainty stand in for the absolute ones and those can be summarized together with the absolute ones as theoretical, as there are: internally true, externally true, subjectively certain, right, exact, apt, convincing, reliable, undoubtedly, believable, probable, etc., of positive character for which there are no fewer negative equivalents.

At first, one misses a relation between the true and beauty and good in these definitions; but if such a relation does not immediately appear in the term, it will appear as fundamental in the fact; and if we could define beauty and good in relation to the last general reason for pleasure that is unknown to us, then one will also find a terminological relation to truth in that. Indeed, an innate feeling of pleasure is directly bound to understanding the truth and the finding of truths that serves as driving force of the sciences and seems to be the fruit of the fulfillment of an important demand in the arts. Yet, only true insights can lead to good practical consequences such that, conversely, the truth of an insight can be deduced according to a very general principle from its goodness; I will not go deeper into this here.²⁶

Goodness is after all like the serious man and organizer of the entire household, who considers present and future as one, near and far, and seeks to conserve the advantage according to all relations; beauty is his blossoming wife who cares about the present under consideration of her husband's will, the agreeable is the child that enjoys the sensuous pleasures and games of the individual; the useful is the servant who assists his masters and only receives bread according to his performance. Truth, finally, appears as preacher and teacher of the family, as preacher in

²⁶ Comparisons hereof in »drei .Motive u. Gr. des Gl.« p. 120.

faith and as teacher in knowledge; it lends its eye to goodness, leads the hand of the useful and holds up the mirror to beauty.

3) Aesthetic, Aesthetics

We will still have to explain the term of the aesthetic and of aesthetics as the science of the aesthetic, that have only been mentioned in passing so far, in more depth and therewith to more definitely confine the field in which the observations of this work will remain.

According to etymology and the initial explanation of Baumgarten (to whom the science of aesthetic dates back) and Kant aesthetic is that which can be perceived with the sense altogether without considering likability or dislikability, which is a terminological explanation that quite a few others have followed later, without that the explication of aesthetics would have followed it. Indeed, how far would aesthetics have to extend to one side and how narrow would it have to contract itself to another if it should fulfill this terminological definition without exceeding it. The entire relations between sensory perception to the relation of itself to the physiological and physical conditions, from which it can barely be distinguished, would belong to it, but Goethe's Faust and the Sistine Madonna would be nothing that moves the senses, nothing that would undergo aesthetic observation. One has never conceived of aesthetics as so broad according to one and so narrow according to another side, and it has not even been conceived like that by Baumgarten. Rather, it has been translated into the current version by him due to the fact that he has raised beauty, as the perfection of sensory perception, to the chief subject of the investigation and by adding considerations that go beyond the conditions of purely sensory perception. According to this, one can posit that from the start until today the science has strongly asserted the relation to liking and disliking in the use of the term aesthetic as well as in its explanation even though not always in its definition.

Thus, one now understands aesthetic altogether as that which refers to the relations between immediate liking and disliking of that which enters us through the senses without simply having their purely sensuous side in mind, as it is rather the relations of the sensory, like in music, and imaginations of association that immediately merge with the sensuous. It is like words in poetry and shapes in visual arts where finally relations of these imaginations are pulled into the realm of the aesthetic insofar all of this is tied to liking and disliking. Depending on the narrower use of the aesthetic, one even excludes that which is able to elicit liking or disliking merely through its sensuous or little extended effect from the term aesthetic, to only understand from higher viewpoints that which is according to higher relations immediately liked or disliked as aesthetic. Like this, one does not conceive of, e.g., the enjoyable impression that a full tone, a deep saturated color, the pleasant smell of a flower, the good taste of a meal can elicit without any connection to imagination as nothing aesthetic. Yes, one would even consider the impression of a simple accord as well as the kaleidoscopic figure as still too low, as not aesthetic. And thus, one only admits the observations of all these into aesthetics only under the term agreeable, rather as an explicit exclusion from the term of the actual aesthetic than as an integration.

Now, one has to admit that these common restrictions to the aesthetic confirm not only common use in life but also to the generally most common use in science. In the latter, these restrictions are insisted on emphatically. But not every view on aesthetics has changed itself accordingly, and with a little more general version of it, it is simply impossible to stick to it for two reasons. There are enough viewpoints that spread across lower and higher liking and both can combine to a greater and higher product (according to section V.). Let us comply with the more general version in the following and only use the narrower version according to the narrowing of the observations without generally restricting ourselves to it; this, by the way, does

not have the purpose to reform the use in everyday life or to defy the narrower use for an a priori narrower circle of investigation.

Certainly, aesthetics is nowadays still not explained with explicit reference to liking and disliking, pleasure and displeasure everywhere; insofar one explains it as a science of beauty, while making the term beauty dependent on other terms, like idea, perfection, etc., as briefly mentioned above. As aesthetics, in fact in every version that could be found so far, predominantly or preferentially addresses those sides of things that are suitable to elicit liking or disliking, and as these terms themselves, that played a role in the initial explanation, find their main use in this direction, it seems indeed best to make this aspect the main one for the definition of aesthetics to from the start denote the direction of its main task. And if this is not in the interest of the aesthetics from Above, I seek in the fact that it does not hit the nail on the head, as in earlier remarks, the reason that the nail takes a more or less crooked path, i.e., one does not get to know what matters for liking and disliking things, but only in how far something subordinates to the idealistic views that are placed at the top for which the term liking and disliking are only incidental.

From a certain perspective, it would be desirable to be able to use the expression aesthetic with a different twist than it has taken through its relation to liking and disliking, yet this relation stands too firm in the prevailing linguistic and terminological use and a different expression would be needed as a replacement. Each object that we interact with takes on a meaning for us, through this interaction, that goes beyond its sensory impression. This meaning makes itself known with each impression as we will discuss in depth in section 9. Like this, we do not see a crown merely as a yellow stripe with some elevations but at the same time as a thing that is destined to cover the head of a king. Undoubtedly, one may wish to label such impressions that

are comprised of a sensory and an associative meaning with a certain word; but there is no word for it if one does not want to use an aesthetic one; therewith, however, the relation to likability and dislikability would vanish; as enough of these impressions are indifferent; the liked and disliked ones merely form a special section of them and could then also be treated as part of a special section of an aesthetic that rests on the previous general term for the sake of preferential interests.

In principle, this is C. Hermann's position on the aesthetic and aesthetics that he advocates in his *Layout of the general aesthetic*²⁷ 1857 (Fr. Fleischer) and in his *aesthetic science of color*²⁸ 1876 (M. Schäfer); I cannot think of any objection against the postulation of such a theory of which our aesthetics would in some sense only be a special section, insofar as one does not want to lay out the direct impressions without associated meanings. Meanwhile Hermann solely relies on the result of the association principle without going into the development of the principle itself, and, on the whole, he follows the path from Above rather than from Below, and as such our concurrence with him remains partial. Also, a theory that, like ours, places the notion of liking and disliking at the top and only considers associated meanings with regard to their contribution to liking and disliking, necessarily needs to take a slightly different turn as one that places the notion of a co-determination of sensory impressions by a meaning on top and considers likability and dislikability only in a subordinate way.

Undoubtedly, one could think of an even greater generalization of the term aesthetic while retaining the relation to pleasure and displeasure. Namely, that one would understand as aesthetic per se everything that relates to pleasure and displeasure regardless of whether the

²⁷ *Translator's note:* Original title "Grundriss d. allg. Aesthetik"

²⁸ *Translator's note:* Original title "ästhetischen Farbenlehre"

impressions stem from the outside world and occur immediately, would understand aesthetics altogether as a science that pursues the entire conditions of pleasure and displeasure in the world, internal as well as external, in terms of their relations, concatenations, modes of development, and modes of intervention. And as one can conceive of a term that can be understood in this way, and as the idea of such a comprising theory of pleasure and displeasure can be posited, a scientific need to use these expressions in this broadest sense can emerge if no others can be found for it. In the meantime, to my knowledge, the term aesthetic has never been used in this way. For the general science of knowledge, the expression hedonic has already been proposed.²⁹ In any case, we are not concerned with such a general science here and so we will only use the term aesthetic in such a greatest breadth only when the terminological circumstances lead to such an exception and make it automatically understandable.

Among many, there are two ways of classifying the inner life of humans that are entwined and to be, in short, distinguished according to sides and levels. According to the first, there is one side of feeling and imagination together with that which arises from them in terms of memories, terms, etc., one side of instinct and will, and one side of feeling pleasure and displeasure that is rooted in or co-determines the first side which sets the drives and stands mediating between the two. According to the second way of classification, one distinguishes a lower sensuous and a higher intellectual level that one can neither structure nor mediate via intermediate levels. Aesthetics in our view refers to the side of pleasure and displeasure, insofar as these depend on imaginations and feelings that are elicited externally, but at the same time

²⁹ One can find the main aspects of such a theory, without using the term hedonism for it, in Hartsen's »Grundzügen der Wissenschaft des Glücks. Halle. Pfeffer. 1869« and his »Anfängen der Lebensweisheit. Lpz. Thomas 1874«, works with who's pure path from Below and eudemonic tendency I find myself in complete accordance with.

extends through the lower and higher fields, insofar the higher connections of these feelings and imaginations fall within its scope according to their pleasure and displeasure content.

Herbart includes ethics in aesthetics and if one wants to elevate the latter to a general hedonic, which Herbart did not do, the former belongs to it from an eudemonic point of view. Apart from that, it will in my opinion always be preferable to separate aesthetics and ethics according to the above-mentioned views on beauty and goodness, rather than to pool from the view that Herbart takes, which does not prevent us to become aware of these and other points of connection between the two. It is true that the morally good, conceived without side-contemplations, elicits immediate delight, and it is the same with beauty. But aside from the fact that the morally good is a purely internal thing, which beauty in its narrower sense is not, goodness is not called good insofar it elicits immediate delight from the right point of view; this is a side-effect, it is so to say external to it; but the good is called good insofar it is the source of fruitful consequences in the sense stated on p. 19, independent on how it appears to the observer. From this, and not from the aspect of its immediate pleasure, one needs to deduce the moral laws and demands under consideration of the experiential nature of humankind and things. In doing so, one will of course also find Herbart's ethical displeasure term again but one will not find reason to include the developments in its framework and to respond to its discussion from Herbart's point of view.

Is there a conscious mind that rules and connects the whole world, in short, is there a God above the world from whom all of our finite conscious minds have either flown out or of whom they are a subordinate part, and if one wants to dare to think of the Godly mind based on the generalization and enhancement of the fundamental conditions of our minds – yet we do not have another indication of imagination hereof or reason for this conclusion – one would also

need to think of a side of pleasure and displeasure in Him and of that which he likes and dislikes about this world. One talks about this, too, because one does not know how to deal without an anthropomorphism that one has basically discarded. If one was serious about the generalization and enhancement based on the fact that the finite mind as spawn of the Godly, one could be dissimilar to it in scope and height but not in its fundamental nature; and if one followed, after ascension from below, the side of pleasure and displeasure from its highest scale in the Godly mind backwards, in connection with the likewise climbed highest ideas of goodness and truth, one would reach an aesthetics from Above in which beauty would appear clearly tractable in its relation to the Godly that one likes to ascribe to it so much. But as not even the point of view of such a reasoning about aesthetics from Above is admitted or clarified, all talk about an explanation of beauty in God remains a euphonious phrase.

4) Eudemonistic principle

We placed aesthetic categories in relation to ethic categories and accordingly aesthetics in relation to ethics based on a eudemonic point of view (setting happiness, pleasure as the goal), and I do not know how this could be accomplished more objectively or more clearly. The prejudice against the subordination of ethics under a eudemonic viewpoint is anyway so common and so strong for some people that it could easily stand in the way of the entire terminological system above based on its plausibility; therefore, I seek to contribute something to the explanation and support of this viewpoint, as we have adopted it, by additionally clarifying a few not always clearly stated points. Of course, this prejudice depends to a great extent only on the fact that one does not properly divide the justly subjective (egoistic) eudemonism and the objective (universal) one, which is the only one we consider here, and partially it depends on

conceiving the anchor point of the eudemonistic system, the term pleasure, as too low and too narrow; but psychological ambiguities contribute, too. However, first the following.

Our notion of an action that needs to be taken (or to be abstained from respectively) can have an air of pleasure or displeasure and every conscious drive or anti-drive for an action is determined and governed by this, the more so the more conscious it is; therefore, one literally calls the conscious drives and anti-drives for an action pleasure and displeasure. If conscience can get us to do something against our pleasure, i.e., to do it despite the imagination that the to be done is afflicted with displeasure from any side, this is only the case insofar imagining not taking this action is associated with more displeasure from the conscience; and there are countless similar conflicts.

In very many cases, the pleasure and displeasure that determine the conscious drives and anti-drives of our actions depend on imagining the pleasure and displeasure that will result from our actions; but the pleasure and displeasure that are merely a product of our imagination need to be distinguished from the pleasure and displeasure that are a moment of feeling the imagination itself and this does not always clearly happen. Yes, we can imagine a pleasure that we cannot obtain along with the feeling of displeasure, and we can imagine a displeasure that we hope to escape along with a feeling of pleasure. But fundamentally, i.e., necessarily and immediately, it is always a moment of feeling pleasure and displeasure that determines the drive and anti-drive of actions, and this moment of feeling an imagination can be determined by the imagined success of pleasure or displeasure, but it can also, on the contrary, be co-determined or determined by itself. Thus, we can have an intuitive innate reluctance to do or to refrain from doing something without thinking of the consequent pleasure or displeasure; in fact, a psychological aftereffect based on experienced pleasure and displeasure plays an important role for determining our

present drives even without remembering or re-simulation of these experiences; and the example powerfully intervenes maybe also for an intuitive reason; we love to do what we see others do given otherwise equal circumstances. The educational means of our drives lie at the same time in their previous moments of definition. It may be disputable how much of some drives, namely the ones of conscience, is innate or acquired; anyway, education has always contributed to them.

There should be nothing that can be said against the plausibility of the previous definitions. Now, the eudemonic principle as understood here rests on nothing but the fact that it also sets the goal of the drives in front of our eyes, which is the same thing as that which necessarily determines every conscious drive, and it demands that the education of all diverse drives focuses on the fulfillment of these goals. This, amongst the allegation of solidarity in which the well-being of the individual shows itself all the more together with the well-being of the whole, fulfills the principle all the more completely the further it is pursued in its consequences.

Favoritism for one's own well-being over the well-being of others is just as little in accordance with this principle as is the sacrifice of one's own well-being for that of others. Because one's own well-being itself is part of the common well-being, and thus everybody may and should pursue his own well-being in moderation so as not to shorten the well-being of the whole, as this will create no more disadvantages for others than it creates advantages for him. He can, however, according to this relation, care better for himself than others can let themselves being taken care of, and conversely others care better for others than they can care for themselves. Now, law has under consideration of historical, national and even more specific conditions, and ethics from a more general point of view that exceeds this one, has to weigh rights and duties and establish laws that, by binding and restricting the individual's judgments,

conserve the cohesion of everyone's actions towards the best. There is already something good in the commonality of the adherence to a law; as it is better if everyone who belongs to a given circle follows an existing law together and consistently, even if it was not the best, it only needs to be not worse than if everyone would act without law according to what is best in his opinion.

Undoubtedly, the drives of humankind are from the start much rather directed at one's own well-being than at the well-being of the whole or at the far-away re-gaining of one's own well-being from the whole, so they are not determined in accordance with the principle above. To educate people in this sense, we should use the same means that were used everywhere and all along where one talked about education, just fit to the principle, example, praise, reproach, reward, punishment, reference to God's anger and liking, threat and promise beyond this life; to this, the awakened insight about nature, the demands and the conclusions of the principle need to be added. The highest aim of this education, however, will not be that which is prescribed by an impractical doctrinaire rigorousness, which can be posited on paper but is not in humankind's nature, that one bans consideration of one's own advantage completely from one's motivations, but that one does not completely cut off the consideration of one's own well-being from the consideration of the well-being of the whole, neither in one's immediate feeling nor with regard to the consequences. For this to happen, however, one on one hand also finds in the feeling of love for others one's own happiness in working for the happiness of others and beyond that feels the higher feeling of satisfaction of conscience that can be amplified to a motivation that exceeds any other in strength and height by the feeling to also please God. On the other hand, this also requires the experienced view that here already the good and bad consequences of one's actions fall back to humans, the more certainly so the longer they are going on, supplemented by the belief that the principle of retaliation stretches from this life to the next and will be completed

there. On top of that, one needs to awaken and strengthen the belief in God and the next life in the correct sense; among the principles of the right faith, however, needs to be the one that He is the one who satisfies and guides humankind best.

Indeed, it is an empty delusion that one can correctly and fully educate either the people or the man of higher education, or that they can educate themselves without the addition of religious motivations according to the principle; without it, this stays an uncovered remainder according to highest and final relations that cannot be covered with all the sermons on humanism; or what considerable thing has one ever achieved with this. Thus, if the principle is to gain practical meaning, it can only be in a context in which the all-excelling, in the end only resounding religious motivations regain world-shaking strength, and with who's weakening the abuse of reason competes with dogmas that contradict it.

I have discussed the things that seem to generally apply to these notions more deeply in the works "Über das höchste Gut" (a discussion of which with Ulrici can be found in Fichte's *philos. Zeitschr.* 1848. S. 163.) and „Die Drei Motive und Gründe des Glaubens“.

III. Aesthetic Laws or Principles in General

In the interest of a coherent character of the entire aesthetics, it would be desirable that all laws of liking and disliking that belong to it can be represented as special cases of one most general law. Should there be such a one, it remains in the dark for us until now, just as a most general and final reason for all pleasure and displeasure to which it is naturally connected.

Admittedly, one has placed the well-known principle of unity in variety that does not prevent the formulation of any law on top of the entire aesthetics; and surely it is one of the most important principles; we will discuss it later; but I would not know how to get by only with this one. How

could one, for example, explain that our liking of the resolution of a dissonance by a consonance is not the same if we switch the order of accords; that we get used to nasty things and that we can get weary of the most beautiful, that there is a too much and a too little everywhere that we dislike, etc.

Zimmermann, one of the main spokesmen of contemporary aesthetics, author of a history and of a system of aesthetics, hale and powerful in aesthetic criticism, has postulated for this law two to be fundamental for aesthetics as a whole, one decisively quantitative, one qualitative; they read:

1) Principle of the so-called perfection: “the stronger imagination is liked when placed next to the weaker imagination, the weaker one is disliked next to the stronger imagination”

2) “The predominant identity of the form’s elements is liked, the predominant opposite of them is definitely disliked.”

Even with those two laws, I would not know how to get by in aesthetics; I would not even know how to agree with them, undoubtedly because I cannot agree with Herbart’s philosophy in which they are rooted; of course, one should not dispute this here. I just want to mention one curiosity that struck me regarding the first law and link it to a few remarks that we can then spare ourselves later.

One main prediction of this law is the law that Herbart has already named and is accepted by Zimmermann: “The big is liked next to the small, the small is disliked next to the big.” In contrast, Burke, who could of course not study Herbart yet, starts the enumeration of characteristics that makes something beautiful in his essay “On the Beautiful and the Sublime” with the sentence: “beautiful objects are comparatively small”, and he even has an entire chapter with the heading “Beautiful Objects Small”, in which he, among other things, argues, remarks: “I

am told that, in most languages, the objects of love are spoken of under diminutive epithets. It is so in all languages of which I have any knowledge.”³⁰

Now, one can, according to an ancillary principle that Zimmermann occasionally brings up, trace liking of the small back to the characteristic of smallness that the smaller possesses to a greater extent³¹ or that it deviates more strongly from the middle than the less small, in short that it is something bigger in the negative sense. Only for clarity and to avoid the accusation that one moves within contradictory notions, it is advisable to declare that which deviates more strongly from the middle to one or the other side as the better liked. For this, the facts that were brought forward by Burke and Zimmermann are indeed equally striking from different sides. But surely, a third one could come along, despite Zimmermann and Burke, and declare the right middle between big and small as the most liked and he could succeed to bring along no less convincing facts.

Ages ago, Venus has fought with Pallas and Juno for the apple of beauty; one sees that she has, according to the above, also to fight with giants and dwarfs because of the beauty of size. Should I be chosen as Paris, I would undoubtedly only need to follow a very general shout to give the prize immediately to her who stands in the middle of the two. But I carry doubt to do this so easily by remembering that I go to a show booth to see a dwarf or a giant but not to see a human of normal height; does this not mean that I must like the sight of them more than the sight of the latter? In the meantime, I also recall that I still prefer to see and converse with humans of normal height surrounding me in normal life than with dwarfs or giants. In short, in exceptional

³⁰ *Translator's note:* Fechner provided a translation of the original English text that has been inserted here.

³¹ Indeed, this corresponds to Zimmermann's explanation in his textbook, p. 39, why despite apparent contradiction with the aesthetic law of the strongest that he proclaims we can like greater leniency more than lesser leniency.

cases I prefer the exceptional and usually I prefer the usual and I do so not only with regard to size but in general; so, one can form a general aesthetic principle out of this that liking and disliking depend only on it, it is one that co-determines everything and that does depend on other co-determinants.

It is even part of enjoying the sublime that it is not merely big but also something exceptional and often other co-determinants play a role. If it now grants us more connecting points for pleasurable activity; we will of course prefer it to the small that can grant less of this in its smallness, but the opposite if the big is a richer source of displeasure than pleasure. To grasp the big requires in itself more activity than to grasp the small, which can be just right for us sometimes but usually only an initiated degree of it appeals to us and the step from sublime to ludicrous is ever so often one that one likes to take.

According to this, I would spilt the apple between the female and male pretender but in such a way that I would only give the outer skin to the giant and only the innermost core to the dwarf.

I want to have insinuated rather than refuted Zimmermann's law with the above and this is why I do not want to calm down completely when it comes to its claim to be a fundamental law; sometimes there will be reason to at least also think about a deviation from the phrasing of the other law. With all appreciation of a limited or dependent validity of both laws, I do not want to find the entire field of aesthetics covered sufficiently.

But I would also not know how to get by with three fundamental laws that might be carved out from the three-part principle of Hegel's philosophy. It is with aesthetics as it is with physics, in which we yet have to make do with a mass of special materials, forces, laws, even if

we presume that there is in the end only one basic material, one basic force, one basic law, of which all physical laws are merely special cases.

Without systematically treating the entirety of laws that can be postulated for aesthetics here, and therewith change the character of a preschool to the one of a school, I do want to put forth a number of these laws here. Partially, I do so to display with that the examples of aesthetic laws from different points of view, partially because of the many and important ways in which we will apply them in the following.

I almost prefer the expression principle to the expression law. Each law is namely a coherent principle for the cases that are subsumed under it, principle, however, is a broader term than law insofar not only legal but also terminological things belong to it. As law places its special cases underneath itself, the term law subsumes this plethora terminologically under itself, and so both cannot be divided. I call the first of the principles or laws that I want to demonstrate aesthetic threshold in short, the second aesthetic aid. I summarize under the label of the three highest formal principles the following three, the one of coherent connection of variety, the one of truth and the one of clarity. The sixth one will be the one of association.

As important as the first two principles are, one does not find them in the textbooks on aesthetics. One can interpret this either as a sign that I am wrong in finding them important or as a sign that the textbooks of aesthetics lack quite a few important things. The others are, by the way, essentially known principles that are merely less developed or used for the application in aesthetics than it will happen here on the path from Below.

Apart from this, one can posit even more laws as aesthetic or use psychological laws for aesthetics, most of which I would know how to introduce merely under a new name, because I do not find an old one for them, as they for the most part still lack sufficient discussion, as there

are: the laws of the emergence of sensuous pleasure and displeasure; of aesthetic contrast, aesthetic consequence, and aesthetic reconciliation; of the scale of activity; of the aesthetic middle; of habituation, blunting, and oversaturation; of pleasure and displeasure from imagining pleasure and displeasure; from imagining their positive and negative relationship to us; from free and from inhibited expression of them; and very well other laws if the former should not suffice; more about this in the following only as needed, as there is reason to apply them, for example. Maybe there will be occasion to go deeper into this later on.

The entirety of these laws can be subordinated to different categories. Partially they refer to conditions of emergence of different kinds of pleasure and displeasure, partially to the quantitative conditions of these, according to which one can distinguish qualitative and quantitative laws. Partially, they are concerned with the native origin of pleasure and displeasure, partially with their dependence on previous pleasure and displeasure; according to which there are primary and secondary laws. Insofar as one distinguishes form and content of things, a distinction that still requires a distinct explanation, one can accordingly also distinguish formal and objective laws.

Of the following laws that will be demonstrated in particular, the first two, the law of threshold and the one of aid, with the law of growth that is mentioned along with it sometimes, provide examples of quantitative laws or principles; the following, the one of coherent connection, of truth and clarity, examples of qualitative laws. These three belong at the same time to the primary and the formal laws, whereas the law of association belongs to the secondary ones.

The clear distinction, clarification and application of the aesthetic laws is complicated by the following three circumstances. For one thing, the preconditions for pleasure and displeasure,

that can be distinguished from some viewpoint, but blend from a different viewpoint, by means of a common momentum, which makes it theoretically not easy and partially impossible to keep them in pure coordination to one another; second, those that can be distinguished from an abstract point of view do not appear so abstract in reality but complicate themselves more or less which makes it in practice difficult to distinguish everywhere what gets on the bill of one or the other precondition and makes it difficult to find pure proofs for the purely conceived. Third, all laws that refer to special preconditions for pleasure are in so far of limited validity as contradictory circumstances prevail and allow contradictory successes, according to which the preconditions can only be discussed under consideration of the possible conflicts between them.

These disadvantages would, in principle, disappear if we could ascend away from the special sources of pleasure and displeasure up to their most general basic conditions that contribute to all of them and only make themselves sources of pleasure and displeasure; but even if this would succeed, which is not the case, one would still be referred back to the application of the special sources and the according special laws of pleasure and displeasure, that we want to look at here, because this most general cause can only be seen as an abstraction that connects all special causes. From this most general cause, we can bridge to special applications via special laws in a similar way as one would also still always have to go back to the applications of special forces and special laws of the forces if the last basic law of physical forces our causes of movement would be known.

As pleasure and displeasure, liking and disliking, are psychological momenta, their according, in short aesthetic, laws naturally subordinate to psychological laws; only that there is no reason to discuss the aesthetic ones in such depth, relation and combination in a psychology of more general scope as it is necessary for the end of aesthetics. Insofar aesthetic laws concern

the effects of the external world on our soul, they can also be regarded as belonging to the external psychophysics that does not pursue less broad interests than aesthetics, demands more exact conditions than was broadly speaking possible in aesthetics so far. Now, one could also wish to know the laws of the dependence of pleasure and displeasure on the states or changes of bodily states that directly underlie these determinants of the soul (so-called psychological ones), too. This is a matter of psychophysics; yes, there is a fundamental need in this regard that cannot yet be fulfilled; and the term aesthetics itself, within our limited discussion here, excludes consideration of the relation between pleasure and displeasure and these inner states and changes about which we can until now only hypothesize in a more or less uncertain way.

IV. Principle of the aesthetic threshold

There is much that leaves us indifferent even though it would by its nature be suited to elicit liking and disliking and does so on different occasions. This depends, generally speaking, on the fact that the strength of the objective impact or the degree of our sensitivity for it, or whether the attention we pay to it exceeds the so-called threshold, i.e., the level at which the impact becomes noticeable for our consciousness. That is to say, it is a generally valid law that does not *only* but *also* applies to pleasure and displeasure, that in order for them to become conscious, there needs to be a certain level of that which they depend on externally and internally; the *quality* of the condition does not suffice, it needs to be supplemented by the required *quantity*, the required level. As long as this level is not reached, we say that the conditions of pleasure and displeasure, as well as the liking and disliking that depend on them, remain below threshold.

Indeed, as much as we can be certain that countless nasty smells are in the air, we usually do not smell anything due to their dilution. The worst tasting medicine still does not taste as bad if it is diluted to a homeopathic degree. Much that gave us pleasure in fresh sensibility dulls sensibility without terminating for that reason, the stimulus of pleasure merely needs to be strengthened to give pleasure again; and how much hits our senses but our attention to little and remains therefore indifferent.

Depending on the consideration of the external or internal conditions of liking and disliking, one can talk about an external or internal threshold that needs to be exceeded if liking and disliking shall become conscious with a true value of pleasure or displeasure. Both thresholds, however, are not independent of one another. For each specific level of sensitivity and attention there is a specific level of external impact that needs to be exceeded, and therewith an associated specific external threshold; but as these internal conditions change, a greater or lesser external impact will be needed and therewith the external threshold will rise or fall, and vice versa for the internal threshold, when the level of external impact changes. If the threshold of a feeling shall be exceeded, there always needs to be the internal and external one at the same time; more can happen through amplification of the internal or external conditions.

We in general say of the conditions that can elicit pleasure or displeasure through exceedance of a threshold at all, that they are in accordance with pleasure or displeasure, without therefore really eliciting them as long as they remain below threshold.

Even though conditions of pleasure and displeasure below the threshold are inadequate for making pleasure or displeasure felt according to the notion of threshold, it is still not the same as their complete lack. Rather, even their inadequate presence can become important from the following two reasons.

First. The closer the internal or external conditions of pleasure or displeasure are to threshold, the lower is the increment of their level, their strength will still be needed to let them exceed threshold, the better are thus the circumstances for the real emergence of pleasure or displeasure.

Second. A condition of pleasure or displeasure, that on its own is or would be below threshold if it remains alone, can together with other kinds of conditions for pleasure or displeasure, that would by themselves be below threshold, yield a pleasure or displeasure result that exceeds the threshold which is the fact on which the principle of aesthetic aid depends that we will discuss next.

V. Principle of aesthetic aid or enhancement

Before we definitely claim this law we first explain it on the examples of a few special cases.

A poem that one hears in a foreign language still gives the full impression of meter, rhythm, rhyme, but without the associated meaning. This impression is liked more than a gibberish of words without rules but this likability is so small that one does not want to attach significant aesthetic value to it without the meaning and does not easily exceed the pleasure threshold by itself. But beautiful poems lose almost all their appeal if one recounts their content in prosaic speech, as the meaning without meter, rhythm, rhyme does not exceed the pleasure threshold either. One thinks for instance of: „Once more you silently fill wood and vale“³², or:

³² *Translator's note:* Fechner quotes the original first line of Goethe's poem "An den Mond"; original text "Fülle wieder Busch und Tal".

„Daylight has departed“³³ etc. As both factors of complacency aid each other exceeding the threshold or climbing higher above the threshold, a positive pleasure effect emerges whose strength is incomparable with the effect of the aesthetic effect of the individual factors.

The good sound, melody and harmony of tones help each other in the same way in the pure field of direct impressions. The sensuously good sound of pure and full tones has on its own little aesthetic value and yet, how much does it contribute to the beauty of singing. If, of course, pure full tones would not already be more appealing than impure harsh tones, the synergy of these elements that exceeds the sum of their individual effects would not yield any enhancement. In general, we can express the principle like this:

A greater, often much greater, pleasure effect emerges from the conflict-free concurrence of conditions of pleasure that achieve little by themselves than the pleasure value that corresponds to each of the individual conditions by themselves, a greater one than could be explained by the sum of the individual effects; yes, a positive pleasure result can be achieved by such a concurrence, the pleasure threshold can be exceeded where the individual factors are too weak to do so; only that they need to make a relative advantage of appeal felt. Specifically, such concurrences shall be said to be conflict-free for which one condition is a precondition or basis for the emergence of the other, whereas cases in which one hinders the emergence of the other do not fall under this principle. In particular, those cases in which a directly appealing impression at the same time gives rise to appealing associations fall under this principle as well as those in which a lower appealing impression is the basis for the emergence of a higher one. The given examples are taken from both classes; the following will give us enough other examples.

³³ *Translator's note:* Fechner quotes the original first line of von Eichendorff's "Nachtlied"; original text "Vergangen ist der lichte Tag".

One prediction of the aesthetic principle of aid is that the omission of a momentum of appeal in a conflict-free concurrence of such moments does greater harm to beauty without comparison than the existence of one moment can do good for beauty. All of the above agrees in that one cannot yet draw a conclusion about the importance of its contribution to beauty as a whole from the insignificant effect of one moment of appeal.

In general, different momenta contribute to the appealing impression of a work of art or nature that we call beautiful, and they can be distinguished analytically; no single one easily attains a significant aesthetic effect on its own; so, in general, we need to consult the principle of mutual aid to give an account of the total impression. If it shall appear with full strength, all momenta need to act completely unanimous, so to say harmonious, in accordance with pleasure. Where this is not the case – and all too often conflicts arise in art as well as nature – its performance suffers from deductions that can again be surpassed by reconciling effects; but the rules of this need to be sought somewhere else.

The previous principle can be carried over from the conditions of pleasure to those of displeasure. If a speech that we do not like because of its content is given with a disagreeable voice, too, it becomes completely unbearable. Yet, cases of this kind do not offer themselves as easily and obviously as such that concern pleasure because one preferably eradicates, evades, or tries to escape them by diverting one's attention.

The principle of aid explicitly refers to conflict-free concurrence of conditions that make little aesthetic contribution by themselves. If conditions of pleasure that by themselves already contribute a lot concur, this would still result in an amplification above the achievement of each individual one but the expected achievement would not be greater and instead smaller than the sum of the individual ones, if the psychophysical laws to which we can count the principle of aid

is still applicable here. Because according to this, the sensation grows much more quickly than the stimulus that elicits it after the first crossing of the threshold, but starting at a certain point of growing (the cardinal point) it becomes weaker, which will soon be called law of development, and so one needs to presume that, if pleasure rises higher by concurrence of two pleasure conditions, this will happen to a lesser extent than expected according to the sum of the conditions. Yet, one has to admit that there is just as much decisive evidence for this as there is for the law of threshold and aid.

VI. Principle of coherent connection of variety

1) Declaration of the principle

The principle that we will discuss here is an important one. Even though its dictum is simple enough, the investigation of quite some sides and aspects of application create difficulties.

Due to innate institutions, one needs a certain amount of change in the momentum of activity or impressions to be comfortable with an object during active or repetitive activity and the object needs to give the opportunity for this by a variety of working points. If there is a lack of such necessary opportunities, the object makes an unfavorable impression of monotony, dreariness, boringness, emptiness, baldness, poverty, and drives us to proceed to other objects. According to the same innate institution, one demands for one's comfort that all moments of the activity that follow in time and space need to be connected by points of commonality or, in short, are coherently connected, for the entire duration of activity with an object; otherwise, the unfavorable feeling of dispersion, fragmentation, incoherence, or even of contradiction arises, which also drives one to proceed to other objects. Where the need to change the activity occurs at

all, be it for this or that reason, one possibly needs the expression of weariness or tiredness due to the previous activity.

It is strange that language does not provide just as fitting expressions for the two sides of liking that concur in the satisfaction of our principle than for the disliking that result from its breach. We can like an artwork because we get conscious about the connection of all that is in it by one coherent idea but also because our observation indulges in the variety of the so connected parts. These are indeed different sides of liking that need to coincide for full satisfaction; but how to differentiate them linguistically? At best one can say that from one side, one finds oneself evenly tempered, from the other side entertained.

In brief, the above aesthetic principle that we are concerned with here is summarized as: that a human needs to find a coherently connected variety demonstrated in the receptive activity – because aesthetics is not primarily concerned with active ones - with an object in order to like it.

What we call coherently connected variety is translated upon closer view to a conformity between multiple in certain relations and deviance in others. This conformity does not need to rest on qualitative equality but can also lie in the conformity of parts of a whole to a particular end, a particular idea or in causal connections of the moments of an event (which always requires a dependence on the same law), and can take place from a lower or higher point of view, as will be discussed and explained with further examples.

Per se, the coherent connection cannot exist without variety because without it, we would have simple identity. For a short-lived activity, however, a very small variety already suffices to let the mind find sufficiency and even positive liking if it does not lack unity; whereas a variety

that does not claim a connection to unity³⁴ does not only resist as long as it prevails but quite from the beginning. And if we, driven by the need for change, proceed to occupy ourselves with something new, we will not want to switch to a scattered variety but to something different that is coherently connected. In this regard, it seems that the aspect of unity has greater weight than variety; but one should not be allowed to say that liking depends mostly on a predominance of unity over variety, i.e. where the equal outweighs the unequal, to not take a white paper, a pure sustained tone as the most beautiful thing in the world. We will rather demand inequality in every greater whole that shall occupy us for a prolonged period of time, and this inequality only needs to be somehow coherently mediated and bound to find ourselves enamored by it.

Temporal and spatial variety fall under the same aspect insofar as spatial variety, though being to some extent graspable at the same moment, needs to be tracked one after another with attention to be clearly grasped, whereas temporal variety induces a certain simultaneity by the continued effect of previous impressions on the later ones. They fall under different aspects because the direction of tracking is more or less random for spatial variety but is prescribed by its own policy when it comes to temporal variety insofar it is not a spatial one at the same time.

That relations of unity can amount to different heights is explained as follows: Not only the parts, elements, moments, in short links themselves of a variety, can be found more or less equal or unequal, but also the differences or relations between the links of which multiple occur. A higher and more unitary relation of these links is based on the unity of differences or relations between given links of a whole, higher than one that belongs to the segmentation of the individual links by themselves or that would belong to the whole when the differences between

³⁴ If the elements of such a variety are agreeable to us individually, this results in a conflict with the disagreeableness that depends on the lack of unitary connection between them. We will talk about conflicts later, for now we will disregard them.

the links would be omitted. Instead of unity of differences or relations, a match between the links that is mediated by them can stand for something equal.

For example:

The relation of unity that connects the parts of a circle is higher than the one that connects the parts of a straight line, and the relation of unity between the parts of an ellipse is higher than the one between parts of a circle. Specifically, for a straight line, the relation of unity is based on the same direction of all its elements. For the circle, each element that is equal to another deviates from the next one but by the same amount; in short, the differences and therewith at the same time the relations of these directions among each other are the same for the adjacent or equally spaced same elements; for the ellipse, these differences are unequal as well; each element deviates from the next or equally near one by a different angle and the differences between these differences, so-called differences of higher order, are connected by a common rule that unites them and which the mathematician can express in a formula. – If one stripes a uniform area uniformly, the rule of this striping determines a higher relation of unity than the uniformity that belongs to each stripe on its own, or that would belong to the entire uniform area, because instead of the uniformity of all parts, the differences that are brought into the area by the stripes make the same distances permeate the entire area.

All activities of a person can be connected coherently with themselves by the relation to his own well-being; they can also be coherently connected through the relation to the greatest possible well-being of all humans that is coherently connected to the well-being of other people. The latter relation is higher than the first in that the differences between the actions of the individuals need to match in this sense.

When looking at an image that displays a battling crowd, the moments of action of each fighter is coherently connected through the imagination of his experience of overwhelming his opponent, and herewith everyone's very different actions are connected in a higher sense by the motivation that concerns battles of all kinds.

In general, there is room for multiple viewpoints on higher relations of unity when they come into play, as the uniform change of direction of all parts of a circle is connected in the different distances of these from a point which one can call a *composite* or *multiple relation of unity*. In the ellipse, the higher relation of unity that connects the radii vectors, insofar as the sum of two radii vectors, drawn from the focal points to its circumference, is the same, is added to the one that connects the elements of the curve.

Where one is not concerned, as with the Golden Section, with ratios of parts to the whole that include all these parts, but only with relations of parts among each other, the greater height of coherent relation can only exist based on an increased number of differences (greater multiple variety); whereas, on the contrary, a higher number of differences does not necessarily carry a higher relation of unity.

Before going into deeper discussion, we explain the principle with a series of examples that are seemingly of a different nature but that all subordinate to it and therewith prove its wide scope. So as not to find oneself mistaken through its contradictions, three things need to be kept in mind, which by the way does not only apply to this principle but is no less transferrable to other aesthetic principles, as it has basically been intended by previous more general remarks.

First, objective unity and variety are important here only insofar as they are also perceived as such by us and thus become subjective. In principle, nothing in the world is so disparate that it would not be connected by points of commonality and nothing is so equal that is

would not diverge in some point; but insofar as we cannot perceive these points, they also do not exist for the principle. – Second, the coherent connection of variety is indeed always a requisite for pleasure, but it does not at all suffice by itself to bring liking above the threshold. While a coherent viewpoint that we cannot grasp does not touch us aesthetically to being with, one that has become completely familiar, which applies to countless ones in our life and environment, ceases to touch us and we become blunt to it, whereas quite a few viewpoints miss the strength because we are distracted by other things. – Third, as coherent connection is not the only condition of pleasure and as there are also conditions for the opposite, it can just as well be supported and elevated by adding concordant conditions, as it can be outweighed by discordant ones, and from the final viewpoint still be disliked despite the satisfaction of the principle, or disliking can occur despite dissatisfaction, in both cases this happens only to a smaller degree than it would without the conflict. Wherever the principle fails, one will be able to find the reason in one of these three aspects.

2) Examples

We distinguish two sides of our principle, one side of unity and one side of variety that have to work together for liking to emerge. Let us first highlight examples in which the first side shows particularly to advantage.

The principle finds the simplest explanation in this sense in the liking that we have for the coherent unity of an area of color, for the pure stroke of a line, for a purely held tone, for the pure smoothness of an area when we cross it with our eyes or fingers which is found in the sensory coherence of the sensation that connects all points of space and time, and how easily this relation of unity can be grasped and completely satisfies the principle of unity to the greatest extent,

whereas variety is lowered to the smallest possible extent, but does not lack completely insofar as it can still be found in the different locations of the individual points in time and space.

Indeed, one cannot deny even the uniformly colored area, the purely held tone variety with regard to the latter aspect. Consider, for example, the swarm of stars in the sky or the eyes of a dice or listen to the beat of a metronome, one cannot consider the differentness of the spatial and temporal location indifferent, even though its distinctness of course decreases due to diffusion. But indulging in the variety of the points of a uniform area with the eye remains different from constantly fixating these points. What we have here is simply the at the same time simplest and clearest relation of unity with the least possible variety.

Everything like that, of course, soon becomes boring if it shall occupy us for a longer time. But even the most beautiful artwork becomes boring if we shall dwell on it too long; the need for change just arises earlier when it comes to pure uniformity or uniform purity than when it comes to an artwork that lets the need of an external change be felt less quickly due to greater inner changes. In general, the eye rests quite some time on a pure color chart, especially if one becomes aware of its purity, and one can well enjoy the stroke of a line, a pure persisting tone if one pays attention to them; in contrast, each spot, each unmoving bend, thickening or thinning of an otherwise pure and straight line, each noise in addition to a tone, each unmotivated fluctuation in its height, each roughness, that we encounter on an otherwise smooth surface, that prevents appeal or elicits disliking as the relation of unity of the disturbing point to every other point gets herewith lost and therewith the relation of unity of the whole breaks down.

One can remark that the increase in disliking an impurity does not grow proportionally with the increase of impurity. A little dirty spot on an otherwise completely clean surface greatly disturbs us; if a second one is added, the disliking in general grows but to a relatively much

lesser extent; and possibly almost not at all. Some woman is beside herself because of the first spot that is made on her white dress or tablecloth; when a second one is added, there was nothing else to be lost, so she thinks. Ethical considerations come into play here, of course, too, but they go hand in hand with aesthetic ones, and the same applies to the moral and the physical spot. The fact that disliking lags behind its causes has two reasons. For one, based on a psychophysical law that can be translated to aesthetics through pleasure and displeasure stimuli, a sensation always grows with the strengthening of the stimulus beyond a certain level more weakly than the stimulus, or not at all perceptibly anymore. A light, brought into an almost dark chamber, adds an exceptionally great amount of lightness; a second equal one lets lightness grow to a relatively much lesser extent. Second, upon doubling of a disturbing point, the disturbance is not quite doubled insofar the disturbing points themselves and the kinds of their disturbances provide something equal. Both reasons should in general be considered jointly.

As little as uniform purity can enamor us on its own, it is yet most welcome in general when it comes to contour, colors in the parts of an artwork because each part on its own only requires short observation beyond which it would start to become boring. We soon switch from one part to another to become aware of the relation of unity between them; now, the awareness of the low aspects of the uniformity of parts can be fruitfully combined with it. Undoubtedly, we can also demand the purity of contours because the to be depicted object is revealed more clearly, yet, both does not contradict each other but aids each other; otherwise, we could not like a purely drawn line better than an impurely drawn one outside of a drawing, too.

Of course, the uniformity of an impression suffers from the greatest disturbance by its utter interruption; and one can say that this is by itself always a displeasure, only that the threshold of displeasure is not always exceeded especially by individual disturbances, and

regularity of interruptions can compensate, insofar it causes a higher relation of unity that can compensate for the breach of the lower one, as it happens with cadence in the field of hearing; but this compensation does not always suffice. A somehow intermittent light stimulus can become almost embarrassing due to its interruptions; the stroking across a rough surface, the roughness of which only rests on interruptions, will not suit anyone, and everybody dislikes an erratic rattling. The effects of sudden strong changes come close to the effect of complete interruptions. So, generally, everything that is rough, shrill, rugged, angular, abrupt, torn has a disadvantage compared to the gentle, round, flowing, connected, resulting from each other, mediated by transitions when it comes to likability; and we do not automatically associate the image of something disliked with these expressions but we downright need them to designate it.

The aesthetic advantage as well as disadvantage that results from the aspects above can, of course, be outweighed by counter-effects in countless cases. That the woman has rounder, more flowing forms than the man is generally speaking due to a beauty advantage of hers above the man under the previous viewpoint; we like the big fat woman despite the fact that she has in flowing roundness of form the most beauty, surpasses the man all the more, but less so already because the need for variety is less satisfied in a not too short observation by the simple curvature of the form, we dislike her even because the shapes of corpulence is linked to the unpleasant image of weighing the body down with a mass that does not add to its strength, only hampers its free movement, to outrun youth, to sluggish life; whereas Persians and Turks, who like rather than dislike indulgent calamity, due to their small need for variety, and because those associations take a backseat, even fatten their young girls to make them more charming with rounder shapes.

We could not like a square mug just as much as a round one, independent of whether or not it would fulfill its purpose just as well, because, everything else being equal, the round is more agreeable than the angular; but in countless cases we do prefer the angular due to its purpose or other side-conditions, yes, even sharp angles.

If a white or colored surface that has first been introduced as uniform gets marbled, dashed, dotted, variety increases but the coherent relation of all parts of the surface is more or less lost. Now, if the variation that is introduced in it completely without principle, if, for example, here big, there small, here regular, there irregular, here red, there black dabs, on top of that straight, crooked, kinky lines are applied to the surface, experience teaches us that nobody likes this; even the tattoos of the wild are in this aspect regular: Proof, that greatest possible variety alone cannot be liked. If, in contrast, the marbling, dashing, dotting without rules has some common character, and even this denotations point to this, such a surface cannot only be well liked when the relation of unity, that this character presupposes, is less clear than the lost one of uniformity but yet it can be noticeable enough to be, under consideration of the increased variety, a pleasure success. Yes, some like such things under some circumstances better than monotonous color, though one cannot say this in general, what needs to be liked more, because side conditions and subjective moods come into play. Not too long ago, one saw marbled book covers everywhere, now they are nowhere to be seen anymore.

The latter example, however, already plays a role in discussing higher relations of unity that we will now turn to.

The closest thing to the simple relation of unity of undiluted uniformity is the uniform repetition of the same simple impressions in space or time as they were only approximated in the previous example, firmly it is only offered by completely regular dotting, dashing, cannellure of

surfaces or the regular cadence of simple auditory impressions. On top of this, however, every compound rule, lawfulness, order forms a more or less high and composite relation of unity, for example in symmetry, golden section, wave-line, conchoids, meander, tapestry and carpet patterns of different kinds, meter, rhythm, rhyme.

Each increase to a higher level or unity relation above uniformity breaks the low uniformity in that the higher one can only exist between a greater difference of parts than a spatial or temporal one. Like this, one gains variety and a reimbursement of a higher relation of unity replaces the breach of the lower one, as mentioned above, herein lies the double advantage: that the greater variety gives way to boredom less easily and less quickly and that the higher relation of unity accommodates a higher intellectual standard. But these advantages cannot completely evade disadvantages that can under certain circumstances prevail.

For one, one finds that the breach of the lower relation of unity is felt with stronger disliking than can be compensated with higher ones in some cases; second, the rule on which the higher relation of unity is based, can be so complicated or of such high order that it is not graspable; then it appears as disorder rather than order; and, in any case, the difficulty of solving the coherent relation grows with its height. Indeed, we do not feel any such difficulty when it comes to a simple pattern; but the coherent relation of uniformity remains in a way the most obtrusive. If, however, the simple relation of unity of uniformity can potentially hold its advantage against a higher one, it is generally speaking still impossible to increase liking with the first one to such heights as one could with higher just not too high relations of unity; hence their frequent application.

Thus, one gives all vessels, appliances, furniture a regular shape, as long as the purpose allows it, even if it would just as well allow for an irregular shape; loves to cover clothes,

carpets, walls in regular patterns; gives furniture, paintings on walls a symmetrical positioning relative to each other; cannelures columns; orders bars according to the rule, etc., but seeks to conserve the advantage of the low relation of unity while doing all this by keeping the parts that enter into a higher relation of a pure kind or color or contours as far as the purpose allows it.

Of course, there are co-determinants in all cases of practical application that can, leaving the above-mentioned inner conflicts of the principle aside, let the advantage of the higher relation of unity wither or on the contrary support it. Otherwise, we would not see so many white and single-colored dresses and walls, we would not be in doubt so often whether we should ascribe the appeal of an object to its regular shape or rather to the associative appropriateness to its determination. Just generally speaking, the higher relation of unity has an advantage over the lower one of uniformity and fully over the lack of rules throughout all co-determinants, and appears the more purely the more these are absent. To have it as pure as possible, one needs to exclude these as far as possible; and to this end, nothing is more advisable than the in a way magical, noticeably removed from co-determinants, achievement of the kaleidoscope.

Indeed, an arrangement may be as indifferent or a subordination as unappealing as it may be, the kaleidoscope forces liking with the composite relation of unity of regular repetition with all-around symmetry, and a fairly well-known game achieves the same thing with two-sided symmetry. What kind of scrawl we make on paper with ink, when we fold it in the middle or at the edge of the scrawl in such a way that a symmetric imprint emerges on the opposite side, a liking grows for the composition of the scrawl with the imprint that only suffers a little damage from the impurity that the imprint gives the individual features.

Unquestionably, therefore, that two-sided symmetry plays a major role in the liking of the human figure; only one side of a human by itself would also appear to us merely as an irregular

scrawl, leaving aside the predominant habit to see the human figure from an associative point of view. Yes, if one breaks the symmetry with a crooked nose, crooked mouth, beauty will already feel this strongly. With this, one cannot exclude that completely different factors contribute to human beauty as it is in a way more of a composite than man himself. One can recognize the achievement of the principle of aid in this again. If one takes away symmetry from the human figure, its beauty loses much more as one would think it could give him based on the achievement of mere meaningless symmetry. If there are deviations from symmetry, as with deviation from uniformity, the decrease in liking does not grow proportionally with the strength of the deviation. If a rectangle is just slightly skewed, we do not even notice the deviation and the disliking of it remains along with its noticeability below threshold; but even a small deviation, if it only becomes noticeable, can severely disrupt liking or transform it into disliking. If the deviation increases up to certain limits but not so much that we would be hit with the double deviation and doubled displeasure, and beyond certain limits, where the feeling of approaching symmetry gets lost, a further increase of deviation has no noticeable influence on an increase of disliking anymore.

That there are indeed cases in which the elevation to a higher relation of unity above the one of uniformity loses appeal due to a too great violation of the lower one, apart from all co-determinants, is proven by the following:

It is certain that, if one runs one's finger across the teeth of a however regularly carved gear wheel, one does not have the same agreeable impression of it as of a completely smooth surface, as the frequent and complete disruption of the uniform impression that creates the lower relation of unity in between, surpasses the advantage of regular repetition that creates a higher relation of unity; and for the same reason we are pained by a light stimulus with ever so regular

intermissions. That this is a surpassed rather than lacking advantage of regular repetition can be proven by the fact that disliking grows with irregularity of repetition, so the regularity does deduct something from the disliking. Also, there are other cases in which the disadvantage of frequent interruption does not prove the same dominance over the advantage of regular repetition. A regular grid appears more agreeable than a smooth continuous wall, - what is the case for temporal intermissions in visual field does therefore not translate to the spatial – and a regular empty beat is no less unappealing than continuous noise. That behavior is different in these different cases cannot be anticipated a priori based on the principle itself, as the conflict can be resolved very differently depending on the differences between circumstances.

Nobody will deny that a regular beat has a clear advantage in likability over an irregular series of beats; also, one does not dislike following the regular steps of even a few empty beats, likely longer than the continuous, merely uniform noise, as our attention finds itself in a way dangled in a not unpleasant way; yet, a prolonged continuation of the empty beats can hold our attention just as little as the continuation of any other uniform impression. The definitive proof, however, that the regular beat is much rather a pleasure than a displeasure, that easily and remarkably exceeds the threshold by itself, is due to the fact that it, in combination with other conditions of the same sense that music adds to it, adheres to the aesthetic principle of aid or enhancement, i.e., results in a greater product of liking than could be expected based on the contributing moments. The beat on its own will say little, a music without a beat, however, could barely exist. If the beat is now filled with the variety of moments that music adds, it is endured nearly infinitely.

Our principle undeniably plays a role in the melodic and harmonic relations between tones, not in the same sense as Herbart divides pitch into equal and unequal, which has led him

to a curiosity to find the complete opposite to the octave in the base tone, and has led to no less weird calculations but in the same way as Helmholtz takes equality and inequality of tones with regard to their overtones into consideration. It is just that our principle cannot make the claim to offer more than a very general viewpoint on the likability of music; calculations cannot be based on its claims at all.

With the examples so far, we have remained within the field of very descriptive conditions as we have for the sake of brevity understood sensory impressions in general. But the principle reaches wide and high above the whole field of our imaginations that rises above them, that we do not completely cover here, but that we do want to touch upon at some points as it has sometimes already been mentioned when talking about the co-determinants that arise from it.

It is the same for the assertion of the aspect of suitability. Indeed, one of the aspects that make us like the suitable, even though not the only one, is that we find all parts of the suitable whole connected via their relation to the purpose idea. However, other ideas can stand in for the purpose idea. And thus, we only demand from each artwork that all parts of it are connected by a coherent idea or by elicitation of a coherent mood. It is quasi the highest demand that we have to make with regard to an artwork by which demands regarding the content that are understood according to the idea are not excluded; however, the demand for unity has to be met given the most different content if the artwork shall not suffer a substantial deficiency.

What do we understand to be a coherent idea here? A still relatively simple, because abstract, connection of imaginations, in which not only all partial imaginations are connected through a common relationship, but that also creates a connection to the concrete between all moments of execution due to the fact that all are immediately or through mediation connected to a commonality.

Our principle plays no less of a role in real artworks than in quite a few little art games, in witty and funny comparisons, puns and other little things of different aesthetic interest while of course otherwise some other things contribute that we will not go into now. Let us only look at one example here:

Riddles amuse us by letting us search for a coherent connection in its solution for a given variety of imaginations. The allure of the successful solution lies in the discovery of the relation while the foreknowledge that the solution can be found is its anticipation, which does indeed belong to it, and lets us find pleasure in the guessing itself; because nobody wants to guess riddles of which one knows that they do not have a solution, one would only have the displeasure of the scattered complex of imaginations; and who is aware that he is not good at guessing riddles does not acquire a taste for them. For charades, it is always advantageous if the task is somehow coherently connected to the different syllables or word classes and not each of them appears as an independent riddle.

Undoubtedly, the pleasure of overcoming obstacles that we feel able to cope with contributes to the appeal of guessing riddles, as we in addition to the other principle of need for unity have the need for a certain extent of activity, while we at the same time demand the coherent connection of this activity by means of being directed towards a specific goal, independent of the nature of that goal; therefore, all too easily solvable riddles do not interest us. But in general, we do want that every overcoming of an obstacle yields something else but the overcoming itself; and therefore we like to read through a longer riddle a second time after solving it to enjoy the coherent connection of the entire content through the word of the riddle; thereby we notice with displeasure what does not quite fit.

As much as we can enjoy witty and funny comparisons, puns, pretty riddles, charades, as much as anecdotes from this or that point of view can amuse us, and as much as we like to read or hear a few of them one after another, we still will not bring ourselves to hear or read a longer series of them; already before the twentieth we are pretty fed up; whereas we can well read an entire volume of a good novel in one go, we cannot get away from it so to say, regardless of the fact that each anecdote on its own yields greater pleasure than a piece of the novel of similar length, and one could be tempted to think that the arousal potential of the anecdotes would remain the same due to their continuous content change. But this change without connecting strings does not let us bear with the reading for long; yes, if not each comparison, each anecdote by itself would adhere to the principle of coherent connection and interest us based on the nature of its content, we would bear them even less.

So much regarding the explanation of the aspect of unity that contributes to our principle. Let us now turn to the one of variety. So, we first want to recall that the feeling of monotony in general occurs the earlier and stronger the more variety is lacking, according to which pure uniformity is more subject to it than the uniform repetition of a simple shape and this one more than the one of a compound pattern; however, we can also specifically point to many spectacles whose appeal, even though it does not entirely rest on variety, grows with increasing variety without that the feeling of unity would increase as well, only it must not get lost, such as not to get in conflict with the first side of the principle.

One never only places two or three little stones into the kaleidoscope, but a multitude of them with which, without an advantage for the actual relation, that always lies in the same kind of symmetrical connection, only an advantage for variety emerges.

We can delight a long time in the flight of pigeons or starlings, the more and the longer the more varied their turns, swings, changes in shape. Now the swarm conglomerates to a ball, now it expands to an ellipsoid, now it shows us its wide, now its narrow side, now it contracts and therewith darkens, now it expands and therewith gets thinner; now the mass separates, now it re-unites, and often one change blurs into another like lightning; one does not tire of watching this. It is similar with the evolutions and maneuvers of soldiers. Yes, one can even follow the movements of a pennant flapping in the wind for some time with interest, as it soon spreads itself flat, soon bulges, soon gets tangled up in itself, so one could think that it could not disentangle, then does unloosen, gets in another tangle, now rears up again, then down again, then being driven to side. In 1870, the decorative flags of the houses that repeated itself with every new victory message often provided an occasion to delight oneself with this spectacle.

In all of these cases, it is not about a pure scattered variety; it is much more that the community of all parts in the flight of the pigeons or starlings is objectively mediated by their social instinct, the evolutions and maneuvers of the soldiers is mediated by the will of the commander and the purpose of the maneuver, the flapping of the flag mediated by the force of the material relations, and a coherent impression of this remains subjectively throughout all changes; but the enjoyment of entertainment does not grow with the impression of this in itself always invariable coherent connection but with the impression of variety.

One of the most efficient ways to face the monotony of things are ornaments. To be tasteful, they always need to be motivated by a coherent relation to the shape, the purpose of the object or the conditions under which it has to be observed. Thus, they need to subordinate to the coherent impression of the objects much more than to harm it; insofar they do fulfill these

requirements, however, they will let the object appear the more agreeable the more varied they are.

In artworks, where an entire structure of higher relations above with a completion in the idea of the artwork happens, variety grows with the height of this structure not only by means of increasing the differences in the underlying sensory material but also by means of the levels of the relations above them, in short, not only by means of breadth but also by means of height. According to this, the ascent to higher relations is one of the most efficient means by which liking cannot only be increased in levels but also in degree which only finds its limits in the fact that higher relations are in general less easily graspable than lower ones and that they require a higher intellectual ability and higher pre-education to be truly grasped.

3) Objective conflicts and aids

We have had multiple opportunities to talk about the associative co-determinants of our principle, and section IX will go deeper into this aspect; for now, however, we highlight another very general aspect of co-determination that is often combined with the previous one and induces no fewer conflicts than aids for the principle.

What matters for an object is, apart from the relations of equality and inequality, to which our principle refers, the state of the things that enter this relationship, where we count the former as formal and the latter as objective side of the object³⁵, hereby we do not exclude that, in turn, relations of equality and inequality also enter the objective side itself in a subsidiary way. Anyway, the state of an object does not entirely realize in such relations, but one can also differentiate a content or substance that underlies these relations as objective side. Now, the

³⁵ We will also count to the formal side-conditions of consistency and clarity that we will talk about in the two following paragraphs and to which an objective side of content corresponds to no less.

aesthetic impression that is formally determined by our principle can also at the same time be aesthetically determined by objectively standing in conflict or being in tune.

The simplest example of such a conflict is given in the fact that a purely bitter taste, a purely foul smell, in any case in which we are not blunted to it, is disliked without regard to how well it obeys the principle of coherent connection like a pure color surface, the pure stroke of a line, a purely held tone. We do not dislike the purely bitter taste, etc., because there would be something dislikable in the purity but because the quantity of its displeasure effect that depends on the quality grows with its purity. In this simple case, the substantial or objective side is reduced to the quality. Whereas one cannot simply just so attribute the appeal that befits the pure color surface, the pure stroke of a line, a purely held tone to their quality except for the principle of unity, as one otherwise one would need to be able to beautify every uniform area with irregularly and blobs dispersed without rule of an in-and-by-itself agreeable color, which is not the case; as, furthermore, we like a purely and sharply drawn line better than one that is drawn unsteadily and swaying, independent of the fact that the quality of both is the same; and as we do prefer to hear singing with a rough tone of which the character is steady than singing where tones that are by themselves appealing but do not fit its character intrude irregularly.

If one demands a simple example of the objective support of our principle, one only needs to point to the fact that (except for associations that can change the success) we like the same surface better if it is covered in a deep or fiery pure color than with a pure gray or even black.

But the former alerts us that we anyhow cannot everywhere only look at the existence of coherent connection but also need to respect the state of the coherently connected thing to correctly judge the aesthetic success; because the lesson we learned in this regard from the

examples from the lowest aesthetic field does apply just as well to the higher field; so, we dislike artworks that fall under the principle of coherent connection with regard to pleasure based on their repulsive content but on the contrary we like them all the better if their content is appealing.

There is an increase in liking according to the principle of aid where formal and objective sides of liking support each other. In cases in which they contradict each other, liking or disliking can prevail depending on the circumstances, or alternation between the two can occur, even different cases can arise.

Like this, the dislikability of an idea shows with greater strength when all means of depiction of a disliked idea fit together while one can like the good fit; where one cannot say, in general, which one will prevail, it will depend on the direction that the mind takes in its contemplation whether it goes more to the formal or the objective side.

That the associative and objective co-determinants of our principle can cross is due to the fact that associative imaginations, that co-determine a direct impression, themselves underlie the relations of unity with variety, and thus do not only express themselves formally through their coherent connection but also objectively through connected content.

4) More accurate determinations

The variety of an object can grow from three different aspects: first, if the amount of spatial or temporal variation grows; second, if the number of differences grows or differences exist in different regards; third, if the degree of difference grows according to which one will soon distinguish an extensive, multiple, and gradual side of variety. aaaaaa , ababab, abedef have the same extensive variety, insofar they include the same number of spatially or temporally different parts, but succeed one another in their order according to the multiple variety. A polygon retains its extensive variety when the number of sides remains the same, no matter how

the relations between sides and angles change; but the multiple variety grows if the side or angles become unequal and the gradual variety grows with the degree of this inequality.

Quantitative determinations do not seem applicable to the relation of unity at first glance but at a closer look, it is regarding the same three aspects as for variety. The equality or the same relation that forms the relation of unity can affect more or less parts and herewith be more or less complete; it can arise from more or less points of view; finally, it can be more or less approximated, respectively complete; according to which one can use different terms for the different sides of variety; but one will be able to also talk about a composite relation of unity instead of a multiple one.

Variety and unity can also grow quantitatively to all sides at the same time albeit at the cost of each other. They grow, e.g., extensively at the same time when uniformity or a regular pattern fills a larger area or when the number of sides of a regular polygon increases while the equality of sides and angles stays constant. For instance, they grow extensively at the same time when the sides of a regular polygon are colored differently but in regular alterations. They grow gradually together insofar the higher unity, that rests on the equality or fit of these differences in something equal where it exists, expresses itself with greater force because of stronger differences between the links of a variety. But it can also be the number of the differences, the number and the degree of the differences, that can grow without the growth subordinating to the old unity or creating unity where such does not exist; in general, it is easier to maintain a lesser than a greater variety in coherent connection; and a composite relation of unity can lack coherent connection itself between the different coherent aspects of which it is comprised.

The above so far concerned the objective relations of variety and unity; finally, however, our principle depends on the variety and unity as it appears to us, in short, the subjective one that

does indeed crucially depend on the objective one but is also crucially co-dependent on the purely subjective conditions, namely the direction and the relative degree of concentration of attention, the sharpness of the ability to distinguish, the degree of perceptivity of higher and more entangled relations, the total intensity of the intellectual activity that comes in play. Thus, it can be that from an extended objective variety only little is targeted, the attention is not or little affected from this or that aspect, be it of unity or variety, a higher coherent aspect slips a too low perceptivity altogether.

One can see from this on the fact that very complicated conditions come into play when applying of our principle. If we add that the likability of an object, that we want to judge it by, needs to be judged not only by the degree of pleasure that it can grant but also by the duration for which it can grant it, thus by the product of both, both factors do, however, not in general depend on the same conditions, one will not be able to expect that the aesthetic success of this principle can be predicted with certainty in each individual case and that comparisons in its sense can be made with certainty everywhere. In the meantime, that does not hinder us to claim the following sentences as generally valid because disregard conflicts here that apply to our principle as well as to others.

a) Every coherent connection that occupies our attention is in the interest of pleasure insofar it does not claim to occupy it for too long or to a too great extent.

b) The liking of uniformity or uniform repetition grows in general up to a certain extent with growing extension of the latter in space or time, beyond certain limits, however, it decreases. But the feeling of monotony can also already arise after one repetition.

Thus, up to a certain limit, we will rather let our eyes rest on a bigger pure or tapestry-like area than on a smaller one; but if we restrict the uniformity of color or of the repeated

tapestry pattern of our chamber's walls by bordures and dados on the top and bottom, and it would be unbearable if these would extend even also to the ceiling and floor without interruption. Yes, even where the feeling of sublimity grows with the size of the object, as for the ocean, the negative feeling of monotony would prevail if we do not also behold the boundary of something different, as if ocean and sky would continue in each other with full uniformity.

That cases can also arise in which we dislike a uniform repetition upon the first time is proven by the fact that we, e.g., do not want to hear the same anecdote told twice after another, do not like to let two sentences after another begin and end with the same word, and with educated musical taste do not tolerate octaves or quint sequences well at all.

c) Given the same extension one can say that, in general, likability grows the stronger the more intense or clear the feeling of unity transcends through a bigger variety; only conflicts hinder us to increase both ad infinitum.

d) There are no extremes on one or the other side where the unity is most increased and at the same time variety is the most decreased, or vice versa. For example, according to the first side, when a uniform area would extend ad infinitum, according to the second, when there is no perceptible common character, as every marbling has it, in an irregular and irregularly changing daub. One can say of such extremes that they are absolutely disliked and the disliking is to be expected all the more certainly the closer one case gets to one or the other extreme.

e) There is a certain middle or mid-range between the two extremes in which the conflicts between unity and variety are weighed against each other to the advantage of liking; if, starting from there, unity or variety is favored at the cost of the other, liking decreases, the continuation of the observation will occur for a shorter time or even disliking will occur. But this advantageous point or this most advantageous range differs according to differences in

subjectivity and even according to differences of the states of the subject. Like this, previous monotony puts one in the mood for liking greater variety, previous amusement for liking greater unity; youth will love a more frequent change than seniority, etc.

f) Insofar variety can be increased by introduction of higher relations of unity, up to a certain limit, without corresponding detriments to the feeling of unity, the ascension to higher relations of unity is an important means to increase the likability up to certain limits. With increases higher than the limit, however, graspability of the relation of unity suffers too much to not rather bring a loss.

g) To the extent to which the mind can grasp higher relations, it also feels a greater need to occupy itself with those and is easily bored if they are missing.

Insofar the perception of relations, connections of a higher level are a matter of higher intellectual activity at all, and require a higher predisposition as well as development of the mind, an important source of pleasure and displeasure lacks for the raw human, completely for the animal with the inability to such comprehension, that exists for the educated human, as the raw one feels higher coherent relations with just as little pleasure as he feels displeasure in their absence

h) If the principle after all this leaves a yet too great uncertainty about the conclusions to be drawn for the individual case, one can judge in each individual case according to the feeling of monotony or fragmentation whether it is broken on one or the other side.

5) Generality of the principle

Even though we only have to consider our principle in its meaning for aesthetics here, thus only for receptive impressions that are mediated by the senses, it may nonetheless be useful to add something about its general scope, as there is no strict delineation in that respect.

At the very beginning the principle has been expressed with such generality that it applies to active as well as receptive activities. Every physical and mental activity wants to be executed in a certain context in order to be agreeable to us, and does not tolerate frequent interruption, it can, however, only tire due to monotony, and who is capable of higher viewpoints also demands those to connect the moments of his activity. Pedaling with hands and feet alone does not suffice for us because it lacks a connecting ideal motivation for the individual movements: but the physical activity also wants to be coherently connected directly in itself, and it is not without interest to see the beat in the realm of these playing an equivalent role in our receptive auditory impressions.

Indeed, we prefer executing all of our movements to a beat to doing so without one if irregularity does not have a purpose. We walk rhythmically, breathe rhythmically, let the gulps when drinking follow a rhythm, bring the spoon rhythmically to our mouths, bang in a nail rhythmically, thrum rhythmically with our fingers on the table for entertainment. In dance, however, the effect of the rhythm of our body movements increases with the rhythmical impression of the music and its other elements to a higher achievement. The advantage of rhythm even extends to completely automatic movements, as one feels in general all the better the more regular one's heartbeat and the peristaltic movement of one's guts, yes, one is on the whole all the better the more regular one's life order is altogether, i.e., the more regularly one repeats the same performances, if there just is no lack of sufficient change between them; whereas strong deviations from it are indeed loved as exceptions but are only allowed to occur as exceptions. Regular period and beat, however, have the commonality of a return of the same moments in equal temporal distances; only that one continuous periodic movement has the double aesthetic

advantage over the beat of separated short beats that each period in addition includes a variety in itself and that no fill interruption of the movement occurs.

On this a few remarks on the side that belong to the inner psychophysics of aesthetic feelings for which the important role that the regular period with the subordinated beat play for the active as well as receptive activities give occasion.

It is a given that visual and auditory impressions are based on vibrations in our nervous system and according to this, we can trace back the liking of a pure uniform surface of color as well as of a pure held tone to the principle of congruent periodic movement, insofar as in the first case our retina is put to the same periodic movement, in the last case the parts of the auditory nerve are maintained continuously in those. Based on this, we could further think that we like every appealing pattern of color or set of tones only because of composite but commensurable periodic conditions³⁶ in the vibration of nerves, finally, to extend and enhance the hypothesis even more, we could think that all sentiments and activities of consciousness in general are based on vibrations of our nerves, and that all pleasure and displeasure is based on it, that the vibrations in simpler or more composite period beyond a certain limit approach or retract from the complete coherence in commensurable conditions. It is very possible and in my opinion even probable that something along these lines happens, also crucially enters a hypothesis that I posited elsewhere but a bit less general; but as of now, it is only a hypothesis that cannot replace and must not confuse the reference to actual conditions and laws; second, it still needs further precision to enter exact observations and to be applicable to experience; finally, it is only a hypothesis of inner psychophysics, of which we cannot make use in our aesthetics, as we comprehend it here,

³⁶ The periods that we in short refer to as commensurable can differ from one another according to size, however, they must be taken up in a greater period in such a way that after it is over, they always coincide again in the same phase as at the start and repeat the same composite procedure from there.

according to the previously made remarks; this is because it does not deal with the conditions of our impressions of physical activities, that underlie the impression of our nerves, but (skipping over this interlink that is unknown to us) with relations between impressions and the impacts of the external world, insofar as pleasure and displeasure are involved; according to this, the aesthetic of facts of external psychophysics leads more into the purely psychological than into the internal psychophysical field.

In science, the formal joy (independent of the objective content of the scientific observations) that we find in looking at coherent aspects between different things, abstracting general aspects, laws from individual cases, ascending to ever more general principles, contrarily also conducting general aspects, laws, principles through the individual, trace them in applications, inferring the individual itself from the general, is based on our principle. Neither unity alone nor the fragmented variety alone suffice but only the development of one through the other.

VII. Principle of consistency, unanimity, or truth

In general, it is in the interest of pleasure to become aware of the coherence or consistency of imaginations or thoughts that present themselves from different sides regarding the same object, in the interest of pleasure to perceive a contradiction between them. However, one has to understand the expression contradiction and its opposite consistency correctly as absence of contradiction.

There is no contradiction in imagining a thing as *simultaneously* black and white if the imaginations of black and white refer to different sides or places of it, which are in principle not the same thing, just as little imagining a particular side of a thing first as black and then as white,

which is in principle not the same thing anymore, the concept of such changes is familiar to us; yet, it is a contradiction to imagine *the same* side as *simultaneously* as black and white; and, even though such a contradiction cannot come to us as a direct observation of reality, there can be reason to feed an imagination that contradicts another, where it does not or not completely underlies our experience, or one can feed for a certain reason an imagination that contradicts the imagination dependent on direct experience. Historical statements can stand in contradiction or agreement with each other, and so can historical statements with conclusions from fact, or theoretic inferences with each other or with observed facts.

Now, it can be that such reasons for contradictory imaginations appear at different times and we, by giving in to one reason once and to the other another time, do not become aware of the contradiction. E.g., we read a note today that on a historical date there was a solar eclipse, one year later we read the note that it shone during that time, without holding one note against the other. Or we read in the bible today that the human lives, weaves and is in God, and find another time reason to contrast ourselves with God, as one human contrasts to another. Where the contradiction is not perceived, because memory does not bridge the contradictory imaginations, there is also no reason for displeasure and the contradiction is aesthetically indifferent; the displeasure, however, crosses the threshold the more easily the more saliently an imagination is accompanied by the memory of a contradicting one.

As little as the existence of a contradiction elicits displeasure everywhere the consistency of the imaginations elicits pleasure everywhere. To see that a planet occupies a certain place at a certain time does not contain a contradiction; but even if we become aware that an observed star accords to its predicted location, or that two calculations approached from different sides concur. And so the consciousness of the possibility of a contradiction or the real solution of one between

two sides of imaginations thereof belongs to the reasons for the pleasure from their consistency everywhere.

The consistency just like the contradiction of two imaginations or circles of imagination can intervene more or less strongly in our field of knowledge, as with it a consistency or a contradiction with more or fewer other imaginations or circles of imagination arises; also, it can be more or less consequential for us. The more one or the other or both is the case, the more easily the pleasure from the consistency or the displeasure from the contradiction crosses the threshold, while it easily remains below it under contrary conditions. Yes, a contradiction that we are theoretically and practically indifferent to can even, instead of eliciting displeasure, make the impression of funniness or ludicrousness, when the appeal of the surprising connection of contradictory imaginations by mediation of the ones to that they mutually refer to gains the upper hand, which we will get back to elsewhere. A conflict, however, occurs here, which is the reason why one finds the contradiction funny while another one is angry about its foolishness.

To summarize the above and disregarding conflicts we will can say in short: If diverging reasons to imagine one and the same thing occur, it is in the interest of pleasure to become aware of the fact that they really lead to a contradictory imagination. It is the imagination of one of the same thing if we refer the imaginations to the same space, the same time, and an otherwise consistent complex of imagination that refers to this space and time.

If no contradiction between any parts exists within one connected circle of imaginations, we ascribe inner truth to this connection, independent of whether or not the imaginations refer to external reality and whether something in the external reality corresponds to them; talking about external truth, where a connection of imaginations or a single imagination refers to the existence of external reality and refers without contradiction to the entirety of imaginations that can be

evoked by external reality, as we cannot have the external reality itself in our field; without having an absolute criterion for external reality. According to this, the liking that we have for the insight into internal and external truth except for the constitution of the content and the use of truth, depends on our principle, as does the disliking from falsehood and lie except for the quality of the content and the bad consequences of the lie. We can call this the formal side of liking and disliking of truth.

As, apart from this, we can like or dislike something whether it is true or not based on the constitution of its content, and as the truth has in general useful as falsehood has harmful consequences, or enter a pleasant or unpleasant connection, the awareness that liking and disliking can be co-determined by truth and falsehood, which we have termed the objective side of liking and disliking, that does not so much concern the truth and falsehood themselves but the things that they show themselves in and what results from them, insofar subordinates to other principles.

The formal side of liking truth is self-sufficient without therefore being the only meaningful everywhere, we seek truth in science and in the arts, we demand the truth of the depiction, and thus science will not rest until it finds no contradiction between to imaginations or connections of imaginations anymore, and we are only satisfied by artworks that first fulfill the demands of inner truth, according to which no individual component of the idea that is elicited by the whole, or, what does not coincide with it but is connected to it, no part of the imagination that the total of the rest elicits, may contradict, second, fulfill the demand of external truth to such an extent that we find reason to assume a match between the artwork and external objects according to the idea of the purpose of these objects. Insofar this is not at all the case in music and only up to a limit in the visual arts, a lack of correspondence between the artwork and the

external world will not be disliked in general. Also, one can contemplate in how far deviations from the external truth are permissible for given genres of art or are even called for in favor of other aesthetic advantages, which does, however, belong to remarks on art, into which we will not go any deeper but for a few short examples, to get back to it in a later section in more detail.

An angel with wings does not exist in reality; but we do not presuppose that the painted angel shall bring forth a really occurring angel, in which case we would really dislike it, but only that it shall bring forth one of God's heavenly messengers symbolically, which the wings do fit quite well. The wings themselves, however, need to be painted in such a way that they appear to be suitable for flight, as otherwise the elicited imagination contradicts the imagination of their purpose. We can very well read a novel with pleasure, even though we know that the persons and events in it are far from reality; we know at the same time, this is not about the depiction of concrete reality. Thus, no contradiction of imaginations. But it may not contain real or psychological impossibilities or strong improbabilities that contradict the general preconditions of existence, the awareness of which accompanies us as a demand while reading.

VIII. Principle of clarity. Summary of the three highest formal principles

Let us throw a glance back at the two previous principles, the one of coherent connection of variety and that of unanimity or truth. So, the first was based on imaginations that are from a certain side temporally, spatially, terminologically different, from another side they need to meet at something common to be in the interest of pleasure; the latter was based on imaginations of something required to be identical that are elicited from different sides truly needing to meet at something identical to be in the interest of pleasure. I summarize both principles, along with the

one of clarity, that will only be mentioned shortly here rather than be discussed in depth, under the term of the three highest formal principles.

This third principle crosses with the other two in that liking depends on it from its own point of view, the equal and unequal, coherent and contradictory in a complex of imaginations as such step above the threshold into consciousness to make an aesthetic effect of these principles to one or another side possible; whereby it can, however, happen that we find joy in the clarity of an observation whereby the disliking from the other two principles becomes palpable. This is because these formal principles can just as well come into conflict with each other as they can with the objective principles that refer to the constitution of the content.

By setting itself the highest scientific tasks, philosophy is also seeking to satisfy the demands of the three highest formal principles in one, and the philosophical striving does accordingly not find satisfaction until not only the entire field of knowledge exist consistently in itself but also through more general aspects, possibly one most general aspect, coherently connected and its controversy has matured to full clarity on both sides. Also, the formal joy of doing philosophy would be not only the highest – insofar we judge the height of joy by the height of the field of its expression – but at the same time the greatest, if it is not subject to suffering from, as the viewpoints rise higher or the higher viewpoints are executed in the individual, partially security, partially graspability, partially clarity.

The arts do not set themselves equally general tasks as philosophy insofar even the investigation of their principles is a task of philosophy; but they have to follow the three principles no less in the field of imaginations that they elicit by their means than philosophy and any science in general.

IX. Aesthetic principle of association

1) Introduction

Under a principle of association, I understand a principle whose importance and scope are already known and acknowledged in psychology but have so far been little appreciated in aesthetics on the whole. It would be too much said that it has not been appreciated there at all; yes, how could it be important for aesthetics if it had not made its importance known already. Indeed, the achievements of the principle are acknowledged everywhere because they appear everywhere without, of course, letting the principle from which they arise be clearly realized or recognized. One remembers it well in psychology and in aesthetics but much more to eliminate it from the investigation of beauty as something that unseemly meddles with it than to become an explanation. It is true, the Englishmen Locke, Hume, Sayers, among the Germans Oersted, primarily Lotze, have paid greater and more just heed to it also as aesthetic principle; but nothing of that has shown through for us; only its neglect and rejection have shown through. Kant in his work has only thought of the so-called dependent beauty of the principle to bring it off credit in things of pure beauty, and has found his successors in this, and after one has declared it waved aside from this side, one has not concerned oneself with the principle from this side anymore either. Schelling, Hegel and their successors have not done it from the beginning; one could think, according to them, nothing like it exists. What Herbart says about the principle (see No. 11), has only been able to contribute to its defiance. No wonder that afterwards, the art experts and art writers that depend on philosophers have not wanted to know anything or little about it; the artists altogether and the art novices that again depend on them. Indeed, as I held a lecture on the principle in 1866 at the Leipzig Club of Art, whose main content one will find again in the following but a little extended, it spurred interest of the laymen as if there would be something at the same time problematic about it, which nonetheless can be heard, was pretty

much a fiasco with the philosophically educated experts, whose circles of thought it threatened to destroy, and a print version of it in Lützow-Seeman's Zeitschr. F. bild. Kunst (1866, 179) has been labeled appreciatively as an "original" attempt, "to introduce a new God to aesthetics". As little new and original the principle may now be, a little more thorough and firm representation of it in aesthetics than it has received so far may be in place. And thus, I want to show here against its predominant disrespect and disregard that in a way half of aesthetics depends on it, like, by the way, Lotze has previously even made almost the entire aesthetics dependent on it³⁷; but because he has not given a system but only a history of aesthetics and some aesthetic essays³⁸, he has found or taken no opportunity to develop the principle as thoroughly as it will happen here.

Indeed, I do understand a so far-reaching dependence only from a certain point of view. However, quite a few general viewpoints cross in aesthetics on which it could be made half or more than half-dependent; and it will not be a hindrance to do justice to them in other places with other considerations.

According to our path from Below, we begin again with explanations based on simplest examples.

2) Examples

Among all fruits, the orange may be the most beautiful one, if one finds the expression beautiful too much, the most appealing to the eye. This has been the case even more so in the

³⁷ This is in so far the case as even the main effect of music is subordinated to an, albeit very broad, conception of the principle, broader than I would personally take its significant scope.

³⁸ Über den Begriff d. Schönheit und über die Bedingungen der Kunstschönheit. 1845 und 1847. Göttingen. Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.

past than nowadays where it is displayed in all public market desks, is a dessert on almost every lunch table; because the appeal dulls with its frequency. I can well remember the in a way romantic appeal that this sight had for me and even now one might not prefer any other one in appearance.

What, now, is the appeal of its appearance based on? Of course, everybody now first thinks of its beautiful pure golden color and pure curvature. And for sure, there is a lot to this; maybe one could think that this is everything. Yes, what else should it be? But, if the reader asks like this, this would be the proof that our principle is not present to him, or if something should come to his mind, it would not belong to the principle. So, one should think for a moment whether the whole appeal of this fruit is really based on its beautiful gold color and pure curvature.

I say no; because why then should a yellow clear coated wooden sphere not be just as good as the orange, if we know that it is rather a wooden sphere than an orange. Yes, even though the orange has a rough skin and roughness is in general less liked than smoothness, as is proven in the comparison of different wooden spheres itself, and is in the interest of a previously discussed principle, we still like the rough orange more than the varnished wooden sphere.³⁹

This cannot be due to a preference in liking for form and color itself; in this regard, both objects are equal, the wooden sphere can even have an advantage. The advantage of the orange can only be due to the fact that we see an orange in it and not a wooden sphere, that we associate

³⁹ Burke even says in his essay on *On the Sublime and Beautiful*, of course exaggerating one-sidedly: » The next property constantly observable in such objects is smoothness; a quality so essential to beauty, that I do not now recollect anything beautiful that is not smooth. ... A very considerable part of the effect of beauty is owing to this quality; indeed the most considerable. For, take any beautiful object, and give it a broken, and rugged surface; and, however well formed it may be in other respects, it pleases no longer. Whereas, let it want ever so many of the other constituents, if it wants not this, it becomes more pleasing than almost all the others without it.«

the meaning of the orange with its shape and color. The meaning of the orange itself, however, lies of course partially itself in shape and color, but far from exclusively, rather in the entirety of it, what it is and does, especially what it is and does in relation to us. If now shape and color are immediately present to the senses, memory adds the remaining, not individually but in an overall impression, carries it into the sensory impression, thus enhances it, thus, in a way colors it in; we may call this as a shorthand a mental color that is added to the sensory one, or the associated impression that combines itself with one's own or direct one. And this is why the orange appears more beautiful to us than the yellow wooden sphere.

Indeed, does the one who sees an orange only see a yellow blob in it? With the sensory eye, yes; mentally, however, he sees a thing with a lovely smell, refreshing taste, on a beautiful tree, in a beautiful country, grown under a warm sky, in it; he sees the entirety of Italy in it, too, in a way the country to which a romantic longing has drawn all of us to all along. The mental color is comprised of the memories of all that whereby it is varnished in a sensuously beautifying way; while the one who sees a yellow wooden sphere does only see dry wood that has been turned in the lathe operator's shop and varnished by the painter behind the yellow blob. In both cases, the impression that results from memory is thus immediately associated with the conception, blends so entirely with it, co-determines its character so crucially, as if it was part of the conception itself. Therefore, we could of course easily be tempted to count it as one of the things of the conception itself and that we can only detect that it is not by means of comparison, as we just made one.

Another example:

Why do we like the red cheek so much better than a pale one on a young face? Is it the beauty, the appeal of red itself? Undoubtedly, it contributes. A fresh red delights the eye more

than gray or mis-color. But, I ask again, why do we not accordingly like a fresh red on the nose and hand just as much as on the cheek? We rather dislike it. The appealing impression of red thus needs to be surpassed by a disliked element when it comes to nose and hand. What could that be? It is not hard to find. The red cheek means youth to us, health, joy, blooming life; the red nose reminds us of drinking and Wilson's disease, the red hand of washing, scrubbing, mashing; these are things that we do not want to have or do. We also do not want to be reminded of them.

If, on the contrary, a red nose and pale cheeks had always been signs of health and temperance, the pale nose and red cheeks would appear as signs of the opposite, the direction of our liking would reverse. North-American and Polish women do indeed prefer a pale cheek to a red one and seek to achieve the paleness at the cost of their health if necessary by drinking vinegar or by other means. One may now well think this is because they like paleness better than redness? For sure not, but because they got used to see the pale cheek as a sign for a fine constitution, higher education and life standing, and in the red one merely rural health, and to prefer the former to the latter. It is for the same reason that Chinese people like the crippled feet on their ladies, the most beautiful ones rurally plump, and they give big stomachs to their idols because they are used to see the most noble dignitaries of their realm with big stomachs, and associate the imagination of a certain superiority above the earthly hardship and work, that of course allows the emergence of big stomachs, with it.

I once heard a lady say that one can only really judge the beauty of a human foot if it is shod. If it was not for candor being one of the lady's virtues, she would have probably shied away from this sentence, so curious it will appear to others. But there is something very true to it. We get to know the meaning of the human foot almost only while it is hidden inside a shoe and are only rightly oriented regarding the meaning of the shod foot. We anyway see almost only our

own foot naked, which is not always the most beautiful one, and the foot of statues that co-determine our liking of it, for a naked foot is not as familiar as for the shod one; and while a certain art expertise plays into the judgment of beauty of the former, the judgment of the elegance and fineness of the latter only requires ordinary social experience.

A blind woman that can only get a hold on shapes with her sense of touch has been asked why she likes the arm of a certain person better. One might guess: she answered, because she felt the soft line, the beautiful fullness, the elastic swelling of the shape of the arm. Nothing of all that, but because she would feel that the arm is healthy, vital and light. This, however, she could not immediately feel but only the things associated with the felt. Now, I do not think that the direct impression, in which one may want to see the only reason for liking, made no contribution; but one does see that the associated impression was more vividly present to her. For us who can see, it seems to be the opposite. We think that we see the beauty in the arm without suspecting that we see most of it into it.

No less than through the field of the visible and touchable does the principle reach through all other sensory fields, whereof the following intermission gives a selection of examples.

A woman, who loved her husband very much, said to him: how glad I am that you have such a pretty name. The name was not very pretty but she loved the man and therefore she liked the name. I myself recall that I very much liked the name Kunigunde as a child until I met a girl with a fatal appearance and character with that name, not long until the name itself was fatal to me; and as I have not met a particularly nice Kunigunde, the impression remains.

The screams of frogs are in and by themselves not very graceful and in the concert hall where everything is mostly about one's own or the direct impression of the music, one does not

want to hear such a frog concert or a quacking singer. In the outdoors, however, we do like the screaming of frogs partially as an expression of the frogs' well-being, partially as an attribute of spring. Should it express the pain of the animals or be heard in November instead of May, it would be unbearable. The nightingales' songs and the tone of the bells of the alps are part of the concert voices of the outdoors that are appealing, however, not only by means of association, like the screaming of frogs, but also far beyond their own or direct performance.

In the past, the sound of the coach horn also had an appeal that stood in no relation to its musical effect by means of eliciting memories of traveling, as I remember well from my adolescence. Now, its appeal has almost completely shrunk to its felt musical effect, if not below it, as one now prefers to travel by train. The carriage now seems to be a snail, while it seemed to lend us wings to the distance.

An educated economist told me that going into a stables and the smell of dung elicits a peculiarly agreeable feeling in him, if he happened to be cheerful or agitated because the impression of fertility that is elicited by the manure was evoked with particular vividness in him.

The roast in the kitchen, the still warm bread, the freshly brewed coffee, roast chestnuts placed on the hot oven, distribute a smell that seems agreeable to most. Here, one can ask whether this agreeableness depends rather on the idiosyncrasy of the smell or on the enjoyment whose imagination is elicited by the smell; and I confess that I could not get clear on this myself; so little do the direct and associated moment of this impression separate.

In Persia, one does not know the use of knife and fork, and when a Persian reaches into a rice dish, he immediately recognizes from touch whether the rice is well-prepared or not. This goes so far that even a Persian Shah expressed to a European envoy: "he would not understand how one could serve oneself with knife and fork in Europe, as taste starts with the fingers." But

he can only associatively start there. And as well as a Shah, a dog complies with the principle of association. Burdach tells somewhere: a dog, who was so spoiled that he did not want to eat dry bread, had yet done it as a dry plate had been wiped with it in front of his eyes, since it meant to taste the gravy that usually is wiped away with the bread.

But, I hear myself scream down from above: What is all this effort of examples for? What does aesthetics, and in general what can one gain from it? The orange, the cheek, the nose, the hand, the foot, etc., are dependent parts of nature and of the human body; an aesthetic, however, that does not want to stay too low, goes from all to the whole and only considers the parts as such.

Well, like this we continue to target the meaning of the principle also for the beauty of a landscape, of the entire human figure, an entire artwork, and we will find them again no less than for the parts in the same relation expanded and enhanced, as the whole surpasses the parts. Our principle is easiest explained with examples, and we cannot go in the other direction, that seems the only possible one for the path from Above, on our path from Below. Thus, conditional on a future higher ascend, we summarize the main aspects of the principle based on the examples so far as follows.

3) Claim of the principle

Every object that we interact with is for us intellectually characterized by the result of memories of everything that we have ever externally and internally experienced, heard, read, thought, learned about that object and related objects. This result of memories is just as immediately associated with the sight of the thing as the imagination of it with the word that denotes it. Yes, shape and color of the object are so to say nothing more but visible words that make the entire meaning of the object automatically present; we must of course first have learned

this visible language, just like the language of words, to understand it. We see the table, basically only a square blob, but in the square blob everything that a table is needed for; only this makes the square blob a table. We see a house but with the house we also see all that a house is made for, what happens in a house; only this makes the blob a house. We do not see it with the sensory but with our inner eye. We therewith do not remember every detail that contributes to the impression; how would it be possible then, if everything demands attention at the same time, to become aware of it. It is much more that, by wanting it, it joins into a coherent felt impression that we called mental color, an expression that is telling in more than one regard. No matter how many different colors we mix together, the mixture always only appears as one color that does, however, change according to the color components, and, put on a compact color basis as glaze, again gives one unitary impression that follows the composition of both. Thus, there always only results one unitary impression from all different memories that are associated with the sight of an object that turns out differently, however, according to the composition of the different memory ingredients and merges with the direct impression of the sight into one unitary impression. Now, a completely different total impression can result from the nearly equal sensory impression through the coloration with different mental colors, whereby only a small sensory difference is needed to convey the different associations. An orange, yellow wooden sphere, a brass sphere, gold sphere, the moon, all for the sense only round, yellow, not very different-looking spots, and yet how different the impression that they make! We stand in front of the gold sphere with a kind of Californian deference, entire palaces, carriages and horses, servants in livree, beautiful travels seem to develop from it; the wooden sphere seems only to exist to rumble; and what hollow identity lies in the moon! We are led to differentiate these things partially by the small differences that we notice on them, partially by the different circumstances under which they

occur. One cannot search an orange in the sky and the moon on a store table. If there is a lack of such signs of differentiation, there is also a lack of different aesthetic impressions, and fakes can make the likable impression of the genuine, which wanes immediately, however, if we gain knowledge of the fake.

According to this, as that is liked or disliked that we are reminded of by an object, the memory also contributes a moment of liking or disliking to the aesthetic impression of an object which can be consistent or in conflict with other moments of the memory and the direct impression of the object, whereby the various aesthetic relations result, that we have had reason to go into numerous times previously and will further find them. The strongest and most frequent effects that we experience from an object, in association with an object, and in comparison with an object of course also leave memories that affect the associated impression most effectively.

Memories, taken individually, of course always remain relatively weak compared to the things that they remind us of; but when many memories coincide with one direct impression, sum up with it, compose, the associated impression can become very strong and content-rich. Of how many things does an orange remind us and how interesting are the things that it reminds us of compares to its mere shape and color. When experiences are often made in the same sense, the associated impression that accumulates from that in the mind can even finitely exceed the direct one, whereas in cases in which the experiences are very ill determines and not rarely change contrarily, the associated impression remains ill determined and weak whereby the contradictory in it weakens or lifts itself where then the direct factor remains as the primary determinant of the impression.

An everyday example may teach us how far this predominance of the associated over the direct impression can go under certain circumstances. If one holds a finger in double distance in

front of one's eyes, one thinks to see it as just as large; and yet its image in the eyes is only half as big and can only appear as half as big to the newly operated person who has been born blind. The knowledge that flow from our entire life experience that it remains the same size at every distance outweighs the sensory appearance of its inequality so completely that we believe to see it the same even with the eyes at every distance. However, then the distances exceed our circle of experiences, objects really appear shrunk according to the distance as sun and moon aloft and objects from the top of high mountains. Is it accordingly surprising that we also take the likability of many things that results from prior experience for their sensory appearance that is much rather a product of our mental assistance.

As much as there is to the associated impression according to the above, one has to be careful about putting too much weight on them, which may be tempting after one has once realized its importance. If we think of the orange with a plain gray color instead of the beautiful gold-yellow one, of a crooked crippled shape instead of the pure curvature, all associated memories will not let it appear likable; the direct impression also has its right, and we will in the future explicitly preserve it. But therefore, one again must still not give too little on the associated impression. The comparison of the orange and the wooden sphere, of the red cheek and the red nose forbids it. Neither the direct nor the associated impression achieve much by themselves; but they achieve a lot in conjunction, give according to the principle of aid more than a merely additive product of liking, and this success of the principle of aid repeats everywhere where direct and associated impression meet concordantly, thus the reason to repeat it and get back to it often.

4) Association by similarity

As similar, related things mutually remind of one another, the associated impression transfers easily from one to the other; and when we encounter a completely new object, even the entire associated impression depends on this, while for objects with whose meaning we are very familiar through life, the influence of transferred association steps back behind its adherent one. Also, associations that are transferred from different sides can mainly cancel or disrupt each other and therewith leave the field to the adherent ones. When a lama came to Leipzig for the first time, everybody liked looking at it, irrespective of the fact that no one had seen such an animal live before. Why? Because its feet reminded one of all slender, light, agile, its eyes of all soft, pious, its hair of all orderly, neat, warm.

The yellow wooden sphere does not transfer its impression of dryness, mechanic genesis, etc., to the orange because we are too familiar with its different nature through life, moreover all round yellow bodies make that claim to also transfer their associations to the orange, that however do not correspond with those of the wooden sphere from this or that side.

Instead of a one-sided predominance, a dispute between the own and the transferred impression associations can be alleged whose victory remains swaying. Let us consider, e.g., an artificial flower. The similarity to a real flower lets it appear as a living thing and all associations of the real flower want to transfer to it; but the associative feeling that it is yet much more artificially made does not bring these associations off, without being able to ban them completely. This results in a dispute that everybody feels, even if one resolves it in oneself. In some way, we enjoy the artificiality as every well-done imitation the more so if something likable is being imitated, in some way, however, the liking that we would have for the natural flower is shortened by the fact that we cannot imagine the artificial one with the merits of the natural one.

5) Ancillary association

Association cannot only color in but also add entire pieces, and this is what seems matching or mismatching much more often than relations of direct impression.

Let there be the figure of an animal, e.g., a dog given in a picture book as half-occluded, such that only the head and the body are visible, then the associating imagination for the head of the dog will add its body or the head to its body, with more or less certainty, depending on whether one has more or less experience with the dog breed; only that the associative addition will never reach the directly visible part with certainty. Now, if the obscured part is revealed, it will appear to fit or not fit the previously seen and vice versa, depending on whether it matches or mismatches our associative imagination within the limits of certainty, that it just has, and herewith according to the principle of coherence a feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction can arise, that can under certain circumstances reach considerable strength. What now appears here between two parts, of which one openly exists from the start, the second subsequently opened to one's view, also happens if both openly exist from the start. Each one associatively poses demands on the other according to whose fulfillment or non-fulfillment we have the feeling of coherence or of contradiction, and it is crucial for every beautiful work that there is no such a contradiction anywhere, i.e., each part satisfies the associative demands that the totality of the others elicits, while it conversely is part of good taste to be educated to only make associative demands that are truly justified to be made.

Each architectural style demands, based on aesthetic and structural concerns, a certain inner consequence, and a part can deserve the disliking of the connoisseur by stepping out of that consequence; but even without knowing the demands of this consequence and even without a real breach of such a one, each part that strays from one architectural style to another, in which it

is not home, will simply be disliked due to the fact that then the associative demands that the overall style of the building poses to its parts are being contradicted. One also has the right to dismiss the like, even if it would not be objectionable in itself; because if the associative demand is justified once by a very general fact, one has to account for this fact, too.

Why, however, one can ask, do we not dislike a sphinx, a centaur, an angel with wings, all compositions in which parts are joined that do not occur together like this in nature, thus, cannot be demanded associatively in our imagination based on our experiences. But, what nature has never joined, art has joined so often that it now finally seems to match, however only in art, whereas it would elicit dread in nature. And how easily does the associative demand of nature stand in conflict with art when it comes to such depictions. As witty as illustrations of Reynard the Fox with half human half animalistic looking and acting figures may be, as much as we like them from other viewpoints, something disturbing about them remains.

However, if one further asks: how did art ever conceive the idea to form hybrid figures whose sight must offend from the beginning, the answer is this: it would have never conceived the idea if it would have always served beauty for whom one has now made her a subservient slave; instead, it has always served religion whose initially out-of-joint and outrageous ideas art did not know to express other than as in accordingly out-of-joint and outrageous creations. By now, we have been past these ideas for a long time but still, the head seems to fit the body of the sphinx, so firmly has habituation melded the two.

6) Temporal Associations, Cognitive and Emotional Judgments

When two people look at a building whose roof rests on supports that are too weak, it can happen that one is told by his reason the other by his feelings that they will break and both express the same disliking judgment about the construction. The difference between the two

judges, however, is that one is aware of the experiences or rules regarding the carrying capacity of the supports that mediate his judgment, the other not. But one will admit that it is also not innate to the one to see whether a support has enough carrying capacity for its load, that this quick prediction is indeed a result of prior experience that immediately claims itself upon looking at the building. – If someone sees a child bend over so that its center of gravity is no longer supported, he quickly jumps to it because a feeling without reflexes immediately tells him that the child will fall. Here, too, one will very well admit that a silent mediation by prior experience is the basis, if one takes into consideration that each child itself – and formerly one has been a child, too – does not yet even have the feeling for how to position its center of gravity to keep standing upright. It only gets it through practice. So, that which we here call feeling is actually only something of a quick association that is mediated by prior experience whereby the imagination of the to be expected breaking of the support connects to the imagination of the too great thinness, the imagination of the to be expected fall to the imagination of the present bending over. The individual experiences have vanished from our memory, their result in the associative feeling has stayed.

So, not only spatial but also temporal relations can be reflected in the imagination and therewith automatic expectations about the future can emerge that play a role in aesthetics insofar as the pleasure and displeasure content of the consequence can therewith immediately be transferred to the impression of the cause.

Insofar one in general makes a difference between cognitive and emotional judgments, that one is conscious of the reasons of the judgment in the former case, not in the latter, one sees from the above, as emotional judgments in general can be mediated by association. But this can occur with different levels of clarity. In general, we dislike thin supports. The one, however, does

not even know what aspect of them he dislikes; there are simply dislikable moments associated with their sight while he cannot separate or clarify these moments, he can still express their result in his dismissive judgment; the other knows, he dislikes them because they are about to break, the third also knows why they are about to break. For the first, reason completely recedes behind feelings, for the third, the feelings are so to say completely transparent to reason.

Experience often displays circumstances that do not really belong to each other as connected – however, more frequent and more urgent indoctrination can also stand in for experience – and thus a wrong association emerges and therewith a wrong feeling; like this, things become connected in the mind that are not connected in nature and based on this, we emotionally attach importance to things that they do not have whereby we can like something that should be disliked, and dislike something that should be liked.

7) Associative Character of Simple Colors, Shapes, Layers.

An associative impression is added to direct ones not only for whole concrete objects, but also for sensory traits, visible conditions, such as color, shapes, layers, and it depends on the entirety of objects on which the trait, the condition is found and is from there transferrable to other objects. Now, even though this impression does not by itself carry an aesthetic character, it can still co-determine the character of aesthetic impressions stemming from elsewhere and therefore it deserves to also be considered in aesthetics.

Where now, as so often, the same trait exists in many objects of most diverse kinds and in most diverse relations, this impression can have the same determinedness and strength as the impression of concrete objects whose existence and functioning are bound to certain conditions, but it can well achieve such given special conditions and special modifications.

In the meantime, the associative impression needs in general support even in those colors, shapes, and layers for which it appears plainest, be it by means of a concordant direct impression, other associative moments, if it shall become very firm, and it can itself only provide one support in that sense but without being able to prevail its own character against firm contradiction from a different side.

There are yellow things that are agreeable to us, like wine, and such that are repulsive to us, like jaundice; there are such of high meaning and great value, like the sun, the moon, the crown, and such of crude meaning, like a sandy plain, a stubble field, straw, wilt leaves, clay. We encounter yellow in clothes, in sulfur, in the citron, in the canary bird, anyways in the most different objects, in the most different uses; how can a determined associative character of the yellow emerge from this, as opposing influences neutralize each other. Thus, only the direct impression of yellow seems to come into consideration. But this changes if we change over to distinct modifications of yellow and sort the examples accordingly. In one part of it, the sandy plain, the stubble field, the wilt leaves, the clay we encounter in great extension, in frequent repetition, a pallid, matte, feeble yellow always with the impression that we face crude earthly things of low meaning with little interest to us or itself little agreeable meaning; in a different part, the sun, the moon, the stars, the crown, the gold a shining yellow always with the impression that we face the jewels of heaven or the valuables of earth that mean power and richness.

Now, pallid, matte, feeble colors in general have little direct appeal to the eye, whereas shiny bright ones are enjoyable for the eye by themselves; associative and direct disadvantage and advantage are thus coherent in both cases. However, as we encounter the crude pallid yellow with the disadvantage of its meaning much more often and to a much greater extent than the

shiny yellow with the advantage of its meaning, it will at least partially depend on this that yellow appears, compared to other colors, for which the former does not hold true, has in general a certain disadvantage⁴⁰ so that we prefer, as G. Hermann noted cleverly⁴¹, to call the yellow wine to be blanc or white, the yellow gold red, and to avoid the unwelcome association with these valued objects. For the same reason, one will not like to speak of a yellow sun, yellow stars, but only of a golden sun, golden stars.

Of green, one can in general say, that it evokes a certain feeling of nature in us, because nature is by and large green; whereas there is a memory of blood and embers in the impression of a saturated red, the memory of the rose preferably has a share in the one of pink, because these colors face us in these objects not only particularly frequently but also with special demands to our attention.

A green room wall, a green piece of paper, of course, does not evoke a feeling of nature even if they totally carry the color of grass or foliage, because the circumstances under which we observe the green here disagree too much with the memory of free nature; but one will here always still be able to say that the green room wall does make a *relatively* stronger impression of a nature environment than a red, yellow, or blue one, and this impression is elevated if the floor is covered with green carpets, too, the tables are draped in green, because we then find ourselves in similar direct conditions as in the environment of forest and meadow green, whereby the memory of it emerges strongly. A room in my house that is furnished like this is jokingly called green Switzerland by my acquaintances.

⁴⁰ Maybe it does have in some regards a direct disadvantage compared to other colors, but I do not want to decide this with certainty.

⁴¹ Grundriss allg. Aesth. 79. — One will find in this work and in "Aesthetischen Farbenlehre" of the publisher in general some interesting and inspiring remarks on the aesthetic color impression; even though I do not want to agree with them all the time.

Like this, nobody thinks of murder and fire looking at the red cheek of a young girl; the impression of red here is by a too general experience reserved for *this* kind of occurrence; if we, in contrast, see a red feather on the hat of a sturdy man, that could there just as well be white or blue, we will thus be inclined to ascribe it a wild rather than a gentle meaning. And thus, the associative character of colors in general can change according to the co-determining circumstances. It is in this regard the same with colors and ambiguous words. Their associative meaning must be illuminated contextually.⁴² Only that colors are generally more ambiguous than words.

We encounter blue in very great expansion in the sky, the ocean and lakes, if a serene calm lies in nature; and it is not a reason that the associative success should not be part of the impression of blue. But the eye finds itself also directly occupied by blue in a gentle way, and one will not be able to separate the two with certainty, which one accounts for it, as everywhere where direct and associative impression are consistent.

We do not know what underlies the distribution of colors in nature in general, while one can still make speculations in natural philosophy. For the human use, in contrast, one can find several motivations, but this is not the place to discuss them; only that the once in this or that way achieved associative character is then co-determining for the further use because it contributes no less than the character of the direct impression to make a use appear appropriate or inappropriate, depending on whether or not the character determines the use itself or not. Through frequent use from this point of view, however, the associative character is only always further established and increased.

⁴² This, too, has already been remarked compellingly by C. Hermann.

According to this, one can only find the green color of garden chairs and garden tables appropriate, insofar as they strengthen the impression of the nature environment, as it associatively reminds of natural green itself and prevents that other colors assert their associative impressions, given that one really seeks to create the impression of a total immersion in the nature environment. But one can prefer the opposite, to rather let the impression of an opposing supplement of the nature environment prevail by the arrangements of social conversation, then one will have to favor white over green.

The rhapsodists that sang the Iliad dressed in red to remind of the battles and the bloodshed that the Iliad is mainly about, those, however, who sang the Odyssey wore ocean green to remind of the travels of Ulysses at sea.⁴³ The red cap fits the Jacobian, the red flag the communist not only because red is more exciting than any other color but also because it reminds of blood and fire. And who would want to give the robber or even Mephistopheles, in whom one might want to think the ember of hell itself resides, a water blue dress that reminds of the pure heaven. Black and blood red or simply fire red are the most fitting colors here. But now, as those colors have really been considered appropriate so many times, we also have a rinoldonic or mephitophelic impression of such clothing and will not seek an idyllic student underneath them.

Similar considerations as for colors can be applied to black and white; but we will leave this for now. Regarding shapes, I will make do with considering the contrast of convex and concave and regarding the positions the one of horizontal and vertical.

When a convex arch confronts the eye straight and is traced from the circumference to the peak of the arch as resting point for the eye, the eye has to accommodate to an increasingly close point; in contrast to an increasingly distant one if it is a concave arch. In the first case, the

⁴³ Winkelmann. Vers. üb. d. Allegorie. p. 401.

gaze seems to be pushed back by the convexity, in the second one sucked into the concavity without any direct reason for it; because the eye does not really move backwards or forwards then, yes, it must bulge more to see a closer point, must flatten out more to see a distant one, thus, must rather get closer in a convex way to the convexity than to back away from it, and vice versa for the concave. But now we only always see convexity pushing back, averting, excluding, concavity taking in, welcoming; and thus, an associative feeling of this does not only transfer itself to every newly seen convex and concave object, it even implants itself in the gaze itself. Indeed, the hump arches towards the stroke that it wants to avert, the breast of the proud one arches towards everything that it wants to push away from itself, the fist clenches towards the enemy to shoo him and to punch back; horses arrange themselves in a circle to avert the wolf, the bridge arches over the river to defend the one who is walking across it from it, the cannon ball rolls down from the vault of the dome, rain trickles down from the convex umbrella. In contrast, a handmade hollow, a hollow vessel, a sack cannot want anything but take something in; the hollow flower takes in the ray of sun and the dewdrop; a pothole cannot want to avert anything, one falls into it if there is no rail that opposes it with its convexity; who looks through an open door of a house finds an invitation to enter it, and when he does not see anything but its cavity around himself he is inside it; as long as only its convexity is directed to him, he is outside, he is excluded from the house. The impression of the convex and the concave accumulates from thousands of experiences like this and can carry a likable or dislikable character depending on whether it matches the current demand of exclusion or taking in. The gaze up at the high sky or at the high church vault carries the first character, the soul feels so to say elevated along with the gaze. If one would think of the sky or the ceiling as arching in the opposite direction, the impression would much rather be a depressing one, as if they wanted to press people into the

floor. Accordingly, it does not have a good effect if sometimes one sees garlands of flowers for a fair drawn from one house to the one across the street hanging down towards the heads of the people who walk below them; whereas it would not look less bad if the semi-circular flower festoons that one maintains mounting below the windows would rather be concave against the street than against the windows because one does not think about them relative to the people on the street but to the windows and the ones who look through those. If the back of a chair bulges towards the front, turning its back on our back, this is not only dysfunctional but also looks bad, whereas a slight forward concavity suits us as an invitation to lie in it. In contrast, one does not want to see a shield other than convex on the side that faces the enemy as one wants to directly behold its defensive property.

Yet, cushioned seats, couches, resting pillows appear the more inviting to sink into them the more swelling, hence more convex they are. But here the associative character of the convex that accumulates in most cases and hence is applied in most cases is outweighed by the *exceptional* character of soft elastic bodies in whom we do not see the concavity but indent it ourselves; after repeated experience has taught us that we rest the more comfortable in this concavity the greater the convexity from which it emerged.

Regarding the *horizontal* position and the *vertical* standing, it is more familiar for us to follow a horizontal line with our eyes back and forth than a vertical one up and down, and already the newborn child will rather look around than look up and down. Thus, the vertical already absorbs more strength in the direct impression than the horizontal and the character of the associative impression completely matches this. Indeed, we encounter the horizontal position in the sleeping and dead human, the lying tree trunk and the fallen column, the calm water surface, the plain that one can easily walk across. In general, everything that wants to rest lies

down and one only lies down on the horizontal; whereas humans, the tree, the column that stand upright still have to resist the heaviness and their balance against it; the wave needs strength to rise and one needs strength to climb a mountain. All this combines with the direct impression such that the horizontal extension is assigned the impression of relative rest, the vertical elevation the impression of vigorous striving. Cannelure on columns accordingly very crucially contributes to support the impression of aspiration, it repeats on every groove, whereas it would appear absurd to surround it with horizontal rings or groves while they are allowed to rest on horizontal pads. With which I do not say that this is the only motivation for cannelure, it does, however, aid the direct likability that lies in the uniform relation of the cannelures among each other and with the eye-catching borderlines of the column. A landscape in which many horizontal lines, e.g. in mountain ranges, banks of rivers, the offsets of the different fore- and backgrounds against each other, broad low buildings, etc., exist appears to have a calmer character than such that presents many vertical lines with rock spires, individual protruding trees, high houses and towers.

Burke once remarked: "Extension is either in length, height, or depth. Of these the length strikes least; an hundred yards of even ground will never work such an effect as a tower an hundred yards high, or a rock or mountain of that altitude. I am apt to imagine likewise, that height is less grand than depth; and that we are more struck at looking down from a precipice, than looking up at an object of equal height;"⁴⁴

Why all of this? -With vertical extension we do not have the difficulty of climbing as with the vertical height and when we look up on a vertical height we do not have the horror of vertigo and falling as when we look down the vertical depth.

⁴⁴ *Translator's note:* Quotation replaced with the original by Burke.

8) The Person as the Center of Associations

Provided that nature has always attached repeating physical expressions of tone, mimic, gestures, posture, motion to specific moods and arousals as well as intellectual and moral traits of human beings in the same or similar manner, and as people do not only socialize with themselves and their kind but also have the greatest interest in these social encounters, it is in the nature of things that associative memories of such expressions play an important role in the entire field of associations. Thus, each shape, each tone, each movement, each position that somehow reflects or simply reminds of the natural expression of a human mood, passion, intellectual and moral trait or utterance becomes itself via this memory in its impression crucially co-determined by those where we encounter it in the inanimate. Like this, the fall as well as the firm standing of a tree in the wind, the rushing of the clouds, etc. will undoubtedly be associatively co-determined by the impression via memories of the human, and a few lamenting sounds of nature owe their impression to such memories.

In a much appealing account, Lotze has pointed out this aspect in his “Abh. Über den Begriff der Schönheit” p.13 etc., similar in “Mikrokosmos” (1st edition II. 192) and in several other places of his history. I do not deny myself to quote the following from it. “The violence of the drives that reside in us does not only affect the course of imaginations and feelings; it also shows itself due to innate necessity in external bodily movements that bridge the intellectual value of thought and the sensory depiction. Yet even without this, strict drawings in the room, meaningless by themselves, betray the first traces of a yet playing beauty by the soothing change of tension and calamity that they grant to the circumferential eye; but for those who once found their own voice broken by pain and felt the trembling tension of the limbs in suppressed rage that which is viewable to the senses has become talking and that which they have found themselves

forced to announce externally, they will assume to lie under every similar alien appearance again. One may believe that most of our judgments of beautiful spatial contours rest on such experiences. When it has always been in vain to find a scientific explanation for the beauty of such a contour, it is because it does not operate by itself but by memories. For those who have once seen a precious figure bend and sink down under the weight of grief in wistful exhaustion, the contour of such tilting and bowing in front of the inner eye will pre-determine the interpretation of infinite spatial figures and they will fearlessly remind themselves how such simple lines of the drawing can arouse such internal feelings in them. Everybody finds his temperament and oversees his movements in the convolution of sounds. This would barely happen if a pre-determination of our bodily setup would not drive us to give a by itself useless expression to our feelings by means of sounds. With sounds and their changes memory thus connects itself to transitions of size and the kind of drives and feelings driven by which we would form the same sounds. Yes, even the memory of the extent and the tension of physical labor involved in yielding these tones themselves and in their heights and depths teaches us to search for a hint of bigger or lesser strength, braver or decreasing aspirations. The spatial conditions of architecture, its striving pillars and the broadly mounted charges above them, would only be halfway understandable to us if we would not possess a moving power ourselves and appreciate in the memory of felt burdens and resistances also the size, the value, and the lurking self-awareness of these powers that express themselves in the mutual carrying and being carried of the building. Thus, the physical life that necessarily drives the internal by means of external determinations forms a transition to understanding sensory figures and contours and even the moral, first determining only a balance of drives, then a specific kind of processes of inner events, will in the end be able to find related and similar things in these sensory images.”

Usually, one does not become clear about how much the mirror images of our own being and doing contribute to the objective impression that the world makes on us. Poetry in some way lends a hand here by expressing the associations on which the impression depends. Thus, Maria sees the clouds move by not like the meteorologist sees an indifferent mass of haze driven by wind but like a person who watches another walk, navigate, and as she wants to move on herself. Yes, poetry finds a main advantage downright translating the natural object, relation, event into a human one to utmost strongly awaken the associative impression in the shortest way. That one sees the moon between the clouds is accordingly not as poetically effective as that the moon itself looks out from under the clouds; that the wave makes a softly changing sound not as effective as that it lisps. The black abyss in a poem is not content with idly gaping in front of us but yawns at us. “There come the teasing airs”, “eerily stir the trees”, “the morning does a red shining”, etc., etc.

Nonetheless, one would go too far, which one might easily be tempted to do after the above, to restrict the aesthetic principle of association completely to these kinds of sources and effects. It is not possible simply already because the principle is not restricted to similarities at all, it is much more that spatial, temporal and causal relation play equally important roles in it. Thus, aesthetically very effective associations can also come about due to memories of objective conditions for pleasure and displeasure that essentially do not have anything formal in common with the instinctive or automatic expressions of pleasure and displeasure of our own body, thus do not influence it by means of memories.

Thus, the associative appeal of the view of an orange does surely not lie in a similarity of its appearance with any external expression of own moods but in the fact that the orange is an objective center of causal conditions of pleasure for us, and the view of the one carries the

aftermath of a memory of this pleasure which is indeed something completely different. Who wants to attribute the contribution that the croaking frog can make to our spring mood, to our desire to express it with croaking ourselves; but if it is not our own expression of the mood, it can also not be the memory of it by which it is re-evoked because what the voice lets out anyway can yet correspond to an opposing mood; it is much rather that we objectively and constantly find the frog calls in conjunction with spring and this gives it its associative value. And thus, one cannot want to claim that a sword, a crown, a bridal garland owes its aesthetic character to the memory of a sword-shaped, crown-shaped, garland-shaped expression of violence, power, love by means of shapes or movements of our own bodies.

Quite a few spots in front of a house, for instance with a linden tree, a bench underneath it and a table, appeals cozily to us, why? Because we can think of ourselves sitting comfortably there but not because tree, bench, and table themselves would look comfortably sitting.

If there should be, which I am not inclined to admit, a fundamental correspondence between our own shapes and the shapes of the external world that we like, it would not be necessary to pin the liking first on an associative memory of our own shape; rather, e.g., symmetry and golden section would be able to be liked by us because we are innately equipped to only like what corresponds to our own shapes, so to say fits directly in them, without that we would first need the memories of our shapes.

9) Analysis of associative impressions. Remarks on the creative capacity of phantasy.

Even though I have previously emphasized that the different elements do not separate in the overall aesthetic impression, aesthetics must, in order to give a clear account of its emergence, differentiate them, must ask: what is a matter of the own or direct impression and what do these or those contribute to it. Such an analysis can never be exhaustive because in

general, innumerable memories contribute to each associated impression, yes, strictly speaking, contribute to each of the entire aftermath of our lives only with a different weight for each different momentum. If we strike a point of a taut fabric anywhere – our entire complex of imaginations is comparable to such a fabric, - the entire fabric trembles, only those points the most that are closest to the point that was struck and that are connected to it by the strongest and most taut strings. Each view, however, strikes already more than one point of our fabric at the same time. But one can, acknowledging the interactions of our entire intellectual properties of each impression, set the task to find the main momenta that primarily determine the impression, yes, correctly truly study the impression in this way.

Aesthetics has, however, all the more reason to elaborate on the composition of the overall impression based from its elements as coherent impressions cannot be described at all but can be characterized according to the composition from different components for which there are many opportunities. Who wants to describe the impression that an orange, a golden sphere, a wooden sphere makes? In contrast, the same one can be characterized by the imaginations that conflated into it.

But not only through those that conflated into it but also through those that can re-emerge from it which represents a new important aspect. Indeed, all imaginations that have contributed to a mental impression can eventually also emerge from it again; it only needs a special external or internal occasion for this to happen. This justifies the possibility to concentrate oneself on the object from different, interconnected directions after achieving an overall impression which forms a second main part of the aesthetic effect of objects that does not solely rest on its coherent overall impression. This one is so to say only the seed from which a plant similar to the one that it evolved from may grow. At the same time, this resultant of memories is the source from which

phantasy springs; and as the entire phenomenon of beauty is recently so often explained with reference to phantasy, this here shall contain a call to investigate this source in more depth than I think has happened since.

According to the usual point of view one should think that unlimited capability to connect this and that to the view of an object by means of its complete power was due to phantasy. On a closer view, however, the associated impression is the given material, that phantasy can well use for that, but that it cannot create and the circle of associative moments is the scope of its movements. Now, given the undetermined discharge and the all-around concatenation of these moments, the freedom of most different directions and most different widths of discharge as well as new combinations of the associated moments appertain to it, but the elements that prevail in the associative impression will show the greatest determining and orienting force in this. One will think more easily of Italy or Sicily when it comes to the orange; more easily of richness than poverty when it comes to the golden sphere; yes, one does not automatically find reason for thoughts of this nature when looking at these objects, which does not prevent one from being able to get there in the further discharge from the center of associations through some conciliatory links.

Instead of external starting points, phantasy can have an internal reason for its creations; but the source from which it draws always remains the same. It is always the aftermath of the things that ever were in consciousness and sank into the unconscious and merged with it and that can for this or that external or internal reason step back into consciousness. Each associated impression is an already complete special combination that we have become aware of due to external reasons that phantasy can spin out individually and make it into the starting point of another spinout according to laws and motivations that we do not have to pursue further here.

One is therefore right to not only search the source from which phantasy draws in the unconscious, just not only in a primal unconsciousness, much rather it is a source that first needed to fill itself from consciousness and that can only be exploited with conscious activity. Neither do further associated impressions form during sleep nor is anything of the fabric with whom phantasy controls and with which it weaves generated.⁴⁵

10) Gradual generation of the associated impression

The mental color, to remind ourselves of this expression, that objects adopt for humans, can of course only develop over the course of life and according to interaction with it. The younger and rawer the human is, the less the mental brush has worked in him at all, the more the direct impression of things prevails. The older and more seasoned the human becomes, the more things he has encountered according to the entirety of their relations and effects, the more the mental impression of them starts to prevail.

An adult who sees the stormy sea for the first time will feel the sublimity of the spectacle in a completely different way than a child that sees for the first time at all because the former can interpret the new impression according to old ones, the latter not. The latter does not feel anything but a seething and surging on the color plate of its eye that it can only stupidly wonder about; it cannot know that violence, danger, fear, shipwreck depend on it like the former; and

⁴⁵ As at least Hartmann wants to infer the coherence of ingenious conceptions of phantasy from a primal consciousness, one cannot find a reason for it as it, like the entire unity of consciousness from which it stems, is only a matter of consciousness itself. Of course, everything that a person has coherently subordinated to the general entity of consciousness, he can also let its coherently connected remainder in the unconscious that can be raised back to consciousness and give in to new coherent creations with new moments of consciousness while consciousness does not need a primal unconsciousness to help with that.

when for the latter the impression culminates because of a ship that just got devoured by the sea, the impression of the sea itself gets devoured with this impression.

Someone born blind who has just been successfully operated will not make a different impression of the orange than of the yellow wooden sphere, the red hand and nose will appear as likable as the red cheek if the redness is only equally pure and vivid; a kaleidoscopic figure, however, he will find more beautiful than the most beautiful paintings, likely also more beautiful than the most beautiful face; even though one can ask whether instinct cannot replace something of the association, more on this later (section XII).

One probably expresses the above such that one first needs to learn to understand the shapes to get the right impression of them, and why not express it like this; only one needs to understand this understanding itself correctly, which is not the case if one thinks, as many seem to think, that the objects betray their meaning to the observer by themselves whereby he only really delves into the observation. Rather, as already mentioned, the meaning of the shape wants to be learned as well as the one of words and becomes familiar in the same way: this is the way of association. But when the basic meaning of words and forms as well as their daily recurring ways of interconnecting is familiar, one can of course also interpret long sentences and entire artworks according to them.

Insofar objects present themselves to different individuals, people, and times under different circumstances, the associated impression also adopts a different character for them which is one of the main reasons for the differences in their tastes. We will need to get back to this later.

11) The principle of higher use

The above contains the most general aspects of the principle that can mostly be explained with simplest examples. The same, however, remains valid when we rise now to the higher and therewith more composite examples from nature and art; only that therewith relations between the components come into play.

Just like an object extends in front of us whose parts are discernible, however, therewith also its associative meanings, impressions, and set themselves in relation against one another, relationships among themselves, that fall again in one result, can conclude in it, without that the distinction of the individual contribution would get lost in it. What can be distinguished in the view of one human, eyes, mouth, the entire head, breast, stomach, limbs, each part has an associative meaning on its own, accordingly makes a different impression; but also the entire human has and makes such a one wherein the meaning and the impression of the individual parts does not get lost but wherein it is integrated and concludes with an overall impression from which the individual moments can emerge again.

As well as the direct impressions cannot only be likable or dislikable by themselves but can also enter into likable and dislikable relations among each other, this also applies to the associated and the triggered individual imaginations; and as the direct impressions remain poor and low compared to the associated one, as long as we stay in the field of the visible, one can already see from this in general how much art owes its richness to the height of the associations.

In the following paragraph, the landscape impression of comparably lesser height will provide an example for a somewhat deeper discussion in this regard. We will come to talk about architecture from the same point of view in later sections (XV, XVI). Yet, the human figure counts as the most beautiful visual achievement of creation. The highest achievements of visual arts involve it or make it one of its main elements. Now, what can be liked already about the

individual figure, apart from all associated meaning, lies undoubtedly in the flow of shapes and the two-sided symmetry, maybe (conditional on closer examination) the simple proportions, as some want, or certain rhythmic relations, as others want, or the golden section, as Zeising wants, also well in something intuitively many-ness; in the entire painting the relations of grouping and color are added in which something of the harmonious and non-harmonious relations can well exercise itself. But all of this is only the low basis for the expression of suitability of the human figure for the affairs and joys of life that associates itself, and the even higher expression of the soul and the movements of the soul, finally for the general and higher human, yes, relationships that go beyond the human, that we can find in the painting as a whole. But we only insert this in the shape and color compositions that we view, according to experiences of their meanings that we made; all of this is a matter of associated, not direct, impression.

In the realm of the visible, no aesthetic impression of its own significance according to height and strength is achieved without association at all. The most significant that this realm achieves apart from this is the kaleidoscopic figure and fireworks. Only the principle of aid repeatedly provides the direct impression in conjunction with the associated one with greater meaning in this realm, too. If one flips the most beautiful painting, its inner relations on which the direct impression depends stay the same, but we stop to like it because the associations that only lend the image its higher meaning exclusively rest on the upright position; unless one could reconstruct the upright position in one's imagination from the inverted one. As colorful as an image might appear to the sensory eye, it appears colorful in a completely different way through its associations; our mind only herein finds the higher appeal and herein one needs to seek and find the coherent connection of the whole.

Also, poetry culminates in the associative factor as the meaning of the poem is only associated with the words; and meter, rhythm, and rhyme gain considerable meaning only according to the degree to which they contribute to it which does not hinder them from contributing much to the strength of the aesthetic impression according to the principle of aid.

But one would be wrong in wanting to find a similarly predominant importance of the associative factor in all arts. Rather, music faces visual arts and poetry in this regard because for music the direct factor plays the main role and the associative one only a minor one, as will be discussed in detail in section XIII; it is only very much, not all, that is to be attributed to the associative factor.

While striving to posit a coherent principle, one has repeatedly wanted to make the primary impression of the painting dependent on its directly graspable, so to say musical, impression of its shapes and colors in the same way as the one of music itself on the relation between tones and between composites of tones; but painting is in this regard more closely related to poetry than music, even though not comparable in every regard, which we will get to with some observations in section XI. Conversely, one has wanted to trace the primary impression of music back to associations but has therewith canceled the differentiation between music and painting from the opposite side.

In and by itself, of course, the striving is justified in reconciling all arts; but one misses the point of unity if one looks for it where there rather lies the differentiation. All beautiful arts have in common that they combine sensory means in such a way that more than sensuous pleasure arises from them. This is the point of unity. This success can be achieved just as predominantly through relations between the direct impressions as between associated impressions and imaginations derived from them; herein lies one of the differentiating aspects of

different arts that one of course cannot uncover if one does not clearly distinguish the associated impressions themselves from the direct ones.

If there are aestheticians that deny the associative factor a significant contribution to beauty in general and claim that its effect needs to be subtracted from the effect of an object to have its pure beauty, this is merely a doctrinal separation of which the live effect of beauty and the live terminological use do not know anything. They confuse the distinctiveness of both factors of beauty with a deduction that needs to be made on beauty and leave from the whole beauty of visible objects so to say only the carcass because the clothing of it only happens with live flesh through associations. Indeed, what remains of the Sistine Madonna after subtraction of all associations is a farraginous color plate that every carpet pattern exceeds in likability; because in that one still has the direct appeal of color harmony and symmetry that is sacrificed in each image to make room for the connection of elevated imaginations and coherent connection. If one now does not want to count this toward the beauty of an image, one fabricates a term of beauty that can well be used in some kind of system but not in life and therewith the system itself is rendered useless for life.

Undoubtedly, some part of associations really has to be separated from the beauty of visible objects; but these are only associations that are too random to also count; to separate everything from it means to separate the beauty itself as well.

Of course, one has wanted to deny a significant contribution of association to beauty just from the viewpoint that it would then become dependent on the altogether differently constructive, yes, for the same human changing circumstances whether something must be declared beautiful or not. Only the most important associations are generally imposed on humans by the general nature of humans, earthly and cosmic conditions, according to which, e.g., nobody

can confuse the expression of frailty with the one of strength and health, the expression of generosity or intellectual talent with the one of malice or stupidity; and when it comes to those associations that change according to individuality, time, location that contribute to the development of taste of different individuals, people, times, these are only significant determinants of the fact but not for the justification of taste and the term of true beauty in the sense mentioned earlier does not have to further follow from them than those individual differences themselves are entitled to do, which they really are only up to some limit, and therewith give room to the different modulations of beauty; because only that needs to be deemed as truly, as objectively beautiful that elicits immediate appreciation, that under consideration of all consequences and relations is fruitful as a whole; and the contribution of associations to this is not foreclosed.

As I remarked at the beginning, Kant bears the main blame for the prevalent view that the associative factor is only an insignificant ingredient to the impression of the pure or according to Kant's expression "free" beauty for whose ingredient he has the expression "dependent" beauty; to this one, however, he does not ascribe real aesthetic meaning. Even though he does ascribe a value to the meaning associated with a work of nature and art from a different point of view, he still does miss a main aspect of beauty with this, that he essentially excludes that which the associated meaning contributes to it.

Herbart (*ges. Werke II. p. 106*) does not go as far as Kant as he only demands that the effect of the, as he says, apperceptions (incorporation of an impression into the past nexus of imaginations and therewith its stimulation) that are inseparable from associations in the appreciation of an artwork insofar "as it does not crucially determine the perception" without, however, making clear what he counts as "crucial". From the way in which he explains some

examples, however, it follows that he, instead of searching a main factor of the aesthetic impression of artworks in associative moments, only a not completely dispensable one, he seeks a preferably rejectable auxiliary element in it and lays the main focus on the direct factor, the so-called perception. Now, of course, the main focus really lies on the direct focus in music, as we will have to discuss further, but Herbart mixes examples from the visual arts, where it much rather lies on the associative one, and from music here in a way that shows that he has completely missed the large difference that exists between the two arts in this regard. By the way, already Lotze (Gesch. D. Ae. 229) has defended Herbart regarding the overestimation of the associative moment.

The most common reason to lessen the importance of associations for the beauty of visible objects is always that one assigns what is added only by means of associations already to the impression of their form; otherwise, it would not at all be possible to underestimate their importance as it happens. This depends on the strength with which the direct impression asserts in its primitiveness, clarity, and determinedness and its emergent, very gradual, only ever firmer and more profound, finally unbreakable conflation with the associative one.

Thus, Vischer says in his *kritischen Gängen* (p. 137), and I have encountered similar views elsewhere: „Actually, the appearance, the form in the beautiful shall not mean, shall not want anything, speak for itself. A lion does not mean the magnanimity; he is just a lion, and the content of his form is simply the building force of nature in this way of depiction with these external and internal properties.”

But form and force are by themselves completely different things; a form can well remind one of the fact that it is generated by some force, as we have seen similar forms being generated like this, but do not themselves purport force; it thus indeed only associatively *means* force, and

admittedly in the case of the lion only the one that has formed it but also, and even much more, the one it can exert itself according to respective experiences. Indeed, paramount experiences belong to both interpretations; the form cannot interpret itself in this sense on its own; one much rather believes to see in it what one sees into it.

Undoubtedly though, something of the forceful impression of the lion figure can depend on the fact that one needs more vivid force oneself to trace the angular silhouette of a lion with the eyes than for the curvilinear one of a pig, wherefore one does not need memories; but if the main point would depend on this direct impression, the just as angular cow would need to appear just as forceful and randomly drawn angular lines even more forceful than the lion force. Thus, the direct effect of the lion figure may not be indifferent with regard to the impression of force, but it would not have an effect worth mentioning without the mightier associative aid.

That a lion does not mean magnanimity has to be admitted. One lacks experiences that have let us associate similar figures with magnanimity, and thus the lion figure cannot associatively mean such to us.

12) A few more general observations

If the likability of objects also crucially depends on the memory of agreeable things, it is inherently obvious that there must be something in and by itself agreeable whereby the association compared to the direct sources can only count as a secondary source of enjoyment. But here, the matter was not to seek out this direct source but only to show that among the many different sources of enjoyment in general, the secondary one of association does play one of the most important roles due to the fact that it takes in the inflows from all sources that are more primordial than itself.

Each direct as well as associative impression at the same time also depends on the makeup of the object that makes the impression and the inner (physical-psychological) equipment of the individual on which the impression is made, in short on an objective and a subjective factor. Direct, however, is the impression of an object insofar it depends on the either subjectively innate or via attention and environment in interaction with objects of the same kind developed and refined equipment, associative insofar it depends on an equipment that emerged from the fact that the object has presented itself repeatedly in connection and relation with given objects of a different kind.

Apart from these direct and associative impressions one can talk about *combinatorial* ones; they can, however, always be resolved into direct and associative ones, are thus not directly coordinated to it. Each house makes on its own a direct impression through its shape and color; an associative one insofar it appears to us as a dwelling place for a person; a combinatorial one according to the relations to its environment; this one, however, is direct if the current shape and color of the house stands in relation to the current environment, associative if the associative imaginations of the house's habitability are influenced by the associative imagination that the environment elicits.

The difference between the direct and associative impressions is not to be seen as coinciding with the difference between the lower and higher impressions, as it is much more that direct impressions themselves differentiate into lower and higher ones, and at least in the field of music they can rise to greater height, whereas some associated impression can remain very low, as in the one example where the vivid sensation of its good taste is associated with the touching of a food or the imagination of a simple thing with a certain word.

To gain clarity regarding the makeup and the emergence of aesthetic impressions, it is of paramount importance to make the distinction between their direct and their associative factor; and it has repeatedly been remarked that this is not as easily done as it should be. Usually, the achievements of both factors is more or less lumped together and namely the one of the associative factor is counted in to the one of the direct factor, from another side, however, the effect of the direct one is well conceived as being wrapped up in or disappearing in or traced back to the associative one; because as little the associative principle is common to aesthetics nowadays, it is indeed common to talk of its successes.

Both, however, cause not only deep ambiguities and skewed conceptions but have also given rise to two one-sided basic conceptions about the emergence of beauty insofar therewith an exclusive or exaggerated weight is given to one or the other factor.

That is to say, under one-sided consideration or unjustified exaggeration of the direct factor, one can imagine that form and color relations that are liked by themselves, i.e., such that are liked without regard to the associated meaning, imagined purpose, in general without contribution of association, transmit the impression of their likability to the objects in which they appear, so to say lend them their own beauty and thus make them beautiful; second, however, one can, when one-sidedly considering or unjustifiedly exaggerating the associative factor, also conversely imagine that that the beauty that we ascribe to the shapes and relations of some objects lies in the fact that the value of a meaning that is agreeable to us, a purpose that we like, the fulfillment of a terminological or ideological demand that we pose on the objects, is associatively transmitted to the external forms and relations of these objects when we view them, and therewith it lets them appear beautiful as an expression of this meaning, as a sign of this fulfillment.

Indeed, one of both views soon is asserted in the aesthetic reflection on art soon the other with a relatively greater weight, even though they do not face each other easily with full consequences as none grants the pure execution to the other. Thus, one usually rather sways uncertainly between the two or gets lost between both without getting clear on their relation.

After we have so far tried to grant the associative factor its right, we also want to satisfy the direct one in a later section (XIII), but before that we will cover a few themes that are closer to the associative factor.

X. Explanation of the landscape impression through the principle of association

Let us try to give an account of the impression that the sight of a landscape makes on us! There is something ineffable in it, something that cannot be exhausted by any description. How will one be able to explain nature and the reasons for the impression? To herewith give an example of the different ways in which aesthetics from Above and aesthetics from Below proceed in their explanations in general, I contrast one explanation of it according to both, the one, in the first way, sourced from one of the acknowledged newer textbooks of aesthetics, the one of Carriere, the other in such a way as it follows on the second path based on the principle in the previous section. The first is the most distant explanation that is associated with the highest and most ideal aspects, the latter is the closest explanation that is associated with the lowest aspects.

“The essence of nature – Carriere says (I. 243) – corresponds itself to beauty; because it is the appearance for the mind that depicts ideal content and mental laws in sensuously pleasing forms and exactly this delights us so dearly when something related to the soulful approaches the mind in the external and material. But everywhere one’s own life is the first purpose of life, each

being exists for its own sake and is not created because its figure shall delight us; it is fortunate when in the totality of the universe the interrelationship of things, the manner in which they relate to each other, displays itself to us from our point of view in such a way that we perceive and recognize the inner nature on the surface that presents itself to us, like the shapes of objects do not only correspond to the everyday purpose but also accord to the conditions and demands of our personality. Yes, we want to most notably praise the goodness and grandeur of the foundation of the world in this when substances that seem to be indifferent for the life of organisms, namely plants, or seem to be excluded from them, such as etheric oils or pigments through agreeable scents or the gloss of colors delight us.” etc.

To also show how the consideration of the individual contributes to these general considerations, it is said (p. 258) of the plant as element of the landscape:

“The potencies of anorganic nature find a central point of concurrence in the plant as here an individual idea appears as figure-shaping life force and in which a continuous creation of an organism is confirmed that is connected to earth via roots but strives towards air and light and with twigs and leaves extends to the sides. The plant illustrates the term of organic creation that we once demanded for beauty, the diversity of leaves and twigs emerges from unity and is visibly carried by it, and the interplay of the individual shapes unites to a harmonious whole.”

Against this twist in the observation our, observation from Below has of course nothing appropriate to offer. Let us take the following as simple as it appears.

To the eye of the blind-born that after successful operation sees the outside for the first time, the entirety of nature appears first as a marbled leaf because he cannot yet see the meaning within what he sees. He looks into the distance: there are meadows, fields, forests, mountains, lakes; he sees the green, yellow, light, dark blobs. Only the feeling of the far-reaching view, the

one of sensory or barely more than sensory variety, of change determine the impression that he has of the landscape. But is this also all that we get from a landscape? We also have all this, it contributes to the impression that the landscape makes on us, the mood that it elicits, even does not contribute little; but we also at the same time see in the distant forest, that is merely a green blob for the unexperienced eye, something that vividly sprouts and grows that gives shade and cooling, wherein the rabbit, the deer run, the hunter walks, the birds sing, quite a fairy tale haunts; even if we do not really see or hear any of this. We know that on the lake in which the former only recognizes a blue spot waves walk, the sky is reflected, the fish play, ships cruise, etc. Imaginations of everything that otherwise sprouts and grows and surges, resonate in this. Basically, we do not see more of the forest and lake with the physical eye than the recently operated blind man and the newborn child, that is, green and blank or blue blobs; everything, however, that we have ever seen, heard, read, experienced, thought about the forest and the lake, as well as everything that they share a point of comparison with, contributes to the impression that objects make on us and therewith makes their view into something ineffably more significant, richer, more vivid, for the feeling deeper, for the phantasy more productive, than for one who has not seen, heard, thought anything of it. And as it is with the forest and the lake, it is with all elements of the landscape, meadow, field, mountain, house. Memories are associated with everything, imaginations of comparisons, through which these objects acquire a certain meaning for us, and also their combination gains such a one for us in the same way. The entirety of these memories and the imaginations now exercises itself in merging with the sensory basis of the landscape; each detail of the landscape plays into another circle of memories and imaginations from a different side and what thus plays into can also play outwards again.

According to this, it is easily understandable in what the ineffable, inexhaustible, inexplicable lies that belongs to the landscape impression. Who wants to follow, exhaust, clarify all imaginations that have contributed to it! Already the individual objects bear a certain inexhaustibility in this regard: the landscape in a way offers us an inexhaustibility of such inexhaustible objects that form undetermined branches amongst each other with their circles of association. But here as well we can consider the main elements and thus characterize, clarify, and explain the impression within certain limits of which an example is provided below.

Now, one may object against the previous consideration that according to it those who lived between mountains and lakes, thus made their experience, must carry off a richer feeling when viewing a mountain and lake landscape than those who set foot in it for the first time while the opposite is the case. Especially the one who has never seen a lake, a mountain is most deeply moved by it. But this is interrelated like this. Everybody knows already after previous experiences what a pond and a hill is. When he for the first time steps with the association of this to an immeasurable lake, to a unsurmountable hill, this is the trigger to extend his previous limited circle of associations quantitatively, itself giving one of the most effective means of excitation and stimulation of his feeling, whereas for the one who always lives between lakes and mountains this ferment that raises the lump of associable imaginations to a powerful and vivid feeling, is missing. His feeling is, in short, blunted, as it is found blunted by beautiful objects for everybody after long travels. This does not prevent that the one who is used to living in a beautiful area wants to make do with a bad one all the less. What here the newly added element of enlargement beyond the familiar extent does can in other cases be done by another new element or another way of combination of the same elements. But if the person had not had anything from his previous life that he could extend or use in a different combination while

viewing a new landscape, the landscape would not be able to grant him more than a big carpet painted with irregular colors that is spread in front of him.

There is something that the carpet cannot grant but also no painted but only a real landscape can grant. Maybe it was noticeable when I, under those circumstances that come into consideration for the direct impression of a landscape, found the feeling of the view that looks into the distance worth mentioning. Indeed, however, a kind of sensory recovery or refreshment lies in the distance of a view compared to the strain of the eye when looking at something close that is strongest, supported by the gentle impression of the color, when we look into a clear sky, but is also not lacking when we look into the distance on earth, incidentally it may be more important for weak, easily strained eyes like mine than for the strong ones. As little as it may mean in terms of aesthetics by itself, it comes in handier than one would want to predict based on its effect according to the aesthetic principle of aid in the overall effect of the real landscape compared to the carpet, as compared to the painted landscape, which obscures our view. We do not want to ascribe everything to association after all. But the direct effect very immediately branches out to an associative one here, too, as the extension of the gaze through the landscape associates the imagination of the magnitude of the distant objects it contains and much depends on this. Only on a big lake can one truly navigate a ship; only a big mountain necessitates much tellurian strength to be lifted and necessitates much human strength to be climbed. We can only make such associations seen in a weaker version in small painted landscapes; they shrink so to say with the downsizing of the image; because even though the small nulled lake and mountain remind of the big ones and without this memory it would completely forfeit its impression, and yet the direct feeling of the view contradicts the preconditions of magnitude. Because the image of the distant lake and mountain may not be bigger in the eye than the painted landscape right

close to us but we must accommodate the eye to far-sight there and to near-sight here; and the impression that the latter is bigger than the former is associated with this; accordingly, the most expansive landscape painting almost heightens the desire to see the real landscape more in some sense than it satisfies it with an artificial substitute, as it is analogously the case with small models of big buildings. Which does not prevent that a painted landscape is preferable to a real one in other regards. The artist can indeed compose the associations more favorably than nature tends to do itself by composing the connecting points for associations accordingly; but we will not follow up on this here.

As we cannot go into all elements of a landscape in particular we first seek to give an account of one main element that one should not take for a landscape element at all without consideration of the principle of association while according to it, its important meaning for the landscape is easily explained.

Everybody will have well noticed what an appeal an otherwise insignificant landscape can gain through human constructions. Many views from small mountains owe their appeal crucially to the view over a village in the foreground of an otherwise empty area; a castle or a ruin on a hill give the appealing point to other views; others become graceful through countryside houses or farms that are scattered here and there; quite some green valley owes the interest in its landscape only to the mill with its frail footbridge that leads to it over the water that nests there. To think away human creation from such locations often means to only leave indifferent land of the lovely landscape.

Now these buildings seem in themselves so foreign to nature in terms of source, color, shape and providence that one could rather believe that they must act disturbingly on the impression of the landscape. Made by human hands, destined for external purposes, they stick

out from the free play of shapes of the creating nature with their straight sharp rectangular boundaries, and contrast their white walls, red roofs with the green and the pale colors of earth and stone. Now, the appeal of a thing can indeed be heightened by variety; but not through varieties that were assembled without principles that otherwise rather make the impression of unappealing chaos, fragmentation, dispersion; why not here as well? On principle that is immanent to the visible variety how such regardless of the meaning of symmetry makes it more agreeable than asymmetry is not to be found in the combination of human buildings with nature. And if some emphasize the rhythm as main condition for beauty, a building rather interrupts the rhythm that is typical for the freely creating nature than comply with it. What then finally remains to explain the appeal that building add to landscapes?

Only the meaning remains that we associate with human buildings. Human buildings are creations, central points, points of connection of human activity, home of human suffering and enjoyments. The memory of it weaves itself into the associations that nature itself evokes and enormously increases the meaning of its content. If, however, nature and human life would now directly be contrasted, the impression of both could remain unrelated or disrupt each other. In contrast, we find that human life is grown into nature *through the buildings themselves* and starting from there it radiates again into nature, but therewith it most variedly mediates the coherent connection the impression of which the shapes themselves are lacking. Every other type of buildings, every other way in which they socially connect or disperse in freedom, plays with different kinds of imaginations of the life and doings of its inhabitants into the impression of the landscape, and a trifle on the house can be the carrier of an effect that stands in no relation to its visible effect. Like this, smoke that rises above the roof of a little house, a small light that twinkles from a window can add a not insignificant appeal to a landscape, not as a gray column,

not as red dot, but as working point for the memory of the coziness in the house in the evening; and of this does not loosely float in the air but is along with the house woven into the landscape, contributes to the mental atmosphere that is stacked on the sensory one.

Now, one must not say, even though one has said it to me: all that which association adds to the observation of the building in nature could also be had without this observation through mere demonstration in the imagination; but then one would not have the landscape impression of the building in nature; thus, it cannot rest on such. – But what one wants to demonstrate to oneself individually, serially, incompletely, with the effort of thought, without a significantly connecting band, is gifted to us at a low in the overall impression through the observation of the building itself in nature, as a component of the observation itself. This is indeed something very different than the demonstration and a very different impression can depend on it.

I want to give a small example of this from my own experience where I faced all of this very vividly.

During the holiday season 1865, I spent a few weeks with my wife in a forester's house a quarter of an hour away from Lauterberg in the Harz Mountains. There was a green hillside across our apartment that we often climbed and from where we had a view across a broad forest-covered mountain landscape of little developed shape. Apart from the forester's house and one neighbor house in the foreground, no human homes were to be seen: only in the distance, a single red roof stuck out of the monotony of the green forest that leaned against the ascending mountains. This, however, brought its very own appeal to the otherwise simple atmosphere of the view. It simply was the point of the entire landscape. And I told myself: how, if one put just such a little red dot on a green forest, would it look just as idyllic, sentimental, romantic, fairytale-like as the red roof in the forest landscape? For sure not. But could this little red dot on

the green wall bring to mind the life and weaving of humankind with its sufferings and joys in a lonely forest nature at the same time just as well as the red roof in the forest?

When I, of course, recounted this example to someone who was educated in the school of the newer aesthetics who did not want to tolerate the introduction of the new God figure in it, that he believed the principle of association to be, I heard the following objection in the Kantian sense:

All that, he said, which the memory added to the impression of the red roof and green forest, that associated itself from accessory imaginations, does not belong to the realm of the aesthetic, to the true landscape impression, and would first need to be separated to have it in its pure form. Because the pure landscape impression, whose elicitation is especially the task of the artist, does only rest on its own in a way musical relations of shape and color that enter us directly through the eye and with which we supplement the truly visible, such as the roof of the house, the green forest area of the forest, in our imagination. Only that which the house and the forest are according to their own visible nature and how they interfere with the remaining relations of visibility with this comes into consideration for the landscape impression.

But this objection is based on the illusion that the house and forest are according to their entire own visible nature much more than meaninglessly and meaningfully with the relations of visibility interfering lineaments that are filled with colors. Only the usability of the house for living in it, only the ability of the tree to grow, and which depends on both, adds content, life, depth to the impression of that which we see of them. Yes, how can one still talk of a romantic, idyllic, historic character of the landscape at all if not that which the relations of visibility mean for the entire life of humans would only bestow them with the higher painterly meaning over the nonetheless acknowledged opposing, harmonic and rhythmic relations of colors and shapes. As

far as those are taken into consideration they themselves gain higher meaning for the landscape by means of inclusion into these higher relations and are then, of course, to be appraised with higher value than by themselves as carriers of the higher ones according to the principle of aid. But we deem this dispute resolved with this interjection as there are no arguments against the stubbornness with which it is retained here and there; to continue our mediations a little further.

It can happen, even though this is not often the case, that a building, instead of increasing the appeal of a landscape, enters unpleasingly in its impression; be it that the associative demand of the building contradicts the ones of its surroundings, the character of the two thus does not match, or that the building itself elicits unpleasant associations itself through its determinants. We would have the first case if we saw a Greek temple in a Nordic ice landscape or a Swabian farmhouse below palms. Meanwhile such buildings are not or only in special exceptions constructed in such locations; much rather these buildings appear almost always not only grown into the ground but grown from it. Each apartment so to say seeks its appropriate environment and each environment the appropriate apartment which does not prevent that the same hut finds an equally appropriate spot at the bottom of a mountain as on its peak, and a hunter's house can fit to the same location in a forest as a forest tavern; there is a certain breadth in this regard that just must not be exceeded so as not to establish the dislikable impression of mismatching according to the (p. 97) stated principle. But there truly are cases in which the building does appear so to stay detached from the environment and only as if it was placed in it; however, we feel that immediately in the aesthetic impression. So namely where the building is placed artificially in architectural perfection without regard to a connection to the environment or designated purpose that have nothing to do with the environment. As an adorned palace or a factory building with advantage does not easily tread into a landscape. The palace wants to reign

over an environment of gardens or houses but not over an unbound natural environment, and the factory building unites workers and work that we do not think of as connected to nature by any strings of interest or operation. However, nothing is more scenic than the castle on a rock that follows all ledges of the rock without consideration of symmetry, of the golden section, than the mills whose gear immediately interferes with the vividly rushing water, than the village whose houses climb a mountain slope without streets or that are scattered between orchards, etc.

The factory building to some degree realizes the second case at the same time, that the building due to some unpleasant associations disrupts the landscape impression because we then automatically think of all the drudgery of work and all the misery of the proletariat. The worst case in this regard are madhouses and jails. Many old castles and cloisters on hills and mountains are now equipped as such; as we learn this of a building, it is as if the appeal that it just gave to the landscape had been erased by cold water. Also, the impression of railway buildings outside the landscape suffers from this. One may well say that such now count towards the most important achievements of architecture. What great, characteristic works with the purest forms of architectural proportion of this kind one sees not only in one but in many places. In addition, they can show the most perfect purposefulness and who does not know the important role that purposefulness, basically also through association, plays in the aesthetic of architecture. But the impression of these buildings always lacks the full satisfaction and the final height; they do never grant the delighting impression of a palace or the elevating one of a temple. Why? Because we see in them the venue of a turmoil and busy activities that we dislike.

What, however, one can ask, causes after all the great appeal that the ruin of an old castle, an old fortress, an old church – because a ruin of a hut or the ruin of a newly built house does not do it – can give to a landscape? Does it not remind of the destruction, decay of something rich,

daring, great, holy? And are these not dislikable appearances? Yes, it can only be memories, sometimes associations, that elicit this appeal; because everybody will admit that it cannot depend on the direct impression of the shape and color of the ruin. Yes, nothing is better suited to proof the power of the associative factor regarding the landscape impression than the force with which a gray shapeless ruin works that barely stands out against the jagged rocks beneath it.

Surely now, if the ruin meant our own ruin, their view would not please us, and even the thought of a ruin that does not affect ourselves could by itself due to its displeasure content only displease; but there are countless impressions in which moments of displeasure are outweighed by moments of pleasure with which they are connected, so we will also only have to search, when it comes to the impression of the ruin, because of what and when we encounter similar cases we will have to do the same.

The ruin of an old castle easily leads us from the imagination of its decay to the romantically appealing imagination of the old knighthood, and not only that we rather remain with such imaginations than with such of decay because they are simply more appealing, also the vivid receptive arousal and occupation that leads us out of the circle of that which we are blunted towards by habituation appeals to us, according to which we even do not dislike to hear of horrors as long as they do not affect ourselves. It is indeed the case that people like to run to the site of an ordinary house fire to indulge in the pleasure of this excitement; however, when it is over with the appeal of the new, the moment of displeasure of the thought of destruction gains the upper hand and we want to see the site of the fires replaced with a new house that we then do not care about as well. Because the history of the burnt ordinary house does not have any incentive to immerse oneself in it and the new house does not have any history yet at all that we could immerse in. It is different with the ruin of something great, rich, daring, strong. Even if we

do not know anything about their true history, what we know about the past of such ruins in general does connect to such through association and can be extended indefinitely by phantasy. Like this, the ruin of the old fortress as focal point of memories of foreign, powerful, variable character introduces a strong moment of interest in such a sleepy landscape and elicits an elegiac change of pleasing and displeasing associations with predominance of pleasure overall, like a spring jolts up again even higher after each momentary pressure.

This will appear completely obvious when we now bring to mind the jail instead of the ruin. The jail now introduces a very limited circle of associations and this one is made of purely and intensively displeasing imaginations. There we see instead of the long, varied history of the proud life of rich and daring lineages that spins itself backwards from the ruin of a castle the inmates that are jammed together with their immoral lives before the background and the now sad existence, in short the worst of that which embarrassingly touches us in life is concentrated here. the jail may now be built as beautifully and recently as it may; the bad associative impression will outweigh the pleasing direct one, at least shockingly disrupt it, whereas the direct displeasing impression of the ruin cannot compete against the associative appeal of it.

Ruins on mountains make a stronger impression than on a plain, partially because attention escalates itself in the heights of the landscape, partially because the impression of one-sided domination of the environment by the building is thereby strengthened.

Partially, the staffage of landscapes with human figures falls under the same aspect than buildings. Only that humans are not just as sessile in the landscape and thus appear more like a random component that does not co-determine its impression as significantly, if they would not through their business coalesce with nature, like the shepherd on the alp, the fishermen on the

seaside. These are truly scenic elements; not all figures, however, that one sees in painted landscapes, are.

There are indeed landscapes that make a strong impression on our minds without any buildings, yes, without a trace of human existence or activities at all, such as, e.g., a gorgeous lonely mountain region or the view through a forest in sunlight, or rocks at the sea with waves surging against them. The sight of humans and their works is really not the only thing that can trigger human feelings associatively, and tragically humans can also be stirred by missing the human which does also again require an associative memory of it. But the sight of a human, his creations, his traces is in the end the most extensive and effective means to elicit aesthetically meaningful feelings in the field of the visible, and the landscape painter will rarely know how to do completely without addition of those; but where it is the case, they almost always seek a surrogate of the human in animal life which constructs the next associative bridge.

Thus, the lonely view through the forest does not easily lack deer, the cliff with the surge not easily the flapping seagull, or the seal that rests on it. If one takes away the cranes or herons from the most beautiful landscape of Lessing, a lake on a cliff that stand on it and one will have cut out one of its primary moments.

One can recall, if I remember correctly, an expression of A. v. Humboldt: that motifs that are usable for the landscape painter can actually only be found in cultivated countries; which can be apparent if one thinks of the abundance of nature in so many regions where human feet have not touched the ground yet, the cultivation of the ground has not yet taken place. Indeed, however, the elements of nature re-order themselves under the cultural impact of humans in a new way; and where nothing reminds of this order-providing impact, the impression of the landscape easily remains a rough one that is not artistically usable.

XI. Relation of poetry and painting from the perspective of the principle of association

It is a promising question what the borders between poetry and painting are, and famously Lessing's *Laocoon* mainly refers to it. His depiction is like everything of Lessing very appealing and witty; but I think that it can in some regards partially be supplemented and partially deepened by adding the views that the principle of association gives rise to, the principle itself, however, can herewith find a further explanation of its usability.

As discussed previously a point of equality between poetry and painting lies in the fact that visible shapes that painting uses just like the audible words that poetry and language in general use are carriers of meanings that were made familiar by associations and communicate the higher impression of these art forms, according to which one can call the shape of things visible words themselves. As important as this point of equality is, it does leave differences that are no less important that we want to examine a bit here.

The main difference is that the visible words of painting do indeed reflect something of the to be depicted object, e.g., the external figure and color of a human that, of course, do not make up the entire human but still a part of him, and that they only leave the remainder that else belongs to him to associative imagination; whereas the words of language (with few exceptions) are completely indifferent towards the object to be depicted and leave everything to imagination, like the word human the imagination of the entire human, the word tree the imagination of the entire tree. To which the second, alas less drastic and important difference connects that the associative meanings of words are conventional and change between different languages, whereas those of shapes are imposed on us and common property of humankind up to some limit, and of course only up to those. Thus, the words for eye and mouth and the associative

meanings that are connected to them could be swapped in two languages, whereas the associative meanings of the shapes of eye and mouth, according to which one is for seeing, the other for speaking and eating, cannot be swapped. But this is only true for the most fundamental and so to say natural meanings of shapes; apart from that one does know that meanings change according to differences in experiences made with them just as well as the one of words according to differences in conventions. And after conventional meanings of words have once crystalized through habituation, they stick to them just as firmly as the natural meanings stick to shapes. This is why the second difference is less important than the first one, at least regarding the aspect that we will focus on here.

Insofar painting now directly gives the entire visible side of an object at once and in full context and full determination that the mind still needs to associatively add to words that mean the same without being able to add them other than in ill-determined generality or in weakened clarity, painting only has an advantage regarding the sensory side of the impression of visible objects; whereas this advantage does also extend to certain limits into the circle and the interplay of the dependent associations as the associations are partially co-determined by the completeness and clarity of their sensory underpinnings.

The painted face gives us with its entire sensory overall appearance of a face the immediate expression of a certain age, a certain degree of health, a certain intellectual talent, a certain mood of the person to which it belongs, at a blow, herewith an associative overall impression that a verbal description cannot meet in any way, as it can well speak of all this but can neither exhaust nor reproduce it in its complete context in an associative overall impression. No beautiful description of the most beautiful face is possible, even less so the more beautiful it

is, so one rather refrains from it altogether and speaks only of the effect; no different with a landscape. Painting, however, is allowed to venture on both.

According to this, painting in general will find application with a greater advantage there where the main aesthetic impression depends directly on the coherent apprehension of the appearances that are manifested in one moment or on the immediate cohesion and play of aesthetically effective and satisfying associative impressions that immediately elicited it, in this regard poetry and verbal depictions in general cannot keep up with as it cannot elicit anything of the direct impression and can elicit the circle of associations that is melded with it only little by little without being able to exhaust its abundance and the overall impression that depends on its context; whereas the poetic depiction and verbal depiction in general has a bigger advantage where the main aesthetic impression depends on relations that grasp through time, space, and inner things that the sensuous appearance of a surface with the initially connecting impressions cannot keep up with.

Now, there are objects, motifs, that are according to the previous aspects are better left to poetry and others better to painting; but there are also enough that provide a common substance of depiction for both; only that both will then, to stay within their proper boundaries, need to intersect rather than cover the treatment of the same substance as poetry goes beyond the average over time that the depiction of a moment by a painting offers by depicting the temporal sequence, the painting in turn goes beyond the sweep through the temporal flow that poetry offers with its spatial extension, poetry mentally deepens the same substance to which painting gives the colored surface. When, like this, both meet each other in the same circle of imaginations, however, diverge from the points where they met, they at the same time come together in a relationship of close union and complementation, alas not only as kinds of art in

general, but they can join in a single achievement to mutual reinforcement and complementation of their effects.

If, e.g., the battle piece of an epos is accompanied by an image, the entirely undetermined insufficient imagination that the verbal description of the spatial extent of the battle can elicit is complemented, enhanced, enriched by the image or, on the contrary, the painterly depiction of a battle that may be incomprehensible to us according to its motifs and its historical or legendary context, is completed by the added historical or epic description.

Here and there one of course finds the claim posed that every good image needs to be understandable on its own terms without needing an explanation from somewhere else. Nothing is more unconvincing than this claim. On the contrary, every historical, mythological, religious, basically every image in general demands complementation by insights that cannot be derived from the image itself, not only to be understood but also to be appreciated according to its entire value and to be perceived according to its entire beauty. Only that we derive many insights that are necessary for understanding images already from ordinary life, others from the level of education that after all makes art accessible to pleasure that we can presume without being first elicited by an explanation that is added to the image. Thus, if one wants to talk about an understanding of images on their own terms, one can only talk about it in this sense. And so there are indeed countless images that are on their own terms immediately understandable and enjoyable in this sense, others, however, that are not and that one still needs to let be enjoyable. Who still needs a special explanation when he sees the birth of Christ, an ascension, a Dutch tavern scene, a landscape; everybody already knows everything that is needed to understand them, whereas many scenes from secular history and even some genre scenes still need explanation, at least a subtitle. What one can conceivably demand from such ones is only that

they already make an appealing or interesting impression without the added explanation to let the complementary understanding search such that the impression that one is dealing with does not entirely only emerge from the explanation but that it fulfills its full achievement to not expect the achievement of the whole from the complementation.

If Luther stands in front of the assembled princes and bishops in a painting, there needs to lie something seeming, elevating in the daring, calm, god-trusting features of the simple sturdy man compared to the splendor, the pride, the hubris of the convened Reichstag that stimulates further research on what all of this means for the one who would not know anything about this entire history. Would the painter not be able to make the painting effective without that which it lets us sense from undefined features, which, more definitely perceived through added history, grants us a full inner satisfaction, he would not be made for the task or the task would not be made for painting. Yet the achievement of the image is not done with this. It is rather that without the added explanation in the undeterminedness and the puzzle how everything in the image is connected, on which motif the movement and the expression depends, the impression with the merging into a unitary peak one would also miss its strength.

Now, poetry can step into an explanatory relationship with painting in different ways, and vice versa. Painters literally draw one part of their most effective motifs from poetry, Homer's, Dante's, Shakespeare's, Goethe's, and then of course they also have to presume knowledge about their works for understanding. But these motifs become the most effective ones due to the fact that the entire interest that poetry associates with the object of depiction, by means of a connection and process of imaginations that cannot be painted, from the poem for the one who is familiar with it and projects it to the painting and is able to elicit an interplay of these imaginations again, and namely a poetic interplay, which is an advantage of such motifs over the

ones from prosaic history. One does indeed in general demand of an image that it makes a poetic impression; motifs from poetry bring this, of course not completely, but half-way finished into the image.

Also, one can find a similar relationship as between poetry and painting in this regard within poetry itself. Among all the lyrical poems of Goethe there is perhaps none that awakened more vivid interest and that can shake our feelings to such a degree as the songs of Gretchen, of Mignon, of Harfner, at all than those that are scattered in his dramas and novels. In the same way, the most lyrical strength lives in those poems of Schiller that appear in his dramas, as e.g. “The clouds rush by, the oaks roar”⁴⁶, - “Farewell, you mountains, you beloved pastures”⁴⁷, - “Wand’ring clouds, sail through the air”⁴⁸. I remember a novel by Eichendorff, entitled “Ahnung und Gegenwart”⁴⁹, that, even though it does not belong to his best poetic works, is interwoven with a poetic touch, and wherein several songs in the context of the narration receive and give a special appeal.

The reason for the advantage is easy to understand according to the above. The song, on its own incapable to encompass everything that could motivate and support the feelings that prevail in it, divests itself of this and to the bigger whole in which it has been taken in and can now all the more easily be content with only presenting that with which the feelings are most directly connected where it so to say becomes densest. Meanwhile, the entire novel Wilhelm Meister, the entire Faust in the songs of Mignon and Gretchen unconsciously play into these feelings, and from the entire richness of meaningful relations that are interwoven like this, the

⁴⁶ *Translator’s note*: original “Der Eichenwald brauset, die Wolken ziehn”

⁴⁷ *Translator’s note*: original “Lebt wohl ihr Berge, ihr geliebten Triften”

⁴⁸ *Translator’s note*: original „Eilende Wolken, Segler der Lüfte“

⁴⁹ *Translator’s note*: English meaning “Apprehension and Present”

song offers us in its little peel the golden fruit. By reading Mignon's song, one sees her standing, hears her sing, and her past and future fate dreamingly floats by.

Some antique pictorial depictions explain themselves in the most simple way by the fact that the figures in them are given names – and archaeologists are often glad enough to find them thus explained, - some old German images explain themselves in the most naïve way in that the speech hangs out on a long ribbon from the mouth of the persons that are presented as speaking. Our present taste, that is in some sense well better, gets the gripes from such tapeworms because they are indeed such foreign parasites in the image that can well be colored in by associative memories but does not want to be broken with means to be so; and in any case, the inclusion of writing into an images will itself always harm more by destruction of its context than it benefits by explaining its sense, unless the hermeneutic interest prevails over the aesthetic one. In contrast, it does suit some images well if it is accompanied, be it only to refresh the memory, by the specific paragraph from prose, poetry, or the bible, in relation to which it is painted, immediately on the frame or, so as not to bother its decorative framing, in a written adjunct below it.

The painter Hübner from Dusseldorf has depicted the departing scene of the old mother Naemi from her little daughter-in-law from the book Ruth. Crying and averted, the younger daughter-in-law moves away; while Ruth cannot break away from the mother and puts the hands on the shoulder of the wistful and deeply moved looking woman. How truthfully and beautifully all of this may be depicted, the painted mute mouth of Ruth cannot give rise to her moving speech, in which she utters the decision that she does not want to leave the mother-in-law, and the meaning of the entire painting that is associated with it, than the added section in the bible that gives the speech itself is able to do; it reads: "Don't urge me to leave you or to turn back

from you. Where you go I will go, and where you stay I will stay. Your people will be my people and your God my God. Where you die I will die, and there I will be buried. May the Lord deal with me, be it ever so severely, if even death separates you and me.“

Surely, herein rests a big, yes, maybe the biggest part of the meaning of the scene for us in the words that the painter simply cannot paint and could not make guessable from the painting, and from which yet few observers of the bible had retained a clear memory from reading the bible. On the other hand it will be impossible for the one who reads the section of the bible on its own to construct the position, gesture, face of the acting persons as determinedly and vividly in conception as he finds it presented by the present of the painting. Like this, painting in combination with writing is indeed only the full whole.

Yet, it could well appear just like a superfluous pleonasm if the paragraph of Shakespeare was placed underneath Hildebrandt's famous painting "The Murder of the Children of King Edward" which follows it very faithfully:

“... lay those gentle babes ... girdling one another

Within their alabaster innocent arms.

Their lips were four red roses on a stalk,

And in their summer beauty kissed each other.“⁵⁰

Because all what this verse says is much better seen in the painting itself. Unless one would be interested in, and one can also let this interest count, knowing the paragraph of the poet that provided the motif for the image and in comparing the way in which it was used with it.

⁵⁰ *Translator's note:* here taken from the original with omissions to reflect the selection that was present in the translation Fechner quoted here.

One has to look at sonnets from a different point of view than the objective explanation that some poets have composed to complement some images, as e.g. the one of A. W. v. Schlegel has written a sonnet about the Sistine Madonna and there exists an entire collection of sonnets by J. Hübner about the main images of the Dresden Gallery. These are rather concerned with either explanation of the images or linguistic unfolding of the poetic content or impression that images give rise to or condensed summarizing and highlighting of the moments by means of which they make it. That is, like a flower does not need a butterfly to exist, but can put up with one of them once sits on it and absorbs its sweet juice.

Instead of merely transposing the memory of a work of poetry onto a painting that refers to it or to awaken it with a short addition, pictorial representation can conversely illustrate poetic depiction as it now happens so often with novels, epic literature, drama, fairytales such that one almost starts to get weary of it and to find a kind of intrusion of the visual arts into the art of poetry. One does sometimes entertain oneself with those alone. One will also not be able to overestimate the power of such a conjunction, without wanting to dismiss it; they always remain more or less two things; where poet and painter do go hand in hand but not as one person. Indeed, while it remains completely necessary for the impression of an image that depicts a scene from a poem to intervene into this impression via the memory of the poem, as it is only painted for this purpose, it is no less but necessary for the impression of a poem, that has been written without the perquisite of the illustration, to intervene with the circle of imagination of the illustration, and even though I have talked about the advantage of the supplement, as e.g. the illustration of the battle scene of an epos can grant with an image, one has to make some subtractions from this advantage upon closer consideration.

From the start, it is plausible that poetry and painting do not harmonize as an appropriate general impression and can thus not grant *effective* support for one another, as do poetry and music in a song, because poetry and music of the song flow in the same stream such that their effects immediately permeate one another, while one can only follow the poem and the illustrating image one at a time and then after all laden with the imaginations of one, one so to say loads one onto the other; but this does not happen during a break; and like a poet who is reading a poem aloud does not like to be interrupted by the audience, the reader of a poem does not want to be interrupted by inspecting of paintings. Additionally, the following comes into consideration.

When the epic poet depicts a battle, only few moments of the battle will in general effectively engage aesthetically in the depiction; and, if it is on one hand a disadvantage of poetic depiction that it *cannot* depict all moments of the battle, it is on the other hand an advantage that it does not *need* to depict them all but can emphasize those that are essential for the poetic effect and effectively weave it into the overall context of poetically effective moments while leaving aside the indifferent ones. Like this, the light pure flow of poetry arises. In contrast, the visual arts are forced to show everything that belongs to the visual context of the battle from a given spatial and temporal point in full breadth and to therewith evoke a context of associations that does complement the one that the linguistic depiction evokes but towards different sides, that do not matter here, leads one out of the depiction. Also, we are used to investigate an image not only with regard to what it depicts but also with regard to how it depicts it and fulfills its purpose, whereby we are so to say thrown out of the poetic flow and onto the land from another side.

After all, the crossover of both kinds of depiction can in some regard mutually strengthen and enrich the impression if only the point of effective crossings is brought to special attention; and right with this directing of attention the illustrating artist has to ply his art; also, the imaginations that we carry over from one depiction to another by means of association do have the inherent tendency to merge around the most effective point. Insofar one cannot avoid with all this that the image does lead away from the poetry to some point, however, one can bear the possibility of switching between the two as an advantage since every lengthy movement within the same kind or category of impressions does finally tire, the switching between the two, however, does lose the unpleasantness of a termination through the two remaining moments. And if the images follow more quickly than the wanting of a change eschews, one is free to jump over an entire series of these to later on go through them at one's leisure. If the poem is sufficiently compelling, one will do this in any case; if the poem is boring, one can compensate for it with entertaining oneself with the image if it is not more boring than the poem. I think poetry and visual arts complement each other most perfectly in Abece books, in the Münchener Bilderbogen and in leaflets; there is nothing too much and nothing too little of one or the other side; those need one another and has one another as much as is needed; only that there is too little of these to begin with and therefore too much.

One might be tempted to dismiss the explanation of poems by supplemented images and vice versa based on the repeatedly claimed aesthetic principle that the artwork still leaves room for phantasy and does not need to forestall everything. What the poem leaves for phantasy to add in would be complemented by the image and vice versa; nothing would be left for phantasy; thus, it is better to separate both than to merge them. After all, this principle does count towards the reasons to dismiss painted sculptures. And surely, if those are objectionable for this reason,

every illustration is for the same reason. But as good the authority is that this principle has invoked, I do deem it fundamentally unconvincing. Rather: the more determination of the to be depicted object the artist preempts phantasy, the more occasions he gives it to exceed that. One should not think that the artist could tie the wings of phantasy and narrow its scope with all that he can give; to do so he would have to preempt and himself give the entire world that form this scope. From each piece that he gives, however, phantasy can start a new flight; the bigger the circumference of that which he gives, the more starting points for it to continue its flight and the less it is delayed by first searching for such.

Thus, Lessing's notion from which the above rule is derived – that an affect does not need to be depicted from the visual arts on its climax to leave room for complementation by phantasy – does not seem convincing to me either.

If a screaming Laocoon would displease us it is indeed not because there would be nothing left on top for phantasy but because the pain of a person does itself displease us. Analogously for all of Lessing's examples, the one of Medea murdering her children and the raging Ajax. The fullest expression of a noble pain, a noble love, joy, enthusiasm, in contrast, will never displease us, rather it will please us the more the more we tell ourselves: our phantasy cannot surpass it; phantasy has all that more: that it can refine all those motifs, effects, relations of fate that caused the expression can expand the entire scope of it; and in addition to this it will find itself all the more animated the more it finds the expression depicted in the most succinct moment on its highest level.

If the principle was right in general, Cornelius would have done very badly in his cycle of Nibelung to let Siegfried be impaled by Hagen's spear. Only the winding up would have been allowed then; whereas the spear in the picture, not to let anything left for the phantasy, has

already found its entire way through the body and its head peaks out of the breast. Ay, one says, phantasy is not done with this because the whole past and consequence of the poem will be evoked by phantasy on this occasion in which everything culminates. Yes, this is exactly what I say; the same will be true for the climax in which the artist depicts his object; and the Siegfried who is completely impaled is in this regard more effective than the one who has yet to be impaled by phantasy.

It may well happen that one prefers the undeterminedness of vivid imagination that a poem by itself leaves to the determinedness that an image seeks to fixate. It is not easy to make someone grateful for a depiction of Mignon, Gretchen, Lotte, Otilie, Klärchen; but that is not because the painter rids phantasy of its power but because he does not satisfy it as he would therefore have to be as important as the poet and additionally in the same direction. That does not come easily. We want to find points of connection to the very deep inner poetic depictions of that personality that is held in most individual features in the picture; but it does not reveal those sufficiently or reveals different ones than we search for. In the meantime, there is no shortage of poetic descriptions where an impression can only be gained because the painter compensates for the undeterminedness that the poet has left by which we are much more enriched than impoverished. Thus, one can illustrate Tasso and Ariosto more easily than Goethe; because with the former one can achieve a lot with generally beautiful knights and ladies because the poem itself does not yield more; with the latter not.

Poetry and painting enter into the most deep and vivid interaction in a disrespected art, balladeering, because the written supplement here is represented by the living word, the linguistic impression is invigorated by rhythm and melody, emphasis, elevation and lowering of the voice and elevated by the pointing stick is kept in continuous relation to the comprehension

of the painted scenes. One should think that there cannot be a more advantageous combination; and indeed, one can ask whether this art, that has until now been referred to fairs and restricted to the rawest execution, is not capable of higher training and effect. Just look at the people surrounding the balladeer, how they stretch their necks, jaws opened wide and pick-eared. Neither the singing alone nor the painting alone would catch their attention. Thus, the combination must be advantageous. But if the raw people like the raw picture on a dirty canvas with the monotonous singing that stems from a worn-out, hoarse or croaky voice from a semi-starved figure, and that is based on bad rhyming, one should think that a more beautiful, more expressive singing set into relation with a series of good pictures, overall perfect in every relation with regard to which balladeering is still raw, could not fail to make an impression on an educated audience, too. It is only that the poem and the picture need to be designed to complement rather than to repeat one another. How boring can a poem become by describing the appearance of a person or a location in detail; the entire but never sufficient enumeration can be replaced with pointing to the picture. Yet, how long do we often need to look back and forth on a painting until the imagination finds the way of understanding in it; here it is immediately guided correctly by the tale and at the same time it is held in the right mood by the singing.

All of this sounds rather nice, as everything that can speak for such an art has been assembled here; but for most my feeling wants to speak against their legitimacy and this feeling could be right in the end. Namely, as painting and singing each by themselves become more and more refined, the tendency may grow to follow each one alone; their greater perfection thus only hampers their interaction and the continuously renewed excitation interrupts the temporal following of the singing and the spatial following of the picture – because an entirely simultaneous following is impossible despite the pointing of the stick – and thus become all the

more bothersome. This is different for the illustration of poems by pictures, where the simultaneous following of both is not forced and is not claimed at all. Rather, one only needs to turn to the other when one is fed up with one.

Yet, it is questionable whether this counter-argument beats those advantages and whether that little positive feeling has only emerged from the fact that the explanation so far accomplishes little because it could not yet be based on anything else. Now, it is my overall intention that one needs to try everything in aesthetics which is not settled a priori and I think the question about such an art belongs to these things without, of course, putting too much trust into this future art.

XII. Physiognomic and instinctive impressions

It can happen, and does often happen, that we feel attracted to or repulsed by a person right upon the first encounter before they have even done the smallest thing that would deserve our affection or justify our repulsion that they are, as one says, sympathetic or anti-sympathetic without us being able to give an account for the reasons. Women are particularly strong with such a priori sympathies and antipathies: a face is often a worse crime to them than an action. At the same time, their intuition is often right and often guides them better than reason guides us. Hartmann says: the wisdom of the unconscious does it. Well, the question is where it got that wisdom from. I think at least primarily from the fact that all experiences we have made from youth on about kindness, love, badness, meanness of humans in connection with their appearance and demeanor – though the ones that we cannot recall individually are countless – exercise a new associative result upon the view of a new human which can make us feel more or less decisively

benevolent or malevolent towards that person depending on how far it coincides with a more or less determined direction of our affinity or aversion.

One has objected to me that even small children that have yet had little opportunity to gather experience with humans reveal the most determined affinity or aversion towards a person that got close to them for the first time. But the same person from which the child has hidden in his mother's lap to begin with often becomes the favorite one after a few hours if the person only handles it right. A few rusks can do a lot to unroot the innate antipathy, or what one would want to take for it. Small children in general easily follow the smallest impression in one or the other direction like an adjustable balance beam. And then, as little experience as the child may have had with humans, the ones that it has been able to make already build a foundation for associations that are impregnated vividly in their fresh minds and make their success noticed until it is neutralized by an opposite experience. Who, however, has ever observed a child so closely that he could say which associations have already been formed in favor or disfavor of a person that it encounters for the first time, which ones will prevail, and which ones have already moldered. Often, the child will dislike merely the clothing instead of the person. Childish sympathies and antipathies are thus irrelevant to this question.

That one does not easily become aware of the associative transmission of physiognomic impressions is of course due to the fact that one likes to find a mysterious reason for it. It could be, on might well think, that two people can be tuned in or out of harmony like two strings and already sense something of this harmony or disharmony in the impression of memory without the need for any previous experience for this transmission. I do not want to say that this is utterly impossible but that it is highly doubtful facing the clear reason that was given above; and if

something of this sort should happen, which I leave undecided due to a lack of critical evidence for as well as against, this does not neutralize the above reason but only compiles with it.

Impressions that are not mediate by previous experiences of this kind would count as *instinctive* ones, and this leads us to the more general question what the relationship between instinctive impressions and associative ones is in general and how far they can replace those on which I want to make some observations that at least also touch on the aesthetic interest.

Animal instincts prove that some psycho-physical constitutions that humans need to first acquire through practice or experience can be innate. A chicken that has just crawled out of its egg immediately snapped for a spider that dangled from a spiderweb next to the egg; but how did it know that that thing was for eating? The bee searches for honey in the flowers on its first flight; what leads it to the right stash? The sight of a spider, the flower must thus be an innate constitution that triggers a similar play of feelings and drives that the view of a delicious fruit triggers in us after previous experience when it immediately stirs our desire to reach for it.

One can search for the source of instinctive constitutions in this and therewith seek to bring them under a common viewpoint with the associatively acquired ones in that they, too, were acquired by the ancestors of the beings that have them over the course of their lives or generations and were only transmitted to them via inheritance. This is mainly in line with Darwin's theory and finds support in the fact that some of the instincts of bred animals have come about in such a way, like the instincts of the sheepdog, the basset, and the pointer. Of course, one can oppose this by saying that if the bee first needed to *learn* to find honey in flowers, and the spider first needed to *learn* how to spin a net, both would have starved a long time ago, since chance and fight for existence, who needed to replace the human teacher, would not have fed those animals until they mastered their skills like him. The fundamental instincts

seem to have an even more fundamental reason, which does not hinder them to be developed and modified into certain directions by education. Thus, I rather imagine, in accordance with a view that I have developed in my “Thoughts on the history of creation”⁵¹, that the organization of bee and flower that had still been uniformly connected in the proto-system has dispersed during the dispersion (differentiation) of this system in the specialized realms in such a way that both are still connected by mutually effective connections that serve the preservation of the whole and their own survival. Of course, this is not very Hückelian.

But we at least let the decision about this question open. The fact of instinctive constitutions in animals, however, remains and even humans do not lack them altogether; that the child recognizes the mother’s breast that it sees or on which it is laid as a means to satisfy its drive, in general that it starts to suck on any round object that is put in its mouth, belongs there, and this is not quite immediately innate but develops naturally from an innate predisposition, later awakens a sexual desire upon the sight or touch of that which can satisfy them.

Accordingly, the task is to also take an instinctive factor into account when looking at the impressions that objects make on us on top of the direct and associative ones, i.e., to investigate what comes into play through an innate rather than acquired constitution, between which and the instinctive ones there is by the way no such strict terminological distinction that one could not also explain the liking of symmetry as the object of an instinctive constitution.

An aesthetic interest of considering the instinctive impression is of special import to the question about the reasons for human beauty. Does a person’s liking of the human figure mainly depend on an innate constitution, or respectively on an innate predisposition that self-develops, or on a constitution that is acquired by means of association in interaction with humans?

⁵¹ *Translator’s note:* Original: “Ideen zur Schöpfungsgeschichte”

In this regard, the following seems to be worth considering.

If in general instincts of a very decided direction are already less common in humans than in animals, one will still have to admit our instinctive sexual and social drives, and as all animals seek their kind sexually and many also socially, while the corresponding constitution also relies on the sight of the figures, the same may be true for the human in its natural state, and indeed human liking of the human figure, as a moment of pull of humans towards each other, will mainly be an instinctive one. At the same time, all purely instinctive impressions and drives of human and animal are only of a very simple and natural kind and much more so in humans than in animals, the successes of the instinct are modified and turned to higher paths through interaction with their kind and others; it is for this reason that liking is bound to very different states of the human figure in different people and when it comes to equally educated people, the expression of character, which is only understandable by means of association, and of physical and mental talent determines liking from a higher standpoint.

A question of considerable interest is related to this that I deem neither answered nor dare to answer myself, namely, whether the expression of simple movements of the soul on the face of a human, of joy, of pain, of affection, of anger, finds its interpretation in others only associatively as a result of previous experience or innately, instinctively. To defend the first view, one could for example say something like this.

There is no reason why the smiling of the mouth or the angry glance should tell something different or something more about the mental life of a human to begin with than this or that positioning of the legs and hands. One could try whether one can scare a child that has never seen an angry glance combined with angry actions by looking at it angrily. The child needs to be trained in such a way as to understand that glance, just as the hunting dog needs to be

trained to understand the words and look of his master. However, the training of the child creates itself. Because it sees the same expressions during actions of the same character of friendliness or anger reappear while the positions of arms and legs change randomly, the association with the former becomes stable whereas the one with the latter dissolves again because contrary associations destroy one another. However, if the child saw the mother sit down a little or stand up to caress it, it would become just as a significant marker of friendliness as the smiling face, just like we have learned to view the gentle forward leaning of the head as a sign of friendliness⁵². Like this, each face, each feature, yes, each movement acquires a physiognomic meaning for us. If one did the crucial experiment in this regard – of course this cannot be asked of parents – to always smile at an infant from an early age while one beats it and to look at it terribly while one gives it food and caresses it, the meaning of the smiling and angry face will reverse for it; yes it will, as long as it cannot yet compare its own face with the one of theirs in the mirror, believe that it smiles when it looks angry and to look angry when it smiles because it will also associate the same expression of the feeling that it has always experienced in others with its own feelings; and of course it will feel like becoming insane when the look into the mirror will finally prove the opposite.

It might be so; but has one really tried the crucial experiment; and even if the success was such as it is presupposed here, nothing would be strictly proven because the instinctive drives, why not also instinctive impressions, can be suppressed and outweighed by training. Probably even the child that saw actions of friendliness of others always accompanied by an angry look

⁵² *Translator's note:* In German, the author adds that the "Vorneigung" (leaning forward) of the head in such a way can thus be seen as the origin of the German word "Zuneigung" (affection).

would thanks to the innate addiction to imitation start to accompany such actions with an angry look despite an innate drive to do the opposite.

Experiments of stricter success than on small children that cannot attest to their impression and cannot concentrate their attention might be done with people who are born blind and only underwent surgery as adults. Will those be immediately able to distinguish the expression of happiness, of pain, of love, and of anger on a face after the cataract glasses⁵³ enabled them to see something clearly after all? But probably they will not recognize a face as such in the beginning and thus nothing definitive could be concluded. Granted as well that the child had an instinctive appreciation of a friendly face, this instinct could have all the more withered in an *adult* that has not seen anything from childhood on as the sense of touch has taken over the role of the face for him. Indeed, people who are born blind are so completely disoriented after the surgery in the realm of vision that they at first close their eyes to find their way.

Now, the fact that there at least exists an innate constitution to *actively* express our feeling much rather through these than those facial expressions, gestures, sounds, implies that there is an equivalent innate constitution to *understand* this expression when made by others if there are any instinctive insights; yes, when it comes to the wooing sounds of animals one cannot doubt it; the question is, however, how far this generalizes. Also, it is a fact that proves that the instinctive association of one's own mindset with the according external expression is at least something much more secure and defined than the recognition of a stranger's one. One can find through observation that the *imitation* of bodily expression of a foreign mental state teaches one to understand it much better than the mere viewing of this expression because an aftertaste of the

⁵³ *Translator's note:* "Staarbrille" was used by the author in German, referring to "Staar", a common name for either a cataract or a glaucoma.

foreign mental state is inversely associated with it; and even though this fact is not widely known it seems to be true in general. Like when I walk behind someone that I do not know and imitate his gait and his behavior as precisely as possible I will strangely start to feel just like I think that the person himself must feel; yeas, to patter or scurry after a woman so to say puts one in this female mood.

I read the following in Burke (On the Beautiful and the Sublime) that belongs here

“To this purpose Mr. Spon, in his "Récherches d'Antiquité," gives us a curious story of the celebrated physiognomist Campanella. This man, it seems, had not only made very accurate observations on human faces, but was very expert in mimicking such as were any way remarkable. When he had a mind to penetrate into the inclinations of those he had to deal with, he composed his face, his gesture, and his whole body, as nearly as he could into the exact similitude of the person he intended to examine; and then carefully observed what turn of mind he seemed to acquire by this change. So that, says my author, he was able to enter into the dispositions and thoughts of people as effectually as if he had been changed into the very men. I have often observed, that on mimicking the looks and gestures of angry, or placid, or frighted, or daring men, I have involuntarily found my mind turned to that passion, whose appearance I endeavored to imitate;“

If the insight into the foreign mental state through his bodily expressions was a matter of an instinct that is just as crucial as the expression itself, one would not need imitation to get a better insight. From a different perspective, one should not forget that we are dealing with complex mental states here, whereby one cannot exclude the possibility that the expression of the simplest mental movements would be just as surely understood as done. However, we can leave

these questions unanswered here easily since they do not penetrate the field of our aesthetic observations deeply.

XIII. Representation of the direct factor of aesthetic impressions towards the associative one

1) Preliminary remarks

We have discussed that not only the associative but also the direct factor has suffered wrong during the change and dispute of aesthetic views in general; and after we have earlier sought to preserve the right and importance of the former, we now want to equally meet the needs of the second with the following observations.

Nobody doubts that shapes, colors, tones, and even relations of such can please or displease us more or less regardless of the associated significance, meaning, purpose, and without any memory of an externally or internally earlier experienced one, in short due to direct impression. Regardless of associations, everybody likes a pure, saturated red or blue more than dirty pale ones, and the combination of red and blue more than of yellow and green, a pure full tune more than an impure one or a shrieking one, a symmetrical rectangle more than a skewed one; uniformly connected variety in general more than monotony or an irregular mess of shapes.

However, where association is added it can disrupt as well as increase the pleasantness that depends on the direct impression. All of this has been in part silently presupposed, in part discussed in depth in previous observations, over the course of this discussion, however, it has been claimed that while for the visual arts the associative factor plays the key role, that part is taken by the direct factor in music.

The latter claim shall now find its explanation and as far as possible rationale in the relations I will point out, after which I will show that while the direct factor does play a much more subordinate role in the visual arts than in music, its effects cannot be disregarded.

2) The direct factor in music

All distinguishable moments that contribute to it or of which it is composed play a distinguishable role for the impression of music, insofar as with a change in each, the same impression changes in a different way. Language, however, has no means to describe all modifications and changes of the impression sufficiently and exhaustively, if not by naming the source moments on which the impression after all depends.

In the meantime, one can for an overview summarize the kinds or sides of the impression that depend on modifications of tempo, tact, rhythm, the direction and the change of in- and decrease on the scale of strength and height of tones under the expression of musical mood, whereas those that depend on the relationships between tones (sounds) that are mediated by the overtones as feeling for melody and harmony, and therefore in short one has to distinguish an element of mood and a specific element of music, insofar the latter is more idiosyncratic to music than the former.

The primary effects of music rest on those two elements, in fact collective elements; they are independent of associations of imagination and as much as one can connect them to imagination, memory, and their results regarding the things and relations outside of music, it still remains incidental to the primary musical effects and changes within some limits according to random incidental circumstances for the same music.

The here so-called musical moods partially coincide or are reminiscent of such that can exist even without the influence of music in a human, e.g. the mood of joviality, of serenity, or

even of sadness, of excitement or gentleness, of strength or leniency, of grandeur or sweetness, of the more or less easy flow of inner movement. Let us call such moods *life-related moods* of music for short in the absence of a different expression. Even though the musical moods are therewith by no means exhausted, - because for how many will one not find a different characteristic than through musical figures or gates themselves on which they depend – they are still of special importance insofar as music finds its only means in relating to other arts and the life outside of music in them.⁵⁴

Regarding the life-related moods, one may well pronounce as a principle that the determinations and relations of music through which such a mood is evoked basically meet the active expression of the same mood in the voice and movement of humans as far as this is possible given the different constitutions of musical instruments and human organization. Funny music has a different tempo, a different rhythm than such that is tragic and one's own expression of funniness and sadness in voice and movement show an analog opposition. Still, it is not at all necessary to presume that we first need to *remember* an already expressed active expression of the same mood for the music to get us into a mood of the given character; the equivalence between the two respective moods is itself naturally based on the correspondence between the rhythmic and overall for movement relations that are characteristic for the mood that are evoked in us by the music that stand in a natural relation to our moods to begin with. Since the active expression of our moods is nor primarily melodic or harmonic, one has all the less reason to

⁵⁴ Whether the life-related moods, as we have called them here, are at least partially influenced by the melodic and harmonic relations between tones and sounds can be doubted; but it is at least not necessary to presume it. Doubtlessly, the direction of the in- and decrease and the switch on the scale of height of the tones have an effect on it, and one otherwise traces the melodic relations themselves back to it; but if Helmholtz's notions, as it appears, are right in this regard, it's not the height-relations themselves that give the melody but the relations between the overtones that come along with it and without whom there cannot be any height relations.

make the impression of melody and harmony of music dependent on the memory of such an expression.

However, there are feelings of several kinds that have a greater determinedness over the above mentioned life-related moods that can be evoked or entertained by music and that still have a very general character insofar they can be common to very different series of imaginations in that they are complicated with associative imaginations of future, past, lost luck or misfortune, or of relations of affection and repulsion towards others, such as the feelings of hope, fear, longing, melancholy, love, of hatred, anger, of revenge; - and thus, Hanslick⁵⁵ is undoubtedly right when he denies music the ability to evoke such feelings with precision or, as one says, to express them. It cannot because it cannot elicit the characteristic associative imaginations of those feelings with certainty. It is different with those general moods. It indeed requires no association to be calmed by calm music, to be aroused by vivid music, to be saddened by sad music. No funny melody fits any sad song, no sad one a funny song. Insofar associative imaginations can carry one or another character, their own appearance is facilitated by this or that mood and sometimes music of that mood, but the mood is not just evoked by the association. And since the same character of mood can be common to very different series of imaginations, e.g., sadness can have very different sources that form the content of the sad imagination, it will remain undetermined in general, too, and it will only depend on random subjective or objective auxiliary conditions whether some music of a given mood characteristic brings along this or that one of the series of imaginations that are at all compatible with it.

In addition, the musician's sense for the impression of musical relations is not refined due to the fact that he gains an associative and not musical meaning the longer the more but from the

⁵⁵ "vom musikalisch Schönen". Rud. Weigel. 1854

fact that he immerses himself more and more into the field of tone relations, learns to grasp higher and more tangled relations between them that escape the raw and untrained perception. In this regard, they remain a matter of direct impression.

Nonetheless, the rhythmic movements and relations of music, the changes and contrasts of strength and weakness and even the sound of some tones of it can immediately remind one of some things outside of music, such as the wash of the waves, the boom of the ocean, the drizzling of the stream or the rushing of a waterfall, the murmur or howling of the wind, the rolling thunder, the falling of the snowflakes, the horse's gallop, the flapping of birds wings, the quavering of the larch, the song of the blackbird, etc.; and thus one has to admit that associative imaginations also play a role for such a kind of music in the same sense as memories of all kinds of yellow, red, concave, convex objects can play a role when looking at yellow, red, concave, convex objects; but still only incidentally play into one's own impression. And thus, one does not understand why one should ascribe the main impression of musical relations first to the imitation of others, to memories of them, why it does not have the right to make its own impression known, make it known from the start mainly and independently from such memories whose silent contribution is not excluded but is still not crucial and almost always only a faint trace. No music perfectly represents in its full execution the wash of the waves or the horse's gallop, etc., it is rather that the memories of it that the music awakens are just as easily disturbed, suppressed, destroyed, as they reveal themselves if they reveal themselves at all. For specific musical feelings, however, that depend on the interconnected melodic and harmonic relationships of tones, there are only very incomplete analogs in our remaining circle of experiences that not even faintly echo the magic of music; but why should one first point to such analogs to explain the magic as a result of a memory of it.

One may accept it from the view point of a very general comparison if Lotse (Gesch. P. 490) says: "That the tone types represent this infinite relatibility, comparability, relatedness and nuanced differentness of world content through which it can happen that the variety of the real, that is evenly subordinated to the general laws, forms at the same time an orderly whole of elements that point to one another, merge into one another or of mutually exclusive genres;" but I do not similarly want to say that Lotze is right in saying that the "memory" of these relations of world content are what makes the figures, rhythms, relations of music valuable to us.⁵⁶ It is much rather exactly because music itself is the most beautiful example of a valuable providence, relation, nuance of world content that there will be no need for memories of something beyond music to elicit a valuable impression. I also do not believe that Mozart and Schubert were people who were determined by memories of the fate of the world beyond the world of music when creating their symphonies; yes, one can ask whether a movement of the spirit in big and harmonious relations of life and thought outside of music are more productive for such inside of music at all. When it comes to this, an antagonistic relation can emerge in this regard just as easily as a sympathetic one.

Undoubtedly, the entire mental possessions of humans can be set to oscillate by the interference of music, and depending on whether these possessions are meaningful or meaningless, which depends on the past education of the person, music will be able to have meaningful or meaningless effects through the oscillation or mood that it puts these possessions into; yet, someone can be relatively little educated in general and receive stronger direct musical impressions, understand music in its actual sense better and more gravely than the educated one

⁵⁶ „We do not conceive of the value of those as one in itself, they appear beautiful by evoking the memory of countless goods that one can think of within the same rhythm of events and only within it.“ (Gesch. p. 487). See also „Ueber die Bed. D. Kunstschönh.“ p. 24

if he is more experienced than the latter with understanding and following musical relations and has a greater musical predisposition, even though he has little to associate and the other has more and meaningful ones; only that the byproduct of music is more important to the latter.

The above does not prevent us from reminding us in a general observation of the arts, as required by the path from Above, that we have to come to meet with our path, of the subordination of musical relations to valuable more general relations of the world as a whole, it is only that I do not want to seek the specific effect of music in such a memory.

Regarding the rules that musical likability depends on, one has to refer to works in the specialized field of music. The most fundamental laws in this regard, of course, seem to still be obscure to me, or at least yet lack sufficient certainty. I believe that the principle of coherent connection of variety plays a key role in this, on top of which (regarding the dissolution of dissonances) a principle of aesthetic reconciliation may be considered, too. The relation between tact and rhythm, the relations of the different keynotes regarding the match and mismatch of overtones as well as among each other, and the building of higher relations above the lower ones between them provide working points for the first principle and indeed most varied and changing ones. The principle seems to in a way develop and indulge in it with pleasure, and in all the higher regions the higher the musical development rises. No other field provides a playground of more favorable conditions in this regard. Yet, one has to admit that this principle is, in the same generality that one has given it so far, much too ill-determined to base a music theory that is executed in detail or even a measure of musical likability on it. The fundamental task in this regard will be hard to solve and I myself forgo an attempt to do so.

Hanslick compares the impression of music once with the one of the arabesque and another time with the kaleidoscopic figure in his writing (p. 32. 33). Both comparisons are very

fitting and explanatory up to a point, even though only up to a point. The points of comparison are that both figures just like musical ones, if one wants to talk of musical figures, have an aesthetic effect without essential contributions of associations, just that one may only think of the arabesque as the winding and twisted features of uniform characters without the, usually contributing, botanical, animalistic and human constructions; - second that for both visual and auditory ones the reason for likability can be sought in the principle of coherent connection of variety. Yet even granted that all the visual figures are far from making a musical impression; and that is due to the more general differences that deny the visual arts to make music at all. It is not a crucial difference that arabesques and kaleidoscopic figures present themselves to the eye as permanent, whereas the figures of music disappear over time; not only that one can follow the arabesque with the eye and attention over time, one also recovers the temporal sequence of music in the play of changing colors in the play of the color piano, namely in the magnificent spectacle of Kalospinthechromokrene, and one may indeed say that if anything in the realm of vision comes close to music it is such a spectacle. Yet, this best approximation leaves a very big gap between the two. Why? – The following differences are easy to find:

Every tone (sound) that can be used for music that we hear is comprised of a keynote and of specific graded overtones that differ by whole numbers on the harmonious musical scale and that are distinguishable by attention to some extent⁵⁷, whereby, as already remarked, various

⁵⁷ Even for tones that are produced outside of our ears as simple ones, this is the case: they all give the series of so-called harmonious tones, that are produced in our ear according to its setup with the externally produced keynote, that a picked string delivers as overtones along with the keynote, even though with less intensity than when the objective conditions for their generation are fulfilled. It may also be that the harmonious tones that ordinarily constantly accompany music produced by the human voice due to objective creation, the internally produced ones also then when they objectively lack, are brought to consciousness more strongly. See also Helmholtz, *Tonempfindung* (3). 248. 249 and a figure by J. J. Müller in the *Berichten der Sachs. Soc.* 1871. 11 5. – The conscious separation of overtones and keynote without recruiting special tools does succeed only with a lot of training and effort of attention (see also *Elements of Psychophysics* II. 272); undoubtedly, however, the indeed existing possibility of

relations of equality and inequality between the different tones that also vary in height are enabled. There are indeed composite colors as well as composite tones (sounds), yes, it is plausible⁵⁸ that even every objectively simple homogenous ray of color in the optic fiber or the conjunction of optic fibers that it hits elicits a color mixture only with the predominance of one color. Yet, the components of a color mixture are not absolutely differentiable by attention⁵⁹, hold themselves everywhere only within the limits of one octave plus one quart because the visibility of colors does not go further at all, and are in general much rather analog to the composition of noises than to the composition of a musical tone (sound). With such means, one would not be able to make music in the realm of tones and one can already explain based on the above differences why the spectacle of the Kalospinthechromokrene much rather only makes the impression of a magnificent succession and juxtaposition on us than a simultaneous internal connection like melody and harmony. But it is questionable whether the previous points have struck and exhausted the most fundamental differences between tones and colors that are important here; in any case, there are still deep but until now insufficiently uncovered differences. Why, e.g., does the perception of tone height continuously rise with the number of oscillations without a change in character whereas with color a change of characteristically different perceptions, red, yellow, blue appears that does not have anything in common with the differences in perceived tone height. Why does the clash of all tones of an octave produce an

separation has an influence on the comparison of two tones, or rather sounds, insofar one considers a sound to be a tone with overtones according to strict distinction.

⁵⁸ Comparison in this regard in Elements of Psychophysics II. p. 304. *Translator's note*: page numbers refer to the German version cited by Fechner.

⁵⁹ This probably depends on the fact that they are not just like a mixture of tones perceived through different nerve fibers.

unpleasant noise while a corresponding pleasant one would be expected from white light, etc.⁶⁰ I will not go deeper into these unsolved questions.

As the musical impression via transmission by the nerves are transplanted to the soul, while the external oscillations of music do still evoke corresponding internal nerve oscillations, one has repeatedly gone back to these inner nerve movements to explain the psychological effects of music. And why not; only that one does not proceed a hair's breadth further like this than with reference to the external oscillations because why do these internal oscillations elicit those psychological effects? This is a question of inner psychophysics which, however, does not have a more certain answer than the external psychophysics on the question why, i.e., according to which laws, external oscillations have this effect. If the internal one should ever be able to give the answer it could still only be due to experience with the external psychophysics. And we have already been repeatedly reminded that aesthetics in general cannot yet get involved with questions of inner psychophysics. The related casual remarks are just to be taken casually.

Let us leave aside all fundamental questions that cannot be solved yet and get to some that lie closer to the surface and are thus more accessible for discussion that have much rather been touched than discussed above but have occupied the music world many times these days and are governed by a contradictory theory. Let us in the following, for the sake of brevity, call the life-related moods of happiness, serenity, excitement, gentleness, etc. that music can elicit, or as one says, express, mostly as simple *moods*, and the feelings of love, longing, etc., that music cannot elicit due to their complication with associations of a special kind, plainly as *feelings*, and let us look at the relation of music to the two a bit more closely.

⁶⁰ A more in-depth compilation of the discussion of relatedness- and difference-relations between tones and colors can be found in *Elements of Psychophysics*, II. pp. 267. *Translator's note*: page numbers refer to the German version cited by Fechner.

The character of a mood that is given by music can prove this character in four ways and if one says that music grants the expression of a certain mood, one basically understands this as nothing but such a proof. For one due to the fact that people who encounter it in a neutral state, assuming their receptivity for music, are put into the given mood; second, that it, if they are already in the given mood, keeps them there and enhances this mood; third, that it, if they find themselves in the opposite mood that is not too strong, overcomes it and replaces it with its own character of mood; but fourth, if the opposing mood is too strong, it does not overcome it but makes its continued opposition known with displeasure, whereas if its character meets the established mood, the harmony is perceived as soothing which also occurs if the opposing mood has been overcome and thus the matching one prevails. Indeed, one has to consider the match or mismatch between the aesthetic effect that music can have apart from the given mood with the music itself as an element of the aesthetic effect.

The above is the reason why funny music can cheer up the sad one whose sadness is not too deep, whereas if the same one is deeper, it only evokes discomfort and makes him, if possible, retire from it, whereas music that expresses sadness can appeal to him even though its character of mood can only strengthen his displeasure and lets him sink all the deeper into the imaginations that carry this character; but this moment of displeasure is outweighed by the cooperation of two pleasure moments, the match of the character of excitement that he receives from the music with the existing mood and the specific appealing impression of the music that remains even if the character of the music is tragic. The corresponding application of this to the funny is easily done. The tired one, if he is not too tired, will find himself encouraged by cheerful music but if he is very sleepy he will only be disturbed with displeasure.

That the specific appealing impression of music is a true and crucial part of the soothing impression that sad music makes on the sad one follows from the fact that if one drops it the soothing character of the impression is cancelled, too. Music with heartbreaking dissonances may well suit the mood of someone but nobody will want to hear it. On the other hand, one will overall want to hear upbeat music with the same perfect musical composition more often than funeral music because the mood character of the former is more advantageous. However, if one, even without being sad, sometimes likes to listen to sad music it is because, apart from the appeal of variety, we feel the soothing influence of it once we are put in the mood of the sad one as the perseveration of a mood that has been introduced by the music by the continuation of the music grants the advantage of a match between the later mood encouragement and the existing mood. In this regard, the modifying thorough composition of a song is a disadvantage compared to the (in other regards advantageous) repetition of the verse's composition given that they fit the mood character that dominates the song overall well. Which does, by the way, not exclude, for one, that deviations from a basic mood that conciliate in the process can be advantageous and that the thorough composition has different advantages than repetition that can dominate under different circumstances which we will not get into detail about here.

Regarding the feelings that music cannot evoke with the same certainty as moods, music is completely indifferent to them because these feelings, without being entirely comprised of moods, do partake in their character, and depending on whether they appear in this or that mood character, they are influenced by music in the way described above. Yet, because the mood character can change within the same feeling, music's influence on it will change as, e.g., the feeling of love can become soft or fierce, even stormy, that is it can raise to the highest level of

arousal, anger can be calm or very excited, from which we can see that one cannot certainly hear whether music wants to express love or anger, if it wants to express anything at all.

At the same time, not every feeling can adopt every mood character as easily and many a feeling cannot adopt many character at all; e.g., the feeling of hatred, of fear not the one of cheerfulness, loveliness, the one of melancholy not the one of strong excitement; and if love admittedly can appear as the state of highest excitement, anger as silent fierceness, it will always be an exception. Thus, not every music of a certain mood character can fit every feeling as well and as often, too. Melodies of songs that express love, hope, longing, melancholy may be easily confused as equally fitting for one as for another feeling, but they will not be confused with melodies of songs that express anger, hatred, revenge, fury because the mood character of those two types of feelings is not or only exceptionally confused. Also, not every character or every modification of it will be equally advantageous for the feelings of changing mood character, thus, there can be a choice from this point of view in the arts. In short, by transmission of musically expressed moods that contribute to more defined feelings, those will also be accessible for a more or less suitable expression through music with some, of course very soft, limits.

When it comes to melodies and songs that express a certain feeling of love, longing, etc., one is an interest in keeping the character of the accompanying music as adequately as possible for the mood character and thus for the feeling itself, and one will be able to ask whether the character has not been missed. In this regard, it is the same with the melody of the song and its meter as with songs of different content where one cannot confuse songs of any content. By contrast, autonomous music pieces, such as sonatas, symphonies, and others, it does not make sense to ask which feelings are appropriate or to try to heighten the uncertainty in this regard that cannot be elevated anymore. They are not, after all, like the composition of songs, calculated to

support certain feelings of love, longing and the like, but to entertain with the specific musical and rhythmic relations within the mood character that depends on those and that cannot even be easily or purely traced back to a (life-related) mood character that can be elicited without music, independent of which feelings this mood character can be set in relation with. Wanting to guess this would not only be in vain but also distract from the main musical impression, while the uncertainty and therefore the guessing automatically ceases to apply during the song's composition because the song, among all the feelings that the composition could be related to, pronounces the one that it shall be related to and now also really does relate to because the feeling in the song truly pronouncedly goes along.

Similar observations that partially connect to the above are to be made if one asks how far music can give the expression of any one non-musical *event* and can be right in wanting to give it. Earlier, we have listed some things that music has in common with the world outside of music, yes, it can, as Lotze has highlighted, have more general and higher things in common with it in its rhythm and its kinds of relations. Insofar and as far as this is the case, it will be able to serve as introduction to or accompaniment for a poetic respectively dramatic depiction of an event or an event itself outside of music in four ways: First, to more effectively show off the moments or the rhythm of that event, as far as they truly serve its enforcement, second, to support the mood that is associated with it, third, to convey the coherent connection of the specific musical element with the content of the event, fourth, to enable a commonality and mutual reinforcement of liking of both via this mediation.

Of course, it is best if these aspects are fulfilled together as much as possible but the first two, on which the *characteristic* of music depends, can also stand in conflict with the demands of the specific musical appeal, and one may not grant absolute and exclusive right to either of

both sides. This is because as characteristic as the music wants to be, if it did not include moments of musical appeal, too, or let them fade too much, it would – as it captures attention just as well as the poem and not only in relation to the poem – easily bore and tire, whereas it would only grant a scattered or even contradictory impression if it would not want to care at all about fitting the content of the poem that it is explicitly set in relation to but only follow its own patch of musical beauty. In the end, opera grants a great concession to musical beauty at the expense of adequacy because people sing more than they speak; if the relation to content shall break, too, everything is over; and practically, one has never gone to a full extreme in that sense. In the meantime, music may not want to end in characteristic let alone because it *cannot* end in it; its specific musical element and partially even its mood element transcends this and also makes its demands that want to be met.

The characteristic will primarily always have to be handled such that only those moments are brought to attention by it that also match the desired mood character. A definitive demarcation of the characteristic in this regard from that which is commonly accused of being tone painting is not to be found and the abjection only starts where it does not meet the requirements of either the desired mood character or the specific musical appeal.

Characteristics in the sense above of course do not play a role for autonomously appearing music because the task here is not at all to depict something that exists outside of music or to support its impression. This does not exclude that one finds commonalities of character of music with other things but one can leave it to wit to search for them and to phantasy to imagine them and does not have to find the actual meaning of autonomous music in this. If, as it happens, a musical composition that was made for independent appearance is set in relation to a poem, drama, or a historical event to grant a corresponding impression as a while,

this may be the case on the part of the mood character and other common moments within limitations, but only in a very general sense, and the main impression of the music will not depend on either the knowledge or the guessing of the relation to something outside of the music. In any case, it is utterly wrong to expect of every music to depict something that is not music.

That there is an interest in giving musical compositions, namely more meaningful ones but also independently appearing ones, an interpretation beyond music finds proof in the fact that one encounters such interpretations multiple times; the above also opens up the possibility that the interpretations of the same composition of different people match in terms of their general character and some main aspects but at the same time the certainty that they will (insofar they do not depend on one another) taper off to very different specifics. The execution of such an interpretation will always be added to the music afterwards without having it in mind with its certitude while enjoying the music, without a need for its certitude for enjoyment, and without thus exhausting musical enjoyment, yes, without touching the specific musical enjoyment that forms the core of it all.

As an explanation, the following example of an interpretation of a Beethoven symphony by Ambros (*die Grenzen d. Musik u. Poesie*, p. 32. 46)⁶¹.

„We have heard Beethoven’s C-minor symphony. After the forceful wrestling and struggling of the first movement, which is ploughed by passion, and in which, as Beethoven said, “Fate knocks at the door,” the sweet, consolatory tones of the *Andante* with its voices of flutes vainly strives to give peace; each triumphant flight sinks and fades like the misty shapes gloomily rushing in, again and again the same figure returns unchanged – a glance of pain

⁶¹ *Translator’s note*: The translation by J. H. Cornell (1893, G. Schirmer, New York) was used here. Citation and page numbers refer to the original German text cited by Fechner.

toward heaven, full of quiet resignation. Then, in the third movement, the basses began, like gloomily threatening spectral forms, to rise up against the realm of light which the *Andante* had shown us, as it were, afar off; voices of lamentation were heard, pain wrested into laughter, frantic merriment breaking out all around, the first melodies returning, but as if broken and halting; instead of the full sound of the strings, feeble *pizzicati*; instead of the strong horn-tone, the weak oboe; we arrived at last at the gloomiest place, where the basses hold A-flat, while the kettledrums accompany them with the hollow strokes of the incessant C; the violins hastily force the theme in a distorted form higher and higher, until, in the *crescendo* of the last eight measures, the black curtain is suddenly rent, and, in the full triumph of the in-rushing key of C-major, we are, so to speak, swept away into an ocean of light, into a jubilation without end, into a kingdom of light now opened to us. When the last chords have died away, we feel with joyful exaltation that we are citizens of a higher world; the petty cares of every-day life seem, as it were, at a great distance from us.” ...⁶² “The effect which we have previously ascribed to the C-minor symphony is not as it were the reflection of this work in the head of an isolated enthusiast; it has – as a matter of fact – produced precisely the same effect in the case of thousands, and when an artist or amateur having command of language has spoken of it, the purport of the discourse is, with all the difference of expression, always the same. Thus E. T. A. Hoffman in his article upon Beethoven’s instrumental music; thus Berlioz in an extremely clever feuilleton-article in the *Journal der débats*; thus W. R. Griepenkerl (“Kunstgenius der deutschen Literatur”); thus Robert Schumann (“Gesammelte Schriften,” vol. 1, page 216); thus A. B. Marx (“Die Musik des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts,” page 216). Nay, when at the triumphant, jubilant theme of

⁶² *Translator’s note*: Fechner here skips over a passage in which Ambros questions the possibility that the beauty (of music) can be computed, i.e., explained merely by the physical laws and events that produce the tones.

the *Finale* the disabled Napoleonic soldier springs up in the hall of the Paris Conservatory and loudly shouts his “*Vive l’empereur*,” this genuine sound of nature from the breast of a brave old soldier means nothing else.”

If one analyzes the above interpretation of the meaning of the Beethoven symphony more closely, one finds that it almost exclusively deals with life-related mood elements, and it can only be those to which that applies which the author says that the effect was „*exactly*” the same everywhere while “the gloomily dawning fog shadows”, the “painful gaze to the sky”, the “grimly threatening ghost figures” etc., undoubtedly belong to what he summarizes as “differences in expression” where the execution of the mood by means of the possible styles will take a different shape with every other interpreter.

A young composer had entitled the individual numbers of the first book of Felix Mendelsson’s songs without words: “I think of you, melancholy, praise to God, joyful hunt”, and asked M. whether he found the right interpretation. M. answered: whether he thought of the same or something different, he can barely tell. Another might find “I think of you” in what the interpreter had called melancholy, and a true huntsman might take the “joyful hunt” for the “true praise to God”. The expression of music reaches and lives and weaves in regions that words cannot go after, etc.⁶³

Imbalances appear, as in all aesthetic conflicts, where one would actually need to weigh the moments that battle for the advantage most advantageously against each other and to let one or the other dominate according to the circumstances, and one soon places the entire or an exaggerated amount of weight on one or the other side, characteristic, of musical appeal. It may

⁶³ According to Ambros’ work p. 71

be even less the intention to get into more detail about the discord in the musical world about this since I do not have the music expertise that one would need to do so.

There can be no doubt about the vigor with which Hanslick asserts the aesthetic right and the aesthetic value of such an autonomous “musical beauty” compared to foreign impressions of feelings, with due right, and one will find the above observations to be in accord with Hanslick in this regard; in contrast, he has not brought the relation that music can gain with the world outside of music is without doubt and namely the duty that an accompanying music has towards the accompanying content to attention sufficiently. Ambors has stood up against Hanslick’s one-sidedness with great determination, meanwhile he fell for the opposite one-sidedness of an underestimation or much rather disregard for the specific musical element. Others have also picked up the dispute in this regard; but I admit that I have not continued to follow this literature.

That acoustic perceptions can be the carriers of very specific associative imaginations finds proof in the meanings of the words; but music is yet something different than poetry and both arts complement each other in this regard rather than repeat each other. Per se, the melodic and harmonic relations of music are also not incapable of eliciting certain associative imaginations, may even truly replace words, as many military signals prove; it only depends on training and experience; but this only holds for such exceptional cases; otherwise there is no doubt that nothing would hinder us to, e.g., replace the words father or mother by a musical quint or third or a minor or major chord to be just as well understood as today. One would only need to show a child from the start the older ones with the sounds of a quint, third, or of one or another accord in constant repetition instead of the words father and mother or dad and mom. Yes, one might even ask the curious question whether a musical language would be possible that would enable to hear the meaning of a poem just as well in the musical intervals of a song consisting of

the mere vowel a as we do today in the articulated words, and to give the melody of a song its meaning at the same time; practical difficulties would undoubtedly arise upon closer inspection that render it seemingly pointless to follow these thoughts any further.

One has repeatedly compared the impression of vowels with the ones of certain colors and some comparability must be there as it at least exists in the negative sense that nobody will find the impression of u analog to the one of white or red, the one of i with the one of black or violet, without finding a contradiction that is just as pronounced with other vowels and colors. If one is willing to admit the comparative relation at all, one may ask whether it is direct or associative, probably a composite of both, after which one needs to investigate on which common sources the comparability is based; which we do not want to care about here.

Associatively, it is obvious that the main influence must be in which words of colors and colorful objects the vowel appears. The synergy of those different moments, however, results in too much uncertainty about the color impression of the vowels as different people make very different statements if they want to say anything at all as the following motions prove.

For me, e decisively makes the impression of a faint yellow, which I attribute to the fact that e appears in the word yellow and that faint yellow is more common than any other yellow. But a does not give me the impression of black even though it does appear in the word black and would probably directly rather make the impression of white if the fact that it contributes to the denotation of black would not counteract it; thus, the impression remains undetermined. In contrast, u maybe does want to make the impression of black on me; but as it does not appear in the word black, it rather makes an impression of a dark, precisely green-brown color. I might get the impression of blue from o; but as it does not appear in the word blue, the impression does not

assert itself strongly. The *i* appears to make the strongest impression of the character of a stinging gloss.

Dr. Fedderson has told me that he knows to find *e* gray, *i* fire-yellow, *o* blue-gray, *u* black; Prof. Hofmeister (the botanist) *i* yellow-green, *o* red.

Prof. Zöllner has told me that his brother, draftsman in a technical institution, connects a very specific imagination of certain colors or coloring idiosyncrasies not only with vowels but also with *consonants*. A red (somewhat dark, certain), *e* white, *i* metallic (silver-colored, lighter than *c*), *o* dark blue (certain), *u* black (very certain), *b* light yellow (whiteish yellow), *c* metallic (steal-colored), *d* ivory-colored, *f* cherry brown, *g* white-blue, *h* dark color (undetermined), *k* undetermined (blueish), *l* whiteish, brown-yellow, *m* reddish brown, *n* undetermined, *p* undetermined, *q* black-brown, *r* reddish brown, *s* white-metallic (lead-colored), *t* gray-blue (dull color), *v* undetermined but similar to *o*, *w* similar to *m*, *x*, *y* both certainly metallic, *x* specifically copper-colored, *y* light bronze, *z* brownish.

As *c* and *z*, *f* and *v*, *k* and *q*, *i* and *y*, despite their equal sound appear with a different color character here, it can only depend on the imaginations that are associated with the different uses and maybe even the different shapes of those letters.

Dubois in Berlin associates certain tones and noises with specific figures according to another message from Zöllner, e.g., the imagination of long cylinders with long, sustained tones, and a bunch of spherically rounded figures with thunder, a star with five points with sharp tones, etc.

3) The direct factor in the visual arts

Switching to the visual arts, we have to face an underestimation of the direct factor that seeks support in observations of the following kind.

It is a fact and acknowledged that relations of shape and color cannot be combined like the melodic and harmonic relations in music into works of higher aesthetic effect that deserve the name *beautiful* in the narrow and higher sense, if no significance, no meaning is added that transcends the direct shape or color relation. Yes, objects of lower or incidental aesthetic meaning, such as a carpet, a room wall, can achieve a direct appeal through shape and color relations but with that they prove that they cannot be raised to a higher and autonomous aesthetic meaning, how small and low the aesthetic effect of these relations is; one also likes to see ornaments in the shapes of plants and animals on these objects which associatively co-determine the impression through memories of their meaning. Finally, in proper artworks one cannot ascribe any importance to the direct appeal compared to the higher one, that emerges from the associated significance of the meaning.

Indeed, as appealing as symmetry appears in the kaleidoscope, it is not tolerated in either the landscape or the historical painting because it does not fit with the meaning of the depicted objects; whereas the greatest irregularities that could only appear indifferent or displeasing apart from their meaning raise our interest in artworks due to their associated meaning and can become appealing. Similarly, the complexion of the picture is determined much rather by the demands of the meaning as by the rules of color harmony; because as well as blue or green match with red outside the picture, one cannot make the face blue or green for the red of the cheeks.

Most often, one talks of the beautiful ratios of a building, beautiful shapes and relations of a human figure, in general thus within the scope of anorganic or organic *art of construction*, and nowhere else does one make liking more dependent on the relations of dimensions and shapes regardless of the associated meaning. Yet, the tower and the temple demand different relations than the palace and the residence; the woman, the child different ones than the man, the adult;

Jupiter and Hercules others than Apollo and Bacchus. Thus, we must change the relations everywhere according to construction material, gender, age, and character of the individuals to be deemed appealing or beautiful. They only always appear appealing insofar as they fit the meaning of the objects, and beautiful insofar they enter the expression of higher and appealing ideas, serve those, not by means of their own appeal, rather dissolve into a higher appeal or fade away in face of it, as one extracts from the fact that they cease to be liked wherever they cease to fit. Because they never completely fit, they never appear perfectly pure in artworks of higher style. Thus, one sees an approximately symmetric composition in many religious paintings but never a completely symmetric one. The artist thus has to abstract under consideration of directly appealing relations and to only take care that the shape and color relations that he uses fit the intended meaning and that the meaning itself be an agreeable one, as much as that the depiction of the latter related relations is appealing in itself or not.

Insofar as one forms an idea of the meaning of the objects, one can say: a shape comes into aesthetic consideration only insofar as it fulfills the idea of what it shall depict, and this is what Bötticher says in his *Tectonik der Hellenen*: “Body shape, looked at in a completely abstract way, can neither be beautiful nor unbeautiful. The criterion of bodily shape gives the analogy of the term essentiality, of function of the body. It is after all the shape that most logically and deeply corresponds to the internal idea and that depicts its essentiality with the external appearance ethically (spiritually, morally) most truly and strikingly, the most *beautiful*. If one speaks of the formation of a shape, this can thus only mean as much as: to develop its schema technically, graphically perfectly for *its internal idea*.”

As little as the above observations that were made from a one-sided point of view sharply hit the truth or exhaust it, they remain compelling insofar as the contrasting one-sidednesses

contradicts each other as it will always remain possible to explain the beauty of visible things only from a higher point of view through shapes and relations that do not take associated meanings into account; but they suffer from two fundamental errors, first, that the not completely deniable aesthetic effect of the likability of lower character that some shapes and relations possess would vanish after an adequate transition to higher relations, whereas it is rather the case that this effect is amplified with the higher effect according to the principle of aid; second, if shapes and relations that are by themselves appealing would start to be disliked when they do not fit a meaning that they shall match, an idea that they shall depict, that they would only be able to contribute to liking if they fit merely according to the service they provide for an idea, only according to their matching a significance, a meaning, whereas they rather heighten that liking by means of their own pleasure value and according to this principle heighten it more than one would conclude from their isolated effects.

Indeed, if the principle of aid has proven itself everywhere in works of poetry, music as well as nature, why should it deny its validity and cogency for works of visual art and architecture. Rather, one may suppose that shapes and relations that evoke a, if only a very low, small or comparably noticeable, appeal through their idiosyncratic features in the realm of these arts, too, that they are capable of contributing something effective to the beauty of their works when merging into the purpose and motif of art not only insofar as they serve the purpose, the motif, but also insofar purpose, motif draw on them and nothing else. The only thing is that they may not contradict the purpose, the motif, the meaning that has to be brought to attention, the significance of the content, because they then appear as an obstacle and not as a requirement for the pleasure that depends on this factor.

Upon a closer look we find, however, that such a contradiction appears more easily and more often in the works of visual art than in the works of poetry or more so music, that does not at all crucially depend on associations, that because of that it is therefore not as easily possible to get to a pure build-up of directly appealing relations via works of visual arts compared to get the verse, the rhyme via the works of poetry, the tact and appealing sound via music; thus, it follows that the application and import of directly pleasing shapes and relations is more limited in the visual arts compared to poetry and music, but it is not negligible as yet numerous cases remain in which the match between the direct or associative factor is complete or partial instead of there being a contradiction within whose limits beauty can be increased by the appeal of the former; yes, it is one of the requirements of the so-called good style (if it is not exclusively based on it) to prefer the directly appealing shapes and relations to the lesser appealing ones as far as it is compatible; even though appropriateness for significance does not crucially *demand* this.

Thus, one sees symmetry executed in the main arrangement in the Sistine Chapel and the Hohlbeinian Madonna, Leonardo's Last Supper and countless other pictures of religious art to the extent that it is still compatible with the meaning of the depiction of a vivid scene without therefore being crucially demanded, and one would feel a considerable loss of appeal if it would be reduced. And even when it comes to landscape and genre paintings, where an application of symmetry that goes as far as would contradict the meaning, artists do take care to weigh the masses in such a way that the main content does not fall on one side without this being contingent upon care for the meaning.

A noticeable violation of this rule in one Entombment by Titian (in the Verona Gallery) was interesting to me. In it, all figures found themselves bundled up to a knot on the left side of

the picture (from the observer's point of view) that tapers off to the right, almost empty side; this makes a very unpleasant impression.

One can find a contradiction in the fact that even a small deviation from symmetry in a rectangle is disliked, while we do like an approach towards a symmetrical order in a religious painting which is basically a much stronger deviation from symmetry than the one that we dislike in a rectangle. But it here comes into question that we make the comparison with full symmetry when it comes to the not completely symmetric rectangle, when it comes to the not completely symmetric religious picture rather with the complete lack of symmetry in the picture; accordingly, the former appears as deviation from symmetry, the latter as approach towards symmetry, the former an error, the latter a gain that, of course, ceases where the approach contradicts adequacy.

The complexion of good images is not at all solely determined by adequacy regarding the meaning, too, but also by the fact that the picture as a whole is not irregularly stained, patchy, held in too harsh contrast or too monotone in color, because all this is liked less regardless of all meaning than a certain gradation and variety of tones without sudden transitions, even though strong demands of the meaning can cause exceptions from this. For this reason, one painting already makes a more enjoyable impression from afar, before we can recognize its content or when we abstract from it, than another. To facilitate this abstraction and to judge a picture all the more solely based on the effect of its colors, some state the rule to look at it inverted. If now an in itself appealing complexion is perfectly combined with the demands of meaning, the successful result of the principle of aid will be an appeal of the complexion that provides the picture with a high aesthetic value that is aimed for by many an artist even at the expense of the demands of meaning. Insofar these relations of large color areas are of essential import for the overall effect of color, namely the colors of clothes, for which a certain freedom regarding their adequacy often exists,

chosen such that appealing color relations emerge that have nothing much to do with the meaning of the image.

One can remark in general: First, that idea, purpose, meaning notwithstanding their essential or main aspect often leave considerable room for applying this or that shape or relation which one can use to the advantage of preferring the most appealing ones, or, which is basically the same, of modulating the to be depicted idea, the purpose, the meaning often according to subordinate or incidental terms such that they give much more reason to apply the more appealing rather than the less appealing ones. Second, that even if idea, purpose, meaning already make higher demands based on the main aspects, to which any consideration of direct appeal has to yield, the opposite often has to occur according to subordinate terms if an important advantage of direct appeal can be bought for the price of a small disadvantage in adequacy regarding the meaning or the appeal of the meaning. Thus, one needs to take a less advantageous change of thought in a poem if the more advantageous one does not want to submit to the verse and rhyme, and one usually still lets the symmetry of side parts of a building prevail in architecture even when the same serve a different aspect, which according to general principles of art much rather invites an expression of internal differences through a connected symbolic or teleological external one; without completely excluding that there may be buildings in which symmetry is entirely put aside in favor of associative motifs.

According to this, one cannot deny the importance of the direct factor even for the higher visual arts as it grows if we descend from the plastic and painting to architecture and from there to industrial art or the so-called technical arts and ornamentation; due to the fact that the associative factor itself loses import compared to the direct one according to the approach on one hand and on the other hand conflicts between the direct with the associative one occur less easily. Namely, the

visibly connected variety gains in those arts a heightened importance to which symmetry, the golden section, the regular pattern, the waved line, the volute, the meander, etc., belong, all of which can more easily lack in the higher visual arts, and for the given reasons needs to lack most often, because one has the vivid connection by means of an associative one through the idea in the higher visual arts. Yet, the gloss, purity and saturation of color, appealing color composition play a more important role in the lower visual arts, too, than in the higher ones who deny themselves the lower advantages to instead offer higher ones.

XIV. Different attempts to posit a basic form of beauty. Experimental aesthetics. Golden section and square.

1) Attempts to posit a normal or basic form of beauty

After the observations we made in the previous section, the question which relations of shape and color can claim an advantage in appeal over others at all, regardless of purpose and meaning, in short association, becomes one of general interest, as well as the one about what this advantage depends on. Also, the interest in this question, that we will here only ask regarding shape relations, has proven itself already by the fact that many have investigated it from more or less general or specialized points of view without, of course, having been tackled sufficiently or having delivered satisfactory results.

The investigations that have been made so far that were based on more or less inadequate principles and methods have much rather only lead to a one-sided or exaggerated preference of certain shapes or shape relations than general *norm-shapes* or *norm-relations* of appeal or beauty, like the circle, the square, the ellipse, the wave line, the simple ratios, the golden section, to all of which one can only attribute a contingent advantage or an advantage within some limits that one needs to gauge correctly instead of generalizing it into the unknown. One has often

thought that one can so to say settle the beauty of visible objects with such shapes without taking the much more important contribution of association into account at all or even as a side-effect and to make a clear cut between the two factors when investigating them, such that all these attempts are basically only of historical interest, apart from Zeising, even though not without objection but in some regard with more valuable results.

Namely the *circle* was considered the line of perfection and thus beauty since ancient times, whereas Winckelmann coined and seeks to prove the sentence; “The line of beauty is *elliptical*.” Hegarth has posited that the *waving line* that winds on a plane is the line of beauty and appeal, on top of which he prefers the *pyramid form* that is also popular with artists as a grouping shape. – The *square* and the ratio 1:1 in general has recently been claimed by Wolff in his Contribution to the Aesthetics of Architecture⁶⁴ as easily processed and thus aesthetically advantageous relation of dimensions and sections, whereas others, like namely Heigelin (Lehrb. d. höhern Baukunst), Thiersch (Lehrb. d. Aesth.), Hay, etc., prefer the *simple ratios* in general, 1:1, 1:2, etc., in part in deference of the fact that these relations in oscillations are consonant in music. Zeising claims that the golden section is not only the basic aesthetic relation but the most general design relation in nature and art, and he seeks it especially in the structure and compartmentalization of the human body as was as the most beautiful works of architecture. I consider a few more theories that can only be mentioned out of curiosity (of Röber and Liharzek) in my article “On experimental aesthetics”⁶⁵.

The term golden section that has been discussed so much by and since Zeising means the following: the smaller dimension of an object relates to the larger one, e.g., the smaller side of a

⁶⁴ *Translator’s note*: Original title “Beiträge zur Ästhetik der Baukunst”

⁶⁵ *Translator’s note*: Original title „zur experimentalen Aesthetik“

rectangle to its larger side, like the larger one itself to the sum of both, or, if this concerns the sections of an object, the smaller section relates to the larger like the larger one itself to the sum of both or the whole. The smaller dimension or section that stands in relations is called Minor by Zeising, the larger one Major. If one now investigates which relation Minor needs to have to Major to fulfill this requirement, one finds that it is in fact an irrational ratio, like the one of the circle's diameter and circumference, which, however, in rough approximation in whole numbers can for the naked eye be already described as 3:5, in further increasing approximations by 5:8, 8:13, 13:21, etc., approximations that can be artificially increased by setting the bigger number in relation to the previous approximation which is how one gets 24:34, etc. The exact mathematical expression for the golden ratio results from the quadratic equation $\frac{1 \pm \sqrt{5}}{2}$ where the upper sign refers to the ratio of Major to Minor = 1.61803..., the lower sign the ratio of Minor to Major = 0.61803..., which the above approximations get closer to the higher they climb. The golden ratio has a series of interesting mathematical properties that I have assembled in my article "On experimental aesthetics".

One can enumerate the following errors that have usually been made (though not from everybody) when trying to list basic aesthetic relations, and they are easily proven by specific examples. a) One builds too much on theoretical pre-considerations that do not have sufficient evidence or binding power, preferably the principle of unity in variety, or, on the contrary, one thinks that one can translate the oscillatory relations that are musically most appealing to the field of vision, too, or one even thinks that one can find an indication in higher philosophical viewpoints. b) one does not sufficiently distinguish between that which should be counted towards associative appeal from that which should be counted towards the direct one in experience-based investigations. c) One ascribes a too general and too exclusive meaning to

particular conditions of direct appeal. d) One prefers to only look at the cases of experiences that pertain to the requirement. e) One sticks to too complicated examples, specifically the human body and buildings, for which not only the appeal of the contained shapes and relations is co-determined by associations and combinations but that also leave more or less room for arbitrariness in their varied dimensions and partially very ill-determined sections what one wants to declare main and what incidental relation and how one wants to measure these. f) One has missed the opportunity to conduct the experiment under the simplest conditions possible which is the only way to draw conclusions from the observations that lead to a certain decision.

Indeed, different ways of empirical aesthetics can lead to success in determining the lawful relations in this field and in deciding which questions belong to it which my article “On experimental aesthetics” (Lpz. Hirzel), of which the first part has been published so far, explains in more detail. Here, a more in-depth investigation would go too far; but I do at least give an example in 3) of the methods that belong here and the results obtained with them after I have taken into consideration the objections given in 2) that are directed against any investigation in this direction in general and against the usefulness of their results which I want to meet so as not to leave the entire field of investigation aside from the start.

2) Objections that can be raised against the usefulness of experimental-aesthetic investigations and their undoing

The objections we will consider here are the following.

Even though certain shapes and relations have a certain advantage over others in appeal when thought of in isolation, they are never used in isolation but always with neighboring shapes and relations, be it in the same object or in the environment or in shapes that lie in them or overlap with them; each form, each relation, however, is co-determined by the impression of a

direct or associated relation to shapes and relations, which I have called combinatorial co-determination, such that those things that are appealing by themselves can appear unappealing or the contrary after combination of its effect with the ones of other forms and relations, or one and the same can appear more or less appealing after a different combination, as, e.g., a circle appears more appealing inside a square than surrounding a square, a circle fits better inside a square than an ellipse, whereas an ellipse fits better in a rectangle, etc. What is the use then, one could say, to know the shapes and relations that are by themselves appealing if we cannot grasp them in application, rather that every new application changes the result.

Response: a) In most applications a certain shape, a certain relation has a dominant influence by determining the main appearance, the main relation of an object and attracts the attention away from an indifferent environment and subordinate parts. b) Especially regarding the influence of the environment: When it comes to artworks, an artificial isolation is usually created by framing and a neutral neighborhood, whereas the environment changes randomly for many other objects which compensates for the combinatory influence on the whole; because if it works just as often positively as negatively, the advantage of direct appeal remains altogether decisive. c) insofar the big influence of combination of one shape with other shapes can neither be denied nor cancelled everywhere, much rather it has to be used to the greatest advantage, the task of an investigation of the relations of direct appeal are not abolished but expanded because it then also becomes a matter of determining the influence of combinations; as this is in general to only way to bring clarity and success to this part of aesthetics: to investigate what each condition achieves by itself and what results from the combination of each one with another. Even though the combinations are countless, their laws are not; thus, the investigation has to focus on their determination. d) The influence of a shape's direct appeal across all changes in associative and

combinatoric co-determination is deemed constant insofar as it is always taken into consideration as ancillary or counter weight even if it is outweighed by such co-determinants in strength in the same or the opposite direction, according to which the directly appealing form always has the advantage over the directly unappealing one, be it that they fit the environment equally well or badly, and the directly less appealing one has so to overcome a difficulty first to become equal in appeal to a directly pleasing one by means of a better fit; a difficulty that may be too hard to overcome in some circumstances. Also, as mentioned above, the co- and side-determinants that can lead to deviations from the directly most appealing forms and shapes do in general, though not in all cases, go approximately evenly into different directions such that the directly most appealing forms and relations always retain their value as, so to say, aesthetic centers starting from which one needs to follow the deviations based on co-determinants and to which one returns to when the co-determinants retreat. As it is important to know the center of gravity for each kind of body as well as its method of determination for the theory of gravity, it is important for the theory of the appeal of shapes to know the aesthetic center, i.e., the directly or by itself most appealing form, for each kind of shape that can appear as a main shape, such as rectangles, triangles, ellipses, wave lines, etc.

The scope of the investigation is only broadened by the remark that the education, age, gender, individuality has an influence on the aesthetic preference for this or that relation, too, as it is necessary to take these influences into consideration and to partially identify that which outweighs everything and that which modifies; insofar a short statement needs to be made to identify that which holds on average for the adult of moderate to higher education is to be preferred to that which holds for the child and the raw people.

After all this, the practical use of investigations like those that I will give an example of in the following will not be estimated as high, the intuition of the artist will in any case remain the best guide; but to control many an aesthetic view, claim, theory, they are in my opinion of great advantage; and the art industry may well also derive a practical benefit from it. What is more, they can in some regard serve to test the taste of individuals and for aesthetic statistics, as I have discussed in my article on empirical aesthetics pp. 605 and the “Report on the album shown in the Hohlbein exhibition in Dresden” (Br. U. H. 1872) without wanting to go into detail here.

3) Methods of empirical aesthetic investigations. Example of a performance of the method of choice. Results especially regarding the golden section and square.

In the repeatedly mentioned article on experimental aesthetics p. 002, I posit three methods that can be applied to our field that I differentiate as *method of choice*, *method of production*, and *method of use*.

According to the first, one lets a person choose between shapes or shape relations that are comparable in appeal, according to the second one lets them produce the most appealing one to their taste, according to the third one measures the shapes or shape relations that are in use. All of this under consideration of avoiding the errors that were listed in 2), for which I have to refer to the article itself. All three methods have to control each other's results. Here, I restrict myself to an example of the application of the method of choice with a control of its results through the method of use. To give a guide to the special intent of this investigation, I have to say some things in advance.

From the start, one can posit the earlier discussed principle of coherent connection of variety as a very general one regarding the appeal of shapes since symmetry as well as the shapes and relations mentioned earlier that have the advantage of direct appeal subordinate to this

without restrictions. At the same time, this generally valid principle leaves great uncertainty in the individual case, and one cannot foresee the relative advantage of appeal for this or that shape a priori based in it. Let us take, e.g., the square compared to the rectangle. The uniform relation of parts is more perfectly executed in the square because of the equality of all sides, all angles and equal symmetry of all sides to the middle than in any rectangle but the variety is smallest. The principle does not let us decide whether the rectangle gains more through the enlarged variety than it loses through the decreased unity. Let us compare a rectangle shaped according to the golden section to other rectangles. The former has an advantage over the others because it contains higher unity than the latter; and one could assume that it thus also gains an advantage in appeal as nothing of the other conditions of appeal of a rectangle are hurt by it; but as higher unity is harder to grasp than lower ones, it is questionable whether this advantage is significant or even palpable; and in general it is questionable whether there is not a bigger loss associated with a split according to the golden section on the longer side due to the lower but graspable symmetry than there is gained. This question, too, cannot be answered by the principle of coherent connection of variety; and if one believed that philosophy could decide on this, the uncertainty of this approach is proven by the fact that the result that is universally valid according to it does not apply as widely in experience.

In addition, one can ask whether the principle of musically concordant relations of oscillations does not come into consideration and whether it claims an advantage of simple ratios in rectangles⁶⁶ while the analogy alone cannot prove this.

⁶⁶ Nowadays, as one makes the consonant relations dependent on the relations of the overtones in music based in Helmholtz, for which there is no analog in rectangles, one will of course not even start to think like this.

Aesthetic experiments have, however, enabled us to find a definite answer to these questions that is not completely in line with either Wolff, Heigelin, or Zeising. To summarize the results up front, they are the following, though not all of them, but mostly originating from the investigation I will report in the following while I have to refer the reader to the future continuation of my repeatedly mentioned article for the others.

- a) Among all rectangular shapes, the square with the rectangles closest to it and the very long rectangles are the most unappealing.
- b) Even the rectangles closest to it still seem to surpass the square in appeal, at least there is a doubtful preference for them.
- c) The simple ratios, that correspond to consonant relations of oscillation in music, do not have any advantage as aspect ratio of rectangles regarding their appeal over ratios that one can express in smaller numbers and are discordant in music.
- d) The rectangle that is formed according to the golden section and the ones closest to it has indeed an advantage in appeal over all other rectangles.
- e) A small deviation of any rectangle from symmetry, however, reduces its appeal much more than a relatively much larger deviation from the golden section, and the advantage of the latter is in general disproportionately less crucial and palpable than the one of symmetry.
- f) The golden section has a decisive disadvantage regarding the dissection of a horizontal length (parallel to the line connecting the eyes) compared to an equal split, of which we have an example in the case remarked earlier, showing that the ascent to a higher uniform connection can under some circumstances compensate for the violation of the lower one.

g) With regard to the dissection of a vertical length (or more general one orthogonal to the line connecting the eyes) the most advantageous division changes according to the kind of crossbar which is concluded from experiments on crosses; given the best relation of crossbar to stringer, however, the division according to the golden section is not the most advantageous but one with a 1:2 ratio of shorter to longer parts.

With this, I cannot but find the aesthetic value of the golden section to be overrated by Zeising while I do not want to deny the interest and worth of Zeising's discovery that this ratio possesses notable aesthetic value but explicitly view it as a discovery. Also, I do not want to deny, as my investigations are yet far from extensive enough to make a generally dismissive judgment, that under special circumstances, which one first has to discover and formulate properly, the golden section can assert an advantage as ratio of sections, likely also when a length divided by the golden ratio is symmetrically connected with another. Only one thing is for sure: We cannot accept the aesthetic advantage of the golden section as easily as Zeising demands.

One further remark regarding the immediate introduction of the experiments.

Given one presents something with an exactly rectangular and a somewhat skewed rectangle and asked him which one he likes better without regard to different applications of the two shapes, he would not hesitate a second to choose the exact rectangles. Like this, one would have obtained a more certain result regarding the advantage of symmetry than if one had taken complex applications into consideration where appeal is co-determined by associative and combinatorial side-conditions. If there was such a great preference for the golden section as Zeising asserts, if there was any such definite preference for one ratio over the others in rectangles, such a simple comparative experiment would show it or there would not be any such

preference. An existing but less decisive advantage, however, would need to prove itself in a predominant preference on average across many comparisons albeit not without exceptions. This is the general point of the experiment. Yet, to give it some broader scope, the procedures were as follows⁶⁷.

10 rectangles made of white cardboard of exactly the same area (= 80 millimeters square) but different aspect ratios, the shortest one a square with an aspect ratio of 1:1, the longest with the ratio 2:5, in between also the golden section rectangle with 21:34, were spread out on a black board in a different random order, every which way in varying angles to each other, for each new experiment (with a new subject). Like this, they were over the years presented to people from the most diverse, but always educated, backgrounds, of most diverse character, without selecting such that one would assign good taste to begin with⁶⁸, starting at about age 16, that offered themselves now and then for experiments, and we asked them which of the different rectangles, while abstracting as much from application as possible, makes the most appealing impression, often combined with the question about which one made the least appealing one. The preference and rejection judgments were summed up, separately for male and female individuals, resulting in the following table for which I have to add that, if a person hovered between 2 or 3 rectangles

⁶⁷ I have started an experiment in which only always two rectangles (not made of cardboard but black outlines on white cardboard) are compared, the entire series of those is made such that the side ratios are equidistant, and the longer side is presented as often parallel to the connecting line between the eyes as it is presented oblique to it, as well as an equivalent experiment with ellipses where instead of the ratio of the sides the one of the axes is considered, but I have not yet pursued them further. – The experiment discussed above is part of the not yet published first part of the *Schr. Z. exp. Aesth.*

⁶⁸ This for the threefold reason that the judgment about the taste of others is a very subjective one, that the determination of the average degree of appeal has its own merit regardless of the differences in taste, and that, since a bad taste deviates from a good one just as soft to one side than to the other, one can hope that one gets the same result with the average of many cases without distinguishing tastes than if one only asked people of good taste. However, if one on the side pays attention to the judgments of people whom one thinks are capable of having an especially good taste, one at the same time gains the opportunity to test whether one indeed finds the presumed consensus.

in preference or rejection, those were noted as 0.5 or 0.33 each such that each person only added a 1 for one experiment; hence the fractions in the numbers (partially due to multiple summations). Like this, I received 228 in total from males, 119 from females, 150 rejections m. and 119 f. The square ration is highlighted as \square , the golden ratio with \odot .

Table for the experiments with 10 rectangles

R aspect ratio, N number of experimental judgments, n number of rejection judgments,
m. male, f. female

V	Z		z		Percent Z	
	m	f	m	f	m	f
1/1 \square	6.25	4.0	36.67	31.5	2.74	3.36
6/5	0.5	0.33	28.8	19.5	0.22	0.27
5/4	7.0	0.0	14.5	8.5	3.07	0.00
4/3	4.5	4.0	5.0	1.0	1.97	3.36
29/20	13.33	13.5	2.0	1.0	5.85	11.35
3/2	50.91	20.5	1.0	0.0	22.33	17.22
34/21 \odot	78.66	42.65	0.0	0.0	34.50	35.83
23/13	49.33	20.21	1.0	1.0	21.64	16.99
2/1	44.25	11.83	3.83	2.25	6.25	9.94
5/2	3.25	2.0	57.21	30.25	1.43	1.68
Sum	228	119	150	95	100.00	100.00

Before discussing the results of this table, I will first say how people behaved during the experiment.

Most explained from the start that each rectangle could be the most appealing one depending on the use. I admitted that but questioned further whether they could not find that one of the rectangles, apart from purpose and meaning, according to its different aspect ratio to be more appealing, satisfying, harmonic, elegant than the other and which one they would prefer as the *on average* most appealing shape⁶⁹. Now, there were three possible cases. Either all or the great majority denies to give a judgments afterwards because there was no difference to be found or they did make judgments but those were randomly scattered between preference and rejection of the different rectangles, or the addition of all cases showed that a certain kind of rectangles had such an excess in the number of preferences, that there was in general such an order in the sequence of preferences that these could not be made contingent on chance.

The success was this: there were very few cases in which a judgment was denied completely, yet, there were also only few, even though there were quite some, in which the judgment was very decisive and certain. In most cases, there was a prolonged hovering between options; and if one had already decided for a rectangle, one preferred sometimes during the same experiment, correcting oneself, a different one or one remained hovering between two, three, or even four rectangles⁷⁰. When one repeated the experiment with the same person at a different time after the impression of the previous one had faded, as it happened a few times, it was not

⁶⁹ Despite the instruction not to think of specific applications, such thoughts may have partially automatically played a role when participants made their judgments; while this may not have caused a great disadvantage on the whole, because the relative advantage of appeal shows itself across all applications for the different ratios, the co-determination, however, must compensate itself due to the different directions on the whole.

⁷⁰ Making a preference decision was facilitated if one first let them reject the least appealing rectangles.

rare that a different, neighboring rectangle was chosen instead of the one from the earlier experiment. Despite these uncertainties in the individual case, the table above nonetheless shows very decisive results overall.

Indeed, one will notice not without interest, how the preference numbers N decrease starting from the golden section in both directions for both male and female individuals and that the proportional ratio of N to the total number for © is almost the same for m. and f. Also, the table suffices to prove the sentences a, b, c, d, e from the above sentences; one must only be on one's guard not to take them for more than they are. If one wanted to design a curve of appeal according to such a table, not only would the aspect ratios of consecutive rectangles be equally spaced (i.e., their logarithms would need to differ by equal arithmetic differences) such that the number of tested rectangles above and below the golden section would be equal, too which is not the case in the above table but which would deserve attention in any resumption of this experiment. This did not happen in this experiment because I first thought that it would suggest itself to test whether the ratios that are consonant in music really show the aesthetic merit that has been repeatedly ascribed to them; and because I wanted to exclude the suspicion regarding the preference for the golden section that it rather depends on its intermediate position between the rectangles in the experiments than on the merit of its shape. One can say, according to the results of the table, that the interval of rectangles that includes the golden section ($21:34 = 1.6195$, more precisely $= 1.6180$) that ranges from 1.558 to 1.692, unites roughly $1/3$ (more precisely 35.17 percent as average of 34.50 and 35.83 percent) of all preference judgments. One has to think of the number Z or z that is written for a rectangle in the table in relation to the (logarithmic) half ratio distance between neighboring intervals.

Regardless of the asymmetry of rectangles on each side of the golden section, the numbers neighboring the golden section on either side are remarkably similar for both males and females and how this could happen is, I admit, not yet clear to me. In addition, it is interesting that, insofar one can predict the shape of the curve of appeal from the table, the male and female curve coincide at the peak © but diverge in its further shape as starting from © the female percentages first appear smaller and then larger than the male ones.

The course of the rejection judgments is in line with the preference judgments due to its complimentary course, and while Z is at its maximum at ©, z is zero there. There only is a non-correspondence in the square as the Z s continue to drop after the square but do rise a bit at the square which seems to indicate that the square itself is a little more appealing than its closest neighbors, whereas the z s let the lower maximum of non-appeal fall on the square itself.

I do have reasons, though, to consider the latter result more important than the former; as the preference of some people for the square seems to merely depend on the fact that they think, according to theoretical preconceptions, the square must be the most appealing because it is the most regular one. Indeed, there were some people that actually stated this to be the reason for their preference, yes it occurred that a person explained that actually the square must be deemed most beautiful but could not decide on preferring it but chose a different rectangle⁷¹. In contrast, it was interesting to hear the various reasons that emerged during the experiment for rejecting the square; one declared it to be the simplest one, the most dry, the most boring, the most plump, and

⁷¹ The blind Dr. Ehrstein, music composer, whom I showed 5:6, 2:3, ©, 13:23, 1:2 preferred based on touch © and 13:23, while declaring the latter as even more appealing than 1:2 while he confused it with this one. Seemingly theoretical preconceptions about the value of musically consonant ratios did play a role here, too.

an ingenuous lady, E. v. B., that did not miss to prefer the (unknown to her as to all participants) golden section characterized the impression of the square as one of “homely satisfaction”.

On occasion, people made characteristic remarks about the preference for or rejection of other rectangles, too. Miss A. V., who has an excellent taste, while preferring \odot , called the two longest rectangles $2/1$ and $5/2$ “reckless shapes” and declared the short $6/5$ “mean” and rejected it in solidarity with those. The same rectangles were repeatedly blamed for almost looking like a square but not being one; yes, the blind Mr. Ehrenstein called it according to his sense of touch a “pretentious shape”. Bookbinder Wellig said, while hesitating between a preference for \odot and $23/13$, about the shortest shapes $1/1$, $6/5$, $5/4$, $4/3$ “they had no ratio.” A lady preferred $2/1$ because “it was so beautifully slim”. The golden section was declared to be the “most noble” ratio by multiple people when rating preference.

In sum, I can say that the golden section was most likely to be preferred by people that I trust to have good taste overall, of course not rarely one or another of the neighboring ones. What is more, the preference judgments of \odot in general belonged to the ones where the person revealed the least uncertainty. Yes, there were some that preferred it with complete determination. However, it is possible that the relative appeal of the square increases with decreasing educational level. In specially conducted experiments with 28 handymen of different trades the most preferred rectangles were the golden section with 7 and the square with 5 preference judgments; yet, theoretical preconceptions played a role here, too, as several said about the square: “well, it is the most regular one”; also, the square ranked second among the rejection judgments with $z = 4$, while $5/2$ ranked first with $z = 13$.

If one presented little children only with the shapes \square and \odot with equal area on nicely colored paper like children love it, not with the question which one they like the most but with

the permission to take one of them, they will clumsily grab one or the other while it does not seem to make a difference to them and without a final great tendency of Z to either side. This is what I found in experiments that I let be done in two care institutions for small children while monitoring the caution with which the location of □ and ⊙ to the left and right was changed for different children such that the preferred grasping with the right would not make a difference and that ⊙ was laid out with the longer side equally often parallel and orthogonal to the line connecting the eyes.

Undoubtedly, the relations of the appeal of the different rectangles must impact their applications; only that in part purpose, in part combinatorial influences have multiple adjusting influences. Indeed, however, one finds that the golden section ratio and close rectangles are preferred insofar no counter-effects emerge from such influences, whereas the long rectangles and the square with close rectangles are unpopular. A mere glance teaches as much; what is more, I have made many measurements on entire classes of rectangular objects from everyday life that confirm this but which I will not go into detail about here and will only briefly mention the following results in general.

One only needs to look at the on average existing book covers, print layouts⁷², writing and letter paper layouts, receipts, cards, photographic cards, wallets, slates, chocolate and bouillon bars, gingerbread, water tanks, snuff boxes, bricks, etc. to be immediately reminded of the golden section by them if one has sufficiently imprinted its ratio by intuition to find that they deviate once to this once to the other side when measuring the individual exemplars.

⁷² I consider print layout to be the rectangle that is covered in print on one page of a book.

Some kinds of rectangular objects, however, due to this or that side-condition show a constantly or nearly constantly *one-sided* deviation from the golden section; yet, there is usually a corresponding other kind of the same objects that deviates due to a different side-condition into the other direction such that the golden section remains the center of deviations between them. Thus, German cards are a bit longer, French cards a bit shorter than ϕ , the Octav-layouts of academic books almost always a bit longer, the ones of children's books a bit shorter while the measurement of 40 novel print layouts of a library yielded on average almost exactly the golden section. About 50 years ago, folded letters that determine envelopes have been, as I conclude from numerous measurements, on average a bit shorter, now they are longer than ϕ . Business cards are, because they have to stretch according to the length of the name, on average a little longer, address cards of merchants and manufacturers, on which several short lines are built on top each other, a bit shorter than ϕ . Unexpectedly, however, gallery paintings of different content that are measured inside their frames are on average not insignificantly shorter than ϕ , whether the width is larger than the height or the height larger than the width, according to which the conditions of the content of paintings cannot be the most advantageous for preserving this ratio⁷³.

The anti-appeal of the \square generally proves itself in applications by only being used exceptionally despite the theoretical preconception that, as we have seen, exists and despite its inviting construction. Also, one only needs to think of those objects that I have presented as proof for the preference for the golden section as square, which is well permissible given their

⁷³ I always understand the average of ratios as the average ratio; derived by taking the arithmetic mean of the logarithms of the ratios that I take from the table of logarithms. Here, the central value and the most dense value, about which one can reflect as well, does not always coincide, about which I will not go into further detail

purposes, to get an impression of anti-appeal. At the same time, the applications seem to prove that the square is indeed even less appealing than the close rectangles since one still prefers such in general if one ever goes for such a low ratio. Purely square gallery paintings do exist but are very rare, whereas portrait paintings generally get close to square but are always a bit higher than wide. The so-called square print format is overall the rarest one for books, yet, it is not purely square but, as one can see for oneself, always a bit higher than wide. What could prevent one from preferring a pure \square if there was an appeal advantage to be achieved. I have often found a shape close to, but only close to, \square in chess boxes, sugar bowls and other, slightly high boxes looking at the area from above. Of course, one finds pillows and cushions always purely square; but this depends on their purpose in that material and space should not be wasted to one side as they stick out below the body part for which they serve as support.

When Wolff and Heigelin claim that the square finds application for the ground plan for beautiful buildings, the first thing to note is that objects of architecture can only be taken into consideration with great caution when it comes to the question about pure appeal due to the influence of secondary and combinatorial aspects that do not lack easily without wanting to completely exclude them; especially, however, the cases that W. and H. refer to are only very rare exceptions and as such rather reject than prove the appeal of \square . If we look at the question more closely under consideration of co-determinants for architectural objects, the unappealingness of the \square betrays itself clearly enough after the following remarks.

Undoubtedly, the shape of the usual house- and room doors greatly exceeds the golden section in length due to their reference to the human figure. Such a relationship disappears for the gates of palace-like buildings that do not only serve to let people walk through and thus there is no hindrance to make them square if that would provide an appeal advantage. Yet, one never

finds this in palaces, but only stable gates are pretty quadratic at a glance where attention to appeal is not important anymore; also, everybody says that such a shape would not be fruitful for the gate of a palace.

When it comes to windows, one has to ask whether their close and parallel position to one another has a combinatorial influence on their aesthetic relation, and whether this would not need to change according to their closeness to each other, experiments on this are still lacking. Also, we will have to pay special attention to the glass, the window opening in the wall, and the wall border surrounding the window. If we first consider the wall opening, one does in general not see it strongly similar to the golden section but in no building that aspires to architectural beauty do they offer the impression of a square except for souterrains or the uppermost floors where they contribute to variation with the rectangular windows of the main floors and help to express the relatively subordinate meaning of the relevant floors. Only the window openings of farm houses often make the impression of a square shape which would be in line with the fact that a lesser degree of education more easily allows to prefer them than a higher one.

XV. Relation of purposefulness and beauty

There is no debate about the fact that an object, to be called beautiful at all, needs to fulfill its purpose to immediately elicit pleasure. Be it that one bases the term beauty on the ability to do so, as we do, be it that one views this ability as one of its traits that depends on the nature of the beauty but determines the term itself otherwise. Kant has called this kind of purposefulness, whereby the beautiful adapts to the nature of our cognitive capacity, *subjective* purposefulness, which has to be distinguished from *external* purposefulness that consists in the feature of an object to further the well-being of humankind, preserve it, and hinder disadvantages

through its use or effects of its existence. It is the question whether this external purposefulness, simply purposefulness in the following, is crucial for beauty, too. Surely not in general, as paintings, statues, music pieces can appear very beautiful to us without fulfilling any other but a subjective purpose, whereas externally very purposeful objects, such as farming tools, machines, outbuildings, dung places, do not only seem non-beautiful but some even disagreeable or even ugly to us. According to which one concludes that even where external purposefulness is found in beautiful objects, as in works of beautiful architecture and art industry⁷⁴, a simultaneously beautiful and healthy human, external purposefulness has to be regarded as random addition to beauty, and that it depends on different conditions. According to this, the beautiful conditions make a building, a vessel beautiful, not the fact that one can live well in the building or can use the vessel well. Kant means it like this and others agree with him. One can say, too: if the beauty of an object encompasses the fact that I like it *immediately*, the fact that we like the consequences of the effects of its use cannot fulfill this requirement.

In the meantime, one may not overlook that the external purposefulness of an object makes itself felt through the associative imagination upon viewing it and therewith they can contribute to its immediate liking, and for three reasons, first, the pleasure effect of the consequence can in some way transfer to the immediate impression of the object – we do have talked enough about this when talking about the associative principle -, second, the perceived uniform coherence of all parts according to the purpose of the object, the uniform coherence of variety, will not fail having its aesthetic effect here, too, third, we like to see a once posed task or

⁷⁴ I use this term as summary description for the art of vessels, machines, furniture, weapons, carpets, clothes. In the essay “Zur experimentellen Ästhetik”, I have used tectonic to the same end, a term that Bötticher has used in his Tectonik in the same sense but included architecture, while Semper (üb. D. Stil) only included carpentry and used „technical or small arts“ for the art industry in the above sense.

generated idea to be fulfilled without contradiction, the more so, the more there seems to be a danger of contradiction.

Thus, if it is a residence, it will delight us to tell by looking at it that it is well built, if it is a palace that the higher position in life and leadership is well framed in it; but apart from this objective interest we already like seeing all details of the buildings connected without contradiction among each other by means of a common reference to its purpose and seeing the aim of the construction thus fulfilled. We do like it when everything correctly matches the idea of a devil in a depiction of the devil on stage, independent of the fact that we dislike the idea of the devil; the objective content of the idea simply does not matter for this kind of liking; all the better, however, if we like this one in addition; it is like that of a building corresponds in all details to the idea of its purpose.

Accordingly, the shape needs to match the purposes of all objects that have an external purpose to conform to an educated taste, partially because one otherwise associates the unpleasurable imagination that it does not accomplish what it should accomplish to maintain or further human wellbeing, partially because we dislike the contradiction in which it stands with the institution of its idea, and thus the generally associated decay of the uniform coherence of its parts.

All objects of architecture and art industry, however, need to fulfill external purposes and thus for all of them, the fulfillment of the requirements of external purposefulness is not merely a coincidence but essential to beauty.

It is different with objects whose idea or purpose does not encompass any external purposefulness; we do not demand the same things of them, and thus artworks can very well

without any external purpose gain beauty through their inner relations of associative imaginations of a different kind than the external purposefulness.

Now, the question arises: why do not all externally purposeful objects appear beautiful? Why does, e.g., a broom, a threshing flail, a plow, a dung place, a stable not seem beautiful despite all external purposefulness, while all preconditions for liking, that lie in such purposefulness according to the above, are given?

Well: let us think of things for once instead of purposeful as rather so unpurposeful that one can immediately see their unpurposefulness, would we not definitely dislike them? Thus, purposefulness does add an appealing moment to the impression which does alone without other aids or even in conflict with opposing moments not always suffice to drive liking over the threshold of positive pleasure or to drive it so far over it and to maintain it so pure that we want to apply the term beautiful to such works. If there is a lack of necessary aids or if too much is acting against it, the impression of beauty does not emerge, or an impression of disliking can even dominate for entirely purposeful objects.

And like this, I do not want to say at all that the works of architecture and art industry can only ground their beauty in the fulfillment of external conditions of purposefulness; on the contrary, it requires additional conditions that we shall talk about; it is only that the fulfillment of their purpose precedes as main condition all other conditions; these or those can lack or stand back; the emerging purposefulness must not lack if beauty shall not lack.

Rumohr once said (Italien. Forsch. I. 88): „After architecture has satisfied necessity and strength, it may also strive for beauty.” It would be more correct to say: “After architecture has satisfied the conditions of external purposefulness, it may also strive to perfect its impression to one of beauty”; because architectural beauty cannot be externally attached to purposefulness.

First and foremost, however, one needs an inner aid. It is apparent that a contribution of purposefulness to appeal or beauty can only show to advantage for the one who is fluent enough in the conditions of purpose-fulfillment such that this feeling of fulfillment appears in the immediate impression. For objects that we are used to handle, this takes place automatically within some limits and it can be presupposed that one is fluent; analogy, however, leads us from such objects beyond them. Like this, anybody, even if he does not understand anything about architecture, enjoys proving his good taste by dismissing columns in a building that have nothing or little to support, and thus needlessly waste mass just like such that have too much to support, thus impending collapse. A professional architect, however, will notice the errors of the building at the first glance and they will immediately arouse disliking and they will not be noticed by the untrained in the same way and thus not be disliked in the same way; alternatively, however, the architect will be able to find appeal in a building by finding everything perfectly fine and good for purpose-fulfillment that eludes the one who does not understand anything about architecture. Similarly, only a horse expert will talk about and completely acknowledge the beauty of a horse, a military person the beauty of a weapon, if one wants to talk about beauty of such objects at all. Like this, it does happen that an expert talks most vividly about and calls an object beautiful that perfectly matches its purpose about which a layman finds nothing beautiful; and anyone at all who does not have professional insight into the conditions of purposefulness of an object that claims to have external purposefulness will not be able to have a certain or sufficient judgment of its aesthetic value. Also, such objects are mainly only judged by art laymen after taste transfer from art connoisseurs.

Further however: for all objects whose purposefulness only goes so far as to protect us from displeasure, disadvantage, to grant the necessary food, drink, clothing, housing, the

imagination of this cannot achieve more than to fight the associative displeasure of the sight of these objects either, thus to not let them appear unappealing; and for many objects the context in which they appear even much rather elicit unappealing rather than appealing associative imaginations of effort or dirtiness that dominate the ones of the distant purpose. Finally, the unappealing direct impression stands in conflict with the appealing association of the purpose.

All that being said, the moment of coherent connection of variety by means of the purpose idea as well as the non-contradiction to the idea remains undiminished but will not suffice alone even for the expert to drive the immediate impression of appeal across the threshold, let alone because we encounter too many purposeful objects every day that fulfill the conditions and therefore the dulling effect of habituation emerges. However, we can still unpleasantly feel a lack of those things that do not pleasantly tempt us anymore due to habituation.

Let's take a plow. Everybody knows that it serves to work the fields and thus belongs to the distant conditions for appeasing hunger. If the plow did not seem to fulfill this purpose, we would dislike it no matter the effort art would put into beautifying it; but insofar it seems to only fulfill this purpose, we do not count this fulfillment of duty to a positive feeling of beauty. Also, the association of hard labor with the plow will suggest itself more than the association with the harvest that it prepares. Finally, the plow has an intricate shape that does not comply with any principle of visible unity. Given all this, the plow seems more ugly than beautiful and would spoil any otherwise neat, noble household. Yet, someone who is well acquainted with the conditions of the purposeful equipment of a plow will be able to immediately have a decisive positive appreciation of one that truly fulfills these in a new, unusual way.

We see countless people being dressed simply, properly, quite purposefully without further positive liking or disliking as the clothing simply does not achieve more than to satisfy the need and we encounter such clothing every day.

Still, there are many objects whose purpose goes beyond the mere prevention or alleviation of displeasure and towards furthering well-being, the state of pleasure itself in a positive way or helping this furthering, and the more effectively the association can be evoked by this, the more it will contribute to the appeal or beauty of the object and will considerably contribute that we do not encounter these objects just as much the usual way than those that only satisfy daily needs. A residence can look just like it provides the necessary protection from weather, the necessary space and the necessary light to do everyday chores; but it can also look like one can live there comfortably and splendidly. A drinking vessel can look like it is only made to still one's thirst from it; but it can also look like it was made to serve a festive drinking bout. Whatever evokes such associative impressions, they will always be an effective leverage for the feeling of beauty but can themselves be supported by moments of direct appeal, such as the regularity and eye-comforting structuring of shape, insofar they do not contradict the purpose. And namely ornaments cannot only support the associative appeal of the purpose by means of their direct one, but they can also highlight the appealing character of the purpose by means of their sensible nature. Yes, the most noble and purposeful works of architecture and art industry need such aids in general to make the immediate impression of appeal or beauty, to not appear poor and empty, while all these aids cannot achieve beauty either without the basis of purposefulness. After all, one could hardly look at a building, a vessel and see that it is destined to serve higher pleasures of life. Associative and direct impression have to support each other in this; yet, as much as one wants to apply ornaments to a useless work of architecture or art

industry, one would not be able to ban the impression that the main point was neglected in favor of a minor point.

Based on the points above, one can explain that some works of architecture or art industry cannot be produced just as appealing or beautiful as others in any way given the same conservation of external purposefulness, be it that they do not give room for equally advantageous associations, be it that one cannot bring in the same aids of appeal without getting in conflict with the purposefulness itself or other conditions of appeal. Thus, one may want to try out all means with whom one seeks to or is able to beautify other objects on a cooking pot and would not immediately make it as appealing as a wine goblet, yes, one will only lessen the level of appeal that the pot can still achieve for the educated taste by trying to match the goblet in beauty.

Indeed, the cooking pot cannot take on the same shape as the goblet without contradicting its purpose and accordingly become unappealing by association, but it demands a simpler, plumper curvature. Second, the unappealing associative imaginations of the brewing of kitchen labor and the raw material that it has to store suggest themselves all the more for the cooking pot and determine the impression all the more the more purposeful it is while the appealing association of its purpose, to contribute to our culinary delights, fades into the background as more distant, while the sight of a wine goblet is all the more strongly associated with the imagination of an immediate pleasure the more it reminds of it by means of its gestalt and suitable ornaments. Third, the ornaments cannot serve in the same way for the pot than for the goblet, be it to heighten the direct factor of appeal, be it the associative one, partially because the application of ornaments would hurt the use or the use would hurt the ornaments, partially because the ornaments that one will want to refer to symbolically will be more distant to the

appealing purpose than to the closer usage and this would conflict with the closer associative imaginations of this usage, all of which is experienced as dislikable by educated taste and would earn the decorated cooking pot the shout: you're neither cooking pot nor beautiful.

Likewise, the plow needs the intricate shape for its performance. If one wanted to paint or carve it beautiful, it would appear rather as a thing made to be looked at rather than to plow and thus would not be as freely handled as the un-ornamented plow; for the right taste, however, its sight would already be ruined by this.

XVI. Commentary on a few sentences by Schnaase regarding architecture

The wrong notion that the external purposefulness of objects in whose purpose lies external purposefulness merely goes along with their beauty often also leads to wrong consequences. One feels the beauty of a building, but one does not grant or does not think that the purposefulness is able to have elicited this feeling or to even have contributed to it and looks for the reason for the immediate appeal of the building elsewhere. One can find an example of this in the remarks of a very esteemed art connoisseur that at the same time give the opportunity to elaborate the general aspects of the previous section according to some special relations and thus explain them more effectively. In contrast, wanting to trace the beauty of a building back to its purposefulness has already been protested against in the previous section and we will get back to it below.

Schnaase says in his Dutch letters when he discusses the positioning of the columns of temples: "Not the purposefulness but beauty makes the narrow inter-columns, that are proportional to the strength of the column's stem, necessary ... The parts of the building need to

be harmonious, the column must not contradict the beams too strongly; it must, despite standing erect, carry a trace of horizontality in it, the individual columns must become a row.”

The meaning is this: the beams are arranged horizontally; thus, the totality of the columns that support the beams must show a trace of horizontality such that the eye does not notice an unappealing contradiction of shapes which will be the case if they stand close enough to afford a continuous row to the view; not anymore, however, if they stand so far apart that gaps become apparent. Then, we look at each column in isolation and like this, the contradiction between their vertical direction and the horizontal direction of the beams stands out loud and unappealing. Whether the columns also satisfy the purpose of the building by means of standing closer or further apart does not matter to our feeling of beauty. It does not pay attention to the purpose of the shapes but to their unrelated coherence or contradiction.

Now, the first question is: does the eye demand elsewhere that the parts that are so different in their meaning, like supporting and supported, accommodate to a shape-similarity? Would not for the same reason a table let its surface rest on a continuous row of legs instead of 4 to be beautiful? But to show more directly that Schnaase’s opinion is not right here, one only needs to switch the building’s material. For a stone building, the columns must not stand far apart because otherwise the feeling would arise that they cannot support the burden of the stone above. However, if one wanted to space the columns of a wooden building just as narrowly, the feeling of unnecessary would impose itself. There, we would become anxious, here, the anxiety of the architect and the lack of motivation based on a purpose would discontent us. Thus, the delicately craved slim columns of the wooden building replace the narrow column order of the stone, yes, the columns may often disappear completely in a wooden building where the stone building imperatively demands them. Like this, nothing is more appealing than the roofs of

mountain huts that reach far over their outer walls that is supported by nothing or only a single pillar here and there. Now completely in the iron building. Each column that appears to be formed according to purest proportion in stone, slender and looming in stone would seem plump, dull, and oppressive in iron, as if suffocating in the fat of its own mass. The shapes of the iron building want to be even slimmer than the ones of the wooden building in general and its columns that almost transform into rods want to stand even further apart relative to their thickness. Everything about iron wants to show that it is even tougher than it is heavy. It effortlessly solves tasks that tire wood and stone or that those would not even dare to tackle. Casting makes it snuggle up to all shapes and thus the iron building can climb up with the lightest and most delicate limbs. It can, but our feeling of beauty also demands this of it.

Of course, we need to know the nature of iron, wood, stone, to feel the contribution to the building's beauty that depends on their purposeful use. Yet, we know them well enough based on our everyday experience to be able to feel without circuitousness or calculation upon seeing the given circumstances whether they contradict this nature or not, and where our judgment becomes uncertain in this regard, the feeling of beauty will become uncertain, too.

One may say that part of architectural beauty is based on experiment and calculation; because the knowledge of the most purposeful ratios of mass, shape, and dimensions rests on it and cannot be achieved by any other means. Yet, an educated feeling for architectural beauty summarizes the entire result of this with pleasure and before the feeling has not yet built up so much that it may do so, this part of architectural beauty remains ineffective, too. The most absolutely purposeful relations of all parts have undoubtedly not been found for any architectural style, yet at the same time no feeling is so educated as to feel what still lacks for absolute purposefulness; this is equivalent.

From a stone building itself we demand that its columns are arranged more narrowly once more wide-spread the other time (in relation to their thickness and length); we demand it even if we do not understand anything about architecture. However, if we enquire we find that here, too, the right feeling of beauty coincides every time with the right feeling of purposefulness. We would not like to see the slender Corinthian columns as far apart as the stocky Doric ones. Those may not stand other than close together if they shall stand with gaps at all, whereas short and thin columns stand half idly if they want to stand close and would rob material, space and light for nothing. We can well see that the Corinthian column may not trust itself to have the same carrying capacity as the Doric one, and therefore we want that it accepts more help from others; whereas we ask of the Doric column to do the work alone that it can do alone according to its stronger built.

This does not seem to apply to the pillars inside our gothic churches. They are slim and looming and yet they stand in relation to this further apart than all actual columns like the ones attached to Greek temples, more often outside than inside: Why not similarly spaced pillars outside as inside? Schnaase says about this (p. 196): “Just conversely, pillars do not suit the exterior of the building because the view of the observer, instead of being fixed on a solid figure, gets lost in the open shaded trees like in a dark inwardness, and thus it would gain the image of a sick unfinished being.⁷⁵ On the interior, in contrast, this shortage grants decisive advantages because the line of the pillars, exactly because it has so little bodily cohesion, is only described by separate points, hence it is an ideal, mathematical line, and reveals itself to us as something dependent, as the mere border of the area” etc. – Against this I think that the observation should be the following: the interior pillars have partially different purposes, partially they find

⁷⁵ Can one not much rather apply this expression to the image used here itself?

themselves to have different conditions of supporting than the exterior column. They must stand wide because otherwise they would inappropriately separate as a kind of wall the tree that shall surround the community with all that is part of the service in compartments, whereas narrow columns outside present as a kind of grid half an isolation against the exterior; however, they can stand far apart, further than columns of the same slimness, because they do not have to carry the wright of the beams like those but only have to support the arches. Those are the ones that, by leaning against the side walls, keep the roof suspended. Only where these give up keeping themselves tensioned with their own force across the wide tree that it sees spread beneath itself, they sporadically contract and a pillar descends as it were they strike a root in the ground. As a mere supporting means for carrying the pillar it thus does not need to fulfill the same conditions of stability that it would need to fulfill if it had to carry the same burden as column, and thus it steps further away from its neighbor not to block the tree that actually wants to be completely free; whereas the columns concentrate to carry safely and easily what they have to carry and to, at the same time, form gate and cordon for the tree that they enclose, more one or the other depending on the context. A right feeling, however, feels all of this without imagination holding any of the particulars.

Schnaase has yet another reason why columns in general demand a narrower stand than pillars that lies in their round and also otherwise elaborated form. This shall namely give the column an air of self-reliance that does not befit it as part of a whole; the view would be easily captured by a single column like this and thus would be in danger to lose the total impression of the whole, if it was not for the coalition of columns through their close standing that contradicts this self-reliance and forces the view to always reflect on an entire row of columns at once and balances the individual effect of each single column.

Let us note, however: one part of a building can indeed have greater independence than another insofar it makes a greater contribution to the fulfillment of the entire purpose of the building; it then appears rather like a part that makes others dependent on it than it appears to be dependent on others. If one such part attracts the eye more, it deserves to do so and there will not be any danger that the impression of the whole suffers from it as it much rather precisely comes into existence through this fact that each part makes itself known according to its importance for the whole, consequently, however, the column of the Greek temple may indeed attract and catch the eye more than the pillar in the gothic building because it really does have a greater self-reliance according to the above, and thus even the decorations may contribute to further emphasize the importance of the column.

However, beauty and purposefulness of columns do not only go hand in hand when it comes to the position but also when it comes to their main shape. Why is the column thicker on the bottom than on the top? Because this is useful for its stability. Why does it swell a little around the middle? Because it is most easily tempted to break at this point and an enforcement provides protection for this point. A dancer may float on the tip of her foot; here, the taper towards the bottom may be just as beautiful as the taper towards the top in the column; but the dancer shall move and show the sovereignty of the soul and vigor over heaviness; the column shall stand and support, and the complete subordination to the laws of the material's heaviness and durability.

At first glance, one may find it striking that chair and table legs, that have to carry weight as columns just as well, are formed according to just the opposite principle. Instead of tapering towards the top, they taper towards the bottom, and whereas every considerable tilt or even bend in a column has to be avoided, chair and table legs, especially the former, love to gear towards

the outside or even bend to the outside. With all this, they not only do not appear unappealing, but demand these relations for appeal. Does Schnaase's way of looking at it not need to assist here? But on the contrary, how can it, how can it explain the liking of such opposing relations? According to considerations of purpose, however, an explanation is easily found: The consideration of stability is here switched in such a way from the individual legs to the interconnected whole that the furniture piece stands as long as the vertical line that crosses the center of gravity enters the base area between the legs, accordingly the advantage to orient or bend the legs a little towards the outside. A broadened basis of each single leg would not help to do so but only make the piece of furniture more cumbersome, whereas the broader connection on top prevents the legs from easily breaking off. For columns that support beams each one has to stand relatively on its own and has to fulfill its task alone. But if the consideration of stability that refers to the entire constellation with solidarity does not quite show to advantage in the column positioning of Greek temples but only shows quietly to advantage and in such a way that the stability of the individual columns only imperceptibly suffers from the tilt. The outer columns of temple fronts do lean a little to the inside and thus the whole in a sense imitates the individual column.

Now, however, we get back to the point that not everything about a beautiful building can be inferred from purpose motives and that its beauty cannot be completely traced back to them. The capital, the foot, the cannellure of columns cannot be inferred from external purpose motives. Of course, Schnaase is right when he considers shape mediation between bordering vertical and horizontal lines, such as column and beams, beneficial to appeal apart from external purpose motives. One does not need to ask the columns to stand close to not make a harsh contrast between columns and beams palpable, but one can use the capital for it that continues the column

vertically at the top and at the same time extends it horizontally in the direction of the beams. Because this replaces for each column especially the leap in the horizontal direction by an appealing transition, there is not only no need for an apparent horizontality for the entire row of columns, this would also stand in contrast to the fact that the different meaning of column and beams shall make a different impression. The thickening of the columns towards the bottom, the swelling in the middle, the leaning of the columns into each other, despite indeed being in line with the purpose, are not as urgently demanded because the achievement of those lets the column and the entire positioning of the columns appear less monotone or stiff or, as one says, more vivid, appears even more important. One might even think that this truly only aims at vivification. Yet, a thickening and swelling of the column on the top instead of at the bottom, a tapering of the columns at the bottom instead of at the top would decrease the monotony, the stiffness just as well as the relations that are really adhered to, and would look disgusting, almost unbearable. Thus, the two moments of appeal support each other, alone having little impact, in the non-contradictory concurrence according to the principle of aesthetic aid that we have applied to often to a considerable achievement.

And thus, one shall also not contest or stunt the contribution of ornaments, symmetry, the golden section and whatever other in themselves beautiful relations one thinks one can find in architecture to the beauty of the whole due to the fact that purposefulness remains the basis for architectural beauty without whose existence these aids could not help and that by harming it they can only create damage. Well, one can accept that one lessens purposefulness for the benefit of other conditions of beauty where purposefulness is only considered so faintly or in such a subordinate relation that the disadvantage of violating it is not noticeably felt compared to the advantage created by fulfilling the other conditions. Per se, it is in the interest of external

purposefulness that no more work, diligence, costs are invested in the building than the external purpose demands. But one does invest more when elaborating the capital, the foot, the cannelure. Yet, they do not directly contradict the external purpose of the building but only become a distant consideration of purpose when one also considers the way in which it is built, and there even exists the demand that something needs to happen to raise the appeal of the building beyond the external purpose; thus, even the disadvantage that could be claimed associatively based on the violation of external purposefulness is not felt beyond the advantage that assert itself directly through the appeal of those parts.

I have considered only a few specific parts of a building before based on which one can easily make the application to the remaining ones and the whole. Each object of art industry can be subjected to similar observations. Let us confine ourselves to a few elaborations regarding an example.

In general, a vessel has the purpose to hold something in itself. It will under otherwise equal circumstances, i.e., given a certain mass and area, be able to hold the most if it is round like a sphere. If this was all that counts, and beauty would merely depend on external purposefulness, we would like the spherical vessel the most because one would see the most advantageous fulfillment of purpose. But many other considerations of purpose claim their demands for the shape and stretch, push, bend the sphere, cut it, add to other parts, and our feeling of beauty not only puts up with this but demands it. At the same time, this achieves apart from purposefulness the direct advantage of liking in that the attraction of variety in each vessel alone but also between different vessels emerges that would drop out if there were spherical vessels everywhere but remains always coherently connected by the aspect of purposefulness.

If we look more closely, one shall be able to pour something into the vessel from above, and it shall also be able to give back its content; thus, we cut off one part of the sphere at the top and either put it aside completely or put it, to best seal off the content, back on top as lid with a knob to put it on and off. The vessel shall further be able to stand on its bottom, and thus the sphere sacrifices its bottom bulge, we flatten it at least or give it a foot. A hollow sphere with a cut off top and flattened bottom gives the simplest bowl. The vessel shall also let itself be gripped comfortably; we therefore either bring a thin cylindrical part to grab with the hands between foot and body that we like to equip with a small bulge at the top or in the middle to fixate the position of the hand and to not let the vessel slip in it, or we put handles on the sides of the vessel, in some circumstances both. Thus, the sphere must also put up with attachments on the sides that may appear like disturbing outgrowths without consideration of the purpose, especially where there is only one handle, as in cups, that does not even achieve symmetry with another. An outward bend in the borders of the orifice facilitates pouring in something, the partial contraction into a spout facilitates draining, and the neck-shaped constriction between orifice and belly retains the encasing power as much as possible where these considerations of purpose are important.

Whereas the spherical shape is completely destroyed in the vertical direction like this, the spherical cross-section does remain in the horizontal direction of the vessel because all side-purposes only assert their influence in the former direction, at least for most vessels. Yet, even symmetry to all sides must concede where the purpose demands it, and this is why the one-sided spout on vessels that faces the handle is often pre-disposed to let something go.

In this entire discussion I have mainly had vessels for liquids in mind. When it comes to boxes, chests, caskets, bags, the shape generally is reluctant against that which they need to

contain, the application of curved areas for the walls, or the plank-based construction automatically brings along the rectangular shape.

Yet, also when it comes to vessels etc., just as with buildings, one cannot make everything dependent on purposefulness, and vessels just like buildings demand, to heighten liking to a point where we start to talk about beauty, also the aid of ornamentation and direct, i.e., independent of any associative imaginations, appeal of shape, insofar it is in accordance with purposefulness. Even though, as remarked above, purposefulness itself appears as coherent linking element of variety on each vessel; yet, even the visible coherent connection must insofar be maintained as can be reconciled with this main condition and certain shapes, certain bends can be more advantageous than others in this regard than others. Since the principle of coherent connection of variety that is mainly considered here lacks sufficient determination, and in addition only may be taken into consideration in co-determination by the purpose that is modified for each other vessel, the aesthetic experiment will need to be consulted with usefulness to determine the more or less advantageous one in this field where no aprioism will suffice. In the experiments employing the method of choice with 10 rectangles varying in their side ratios one of a certain ratio was preferred more often than the others according to the table on p. 210. Let's say that, instead, an artist creates 10 models of a cup that vary along any one aspect and applies the method of choice to them accordingly, he would be able to count on selling the most preferred cups most often and at the same time maybe give some theoretical observations a useful clue. The aspects according to which the shape of the cup can be varied are of courses many more than those that the ratios of a rectangle depend on; but after a certain main shape is usually already fixed for a given usage, the variations of aspects that remain for variation confine themselves.

As is easy to guess, the previous remarks on cups can be transferred to any object of art industry. The artist would have an easier time altogether in applying the method of choice to such a thing than I had it with my private experiment with abstract rectangles because he would only need to consult all costumers that buy something from him at all at that occasion, thus he would not have any lack of participants, and the preference choice between concrete objects of a certain use is easier than between simple forms with abstraction of such. At the same time, he would achieve the practical advantage to learn about the most liked shape especially for the taste of those who make up his clientele. Alas, whether he would find his colleagues turning up their noses as mine did regarding the aesthetic experiment, I do not want to attest to.

XVII. Of witty and funny comparisons, puns and other cases that have a character of delightfulness, funniness, ludicrousness.

In my opinion, the principle of coherent connection of variety plays the main role in the field that we are looking at here but does need additional supporting side-conditions to drive the enjoyment that cases that belong here can elicit with its idiosyncratic character across the threshold.

Funny comparisons and puns probably grant the most obvious explanation of this. For the former, the enjoyment is based on us simultaneously discovering a coherent *terminological* aspect between otherwise very different ones with a short glimpse while for the latter the coherent aspect is mediated by the same or similar *word* description; and comparisons just like puns elicit the greater enjoyment and are found funny and even ludicrous the more easily the more trenchant they are, the easier to grasp the coherent connection on one hand, the greater the difference or the apparent contradiction that is mediated by it becomes, on the other hand the less

common, expected, more surprising, distant the kind of connection is thirdly, while the aesthetic effect of common or proximal ways of connection in general fall below threshold.

Indeed, the threshold principle and blunting against familiar stimuli is a crucial co-consideration when it comes to the aesthetic effect of these games. Only that these principles are merely co-determinants while the quasi core of the effect lies in the above principle.

Apart from these co-determinants, however, the effect of the principle can experience aid or counteraction also from an objective side by the quality of the content, that tends more to pleasure or displeasure, and that contributes to the comparison or pun. The per se purely formal effect of the principle appears in its purest form when the content is most indifferent.

We encounter countless similarities every day, but they do not move us due to their familiarity, do not catch our attention. In poetry, one will like to acquiesce in, almost prefer it to the use of direct descriptions, finding a beautiful girl described as blooming rose, a brave man as a lion, a cruel one as a tiger. Such comparisons, of course, do not really interest us anymore, they have become dull due to their frequent repetition. Yet, if Jean Paul calls the moon a swan of the sky, this comparison seems admittedly pretty obvious not funny, but we are more interested in it than in the previous ones since it does not share their familiarity. Also, our liking of it is reinforced by the fact that the graceful imagination appeals to us objectively. Yet, when Jean Paul elsewhere calls the moon in the phases of decreasing and increasing, at the same time taking his shape and that the moon in the sky and poppy juice share a relation to sleep into consideration, a poppy-oil-cake that has been bitten into, this very distant comparison between entirely heterogeneous objects appears, even though in some regard less apt, funnier than all previous comparisons, even though it would not fit at all, would not be able to amuse at all, because the distance does not do it alone, it only heightens susceptibility; and if someone wanted

to say that the moon was, e.g., a fox or a piece of bread, one would not find that funny but only tasteless because this completely lacks a connecting imagination.

When it comes to puns, we are per se not aesthetically moved by a word appearing with different meanings and is accordingly listed in the dictionary with such as we know that these different meanings apply to different contexts and automatically classify it accordingly.

Conversely, we find it extremely delightful when the real use of the same or a similar word or sentence reveals the common intermediary term for the different meanings, by which the commonality of the word use is justified unexpectedly. For example:

Somebody said regarding a dancer that for a wage of 4,000 thaler mainly danced the roles of elves in Oberon and such: “2,000 thaler for each leg, that is expensive elven leg⁷⁶.” – Saphir had lent 300 guilders from a banker he knew. When he visited him after some time, he said: “Ah, you came in for the 300 guilders.” “No, Saphir replied, I came in for 300 guilders.” – During a larger family party that I went to, someone gave cheers to the uncle who was present after the main person of the party had received enough toasts; soon, an Englishman stood up who, despite having lived in Germany for years, only expressed himself clumsily in German, regardless of which he excelled in German puns with the impeccable counter-toast that he himself gives cheers to the uncle “mit Nichten”⁷⁷.

In the first example, it is the term of inflation, in the second the deal with the 300 guilders, in the third the toast to members of society that forms the basis of the coherent connection between the different meanings.

⁷⁶ *Translator's note:* Literally translated from German “Elfenbein” = “ivory” in English. As so many puns, this is not translatable to a different language.

⁷⁷ *Translator's note:* “Mit Nichten” translates both to “with nieces” and to “not at all”.

It is a short, quasi quickly up-flaring and down flaring-delight that a witty or funny comparison or a similar pun grants us because it is a small circle of imaginations that we move in and we want to repeat the same movement more often than the displeasure of monotony would invoke quickly. But this short delight can be more intense than the longer one and in its entirety more substantial that we can gain from a context that lets us pursue the coherent relation through a larger series of different moments without, however, heightening our attention so intensively at any time and momentarily tense it so much as it happens during a game of this kind by means of the so unexpectedly happening coherent mediation between two completely heterogenous appearing imaginations or circles of imagination.

Some comparisons elicit pleasure, we find them witty without finding them funny or even ludicrous, as the following by J. Paul: Great pains make us impervious to small ones, like the waterfall shields from the rain. – The happiness of life lies, like the day is not formed of individual lightnings, but in a constant quiet lightness. – Now, one easily tells oneself that the funniness of these and similar comparisons is hampered by the sincerity that provokes thought in some regard; but the fact that the pleasure here mainly depends on the aptness of the comparison much rather than on the opposition of the compared ones plays no smaller role. Since despite the fact that one can find physical and mental things, as compared in the previous, very opposing, we are used to view the physical as a symbol of the mental and to compare the two such that in the previous comparisons we much rather encounter the *aspect* of equality than the distinctness. This begs the question: what does the specific character of funniness depend on, after all.

In general, one conceives the funniness of a *subject* as a state of pleasure that carries an easy transition between imaginations and is itself based on them according to which that is *objectively* funny which evokes or facilitates such a state of pleasure. The stronger the level of

pleasure and the stronger the transition in which it moves, the funnier the subject or object. A strong degree of funniness becomes ludicrousness. Comparisons and puns can only become funny or ludicrous by giving occasion for executing a *strong* transition between imaginations due to coherent connection. The more heterogenous or even opposing the imaginations are, the funnier the connection will be under *otherwise equal conditions*, but the character of the content of the connected imaginations can just as well counteract the formally caused funniness as it can increase it. As the former can happen due to the serene character of the content, the latter can happen due to playful references, insofar the person likes to befool others at all without harming them; like this, Heine says: a girl is milk, a young woman butter and an old woman is cheese; or Saphir: a Bavarian is a beer keg when he stands up, a keg of beer when he lies down.

The talent for funny comparisons and for puns does not completely overlap. Jean Paul has a lot of the former but little of the latter, vice versa for Saphir. For the former, one needs great richness in things and objective relations, for the latter a great capacity for remembering many words with their associated meanings simultaneously or in quick succession and to realize the inherent connotations. The former is undoubtedly more important than the latter and can be linked to great intellectual importance in general; but the funny ones can lack depth, too, which is easily understandable as each joke in itself is completed within a short circle of imaginations.

That the funniness of comparisons and jokes, insofar as they happen, is really based on the circumstances under which they are made is confirmed by the fact that it appears with a very similar quality in cases that at first glance have little or nothing in common with those games or one another, upon closer examination, however, they do have the specified main and side-conditions in common. This is where the funniness or even ludicrousness of many mistakes, slips of the tongue, silly answers, absentmindedness, misled expectations, etc., belong.

In this regard, the misprint and the slip of the tongue (confusion of words) are closest to puns with the non-trivial difference that here the word itself, without intermediate effects of a mediating term, mediates the switch to a heterogenous meaning. If the meaning becomes unintelligible or somewhat quirky due to the misprint or the slip of the tongue, this will not contain any ludicrousness; it is indeed part of it that the actual meaning shifts to a more or less contradictory one or one that is completely out of the way due to the use of a similar word. A couple of examples in the following.

Misprints.⁷⁸

In the description of a school fair: “The fair ended with the singing of a cholera verse” (instead of chorale verse).

Advertisement: “A landowner wants to sell all his gods” (goods).

In an edition of Goethe’s poems instead of: “he almost felt entranced as often as he drank from it” – “He almost felt entranced as he drank from it often.”

In the opening poem of Uhland’s songs 1st edition, instead of: “Songs we are, the father sends us into the big world” – “tongs we are” etc.

Obituary of a tailor who died after long suffering, instead of: “He endured 3 years” – “He endured three years.”

Public acknowledgment for a doctor from a husband that he had led the sickness of his wife to a fortunate cremation (cessation).

Slips of tongue.

⁷⁸ *Translator’s note:* Misprints were not translated literally but in such a way that the same character of (slightly outdated) funniness was retained).

A young person that I hired to read aloud made, among others, the following mistake: Schiller's statue on the pedestrian (pedestal). – An English bear (pair) is usually a man of high influence and reputation. – The moon appeared in full gallop (glance) on the horizon.

During exams, an entire series of wrong answers come up, and if the examiners were to laugh about every one of them, they would never be able to stop it instead of not being able to stop their anger; wrong answers due to ignorance, bad memory are all too common; everybody, however, will find the following answers ludicrous because the mediation between the given and the expected answer is just as obvious as the deviation between both is unexpected and steering into completely different directions.

During the exams of Oxford students one of them answered the question: why did the Israelis leave Egypt? with: "Because, because, it may well have been because of the story about Potiphar's wife;" another to the question: why was Johannes the Baptist decapitated? "Because he wanted to dance with Herodias's daughter."

Exaggerations can become ludicrous, too, when imagining the right extent or level of one and the same object turns into the completely wrong extent or level. Of course, nobody will laugh about idioms like "it is hot as hell" or "I could die of hunger", even though these are huge exaggerations; but these and similar exaggerations are so common in everyday talk that they are not necessarily seen in a peculiar way to remain effective.

When it comes to ludicrous absentmindedness one commonly sees that a purpose is sought to be achieved in a way that completely contradicts the way it could be achieved. The linking element of the contradiction is the common purpose imagination in which the contradictory imaginations coincide. Like this, I saw a woman walk through all rooms to search for her child that she held in her arms; because of which people, of course, laughed at her. If one

had seen that she sought the child in a room while one knew that it was in another, it would not have seemed ludicrous; because nothing peculiar could have been found in the act of somebody searching for something in the wrong place where one has not looked yet, very much so, however, if he does not find it where sight and feeling should let him find it immediately.

When I needed a water cure in Ilmenau, one said about an anxious guest that he was worried that the water in which he should have stepped might be too cold for him and thus tested the water by holding his stick into it.

When someone de-contrives a mistake or the act of an absentminded one and one recognizes this intent, the character of ludicrousness vanishes because the contradiction between the behavior that should be directed towards the purpose and the behavior that really was directed towards the purpose vanish from imagination, as one does indeed see the purpose of the actor to be deception and the simple direction of this action.

When it comes to deceived expectation that have the character of ludicrousness it is, instead of a common imagination of purpose in which the contradictory imaginations coincide, rather the common starting imagination of a kind of event that dissolves into contradictory modifications that provides a binding element.

Nothing is more ludicrous than the jumps of young cats. Why? We are used to anticipate the following movement from every movement that we see executed. But the jumps of young cats contradict this natural expectation almost every moment.

When a child runs after his cap that has been blown off by the wind, we do not find it ludicrous, we see a child run more often than walk in general; however, when a serious man runs after his hat, it seems ludicrous for the same reason as the jump of a young cat; and maybe one

will find the comparison itself ludicrous because one is not used to seeing a serious man compared to a young cat.

When a tile falls of the roof and one has not thought about it, there is no reason for ludicrousness; but if a tile falls in front of someone's feet while he waited for the fall of a rose from a beautiful hand, he will find it ludicrous himself given that the failure does not annoy the expectations too much objectively, and we, who do not share his annoyance, will definitely find it ludicrous, the more so if we find that he deserves it. The case would cease to be ludicrous to us, too, if the tile struck the man dead or injured him severely because the objective displeasure of the incidence does not let the advantage of the formal pleasure of ludicrousness show; and this example can stand in for many others where the ludicrousness does not come into being because of objective counter-effects.

One can remark that the principle of imaginative unanimity stands in conflict with the principle of coherent connection of variety, to which the cases here are subordinated to, in the case of counter-purposive actions, deceived expectation and in other cases where the imagination is contradicted by the facts. Specifically, while the pleasure in such cases is attributable to the satisfaction of the latter principle, one might expect much more displeasure from the violation of the former. Yet, it has already been remarked earlier that in general displeasure that arises from the violation of that principle easily remains below threshold if the contradiction does not deeply affect our theoretical and practical interests, and it will be able to show an effect even less if it is outweighed by the strong contradictory effect of another principle. Also, it compensates itself in a way automatically. What do we care, e.g., when the cat makes a different jump than we could expect; of course, we do find our imagination contradicted by this but at the same time we also find it immediately refuted, corrected, the contradiction is at the same moment resolved as it

emerged, the new imagination takes the place of the old one; and the resolution of the contradiction is in the interest of pleasure just as the contradiction is in the interest of displeasure; thus, there remains room for the principle of coherent connection of variety to exert its effect. It is different when something seems to go against the usual course of nature, to contradict its laws and therewith the preconditions that we need to hang on to; this does not seem ludicrous to us even if it otherwise seems to unify all other conditions of it. Here, the feeling of eeriness takes the place of ludicrousness. Let us, e.g., imagine that the rain, after we have seen it, as often as it had ever rained, seen pour downwards, would start to fall upwards again all of a sudden after its downfall and to imitate the jumps of young cats in all directions, this would not seem as ludicrous to us because our preconditions of success cannot be unrooted by the contradictory success, the contradiction would thus permanently remain in place and confuse our notion of nature.

Thus, it would be implausible and outright wrong to attribute the ludicrousness in the described cases to the existence of a contradiction; elsewhere, a contradiction of imaginations does reveal its displeasure-eliciting trait sufficiently. A stronger contradiction can only insofar heighten the funniness as the diversity that establishes variety cannot become greater than to the extent that it would become a contradiction; however, the greater the variety, the funnier its coherent connection.

All of the above only needs examples from the verbal arts and real life; but cases that can be subsumed under corresponding aspects are not foreign to the visual arts.

When a pen-cleaning rag is depicted as a small puppet or as slipper or as duster or as book, etc., we find in every such travesty the conjunction of the very heterogenous imaginations by a mediating one; because the interpretation of one and the same shape facilitates two very

different meanings. Lighters, toothpick containers, portable lamps, and other objects of small purpose are often seen travestied and one can find delight in it for similar reasons as for the verbal games above, insofar as a conflict, that does give those games a certain disadvantage, does not show itself too clearly. The fact that, according to the discussion of the 15th section, it lies in the aesthetic interest to bring the purpose's meaning to greatest attention when it comes to purposeful objects, does not hide itself more or less due to travesty but in a way strikes a balance with it, in any case it cannot bring its full value to attention anymore. Where the purpose is now such an insignificant one that we do not put much weight on the aesthetic demand for its pure enforcement in appearance, the appeal of travesty, especially in conjunction with an interest in or appeal of the shape itself, can easily outweigh the disadvantage, and one may allow such shenanigans. Whereas it would be utterly distasteful to travesty similar objects with purposes of more important meaning. One has, e.g., proposed to aesthetically enhance the locomotives, that of course do not make the appealing impression of a swan moving on water, by wrapping them in a cover in the shape of a swan. But not only that one hides their play with that which interests us at least as much as the swimming of the swan, it also contradicts our imagination that a swan slides on the ground or that a locomotive swims like a swan, and this contradiction is too serious to be compensated by the appeal of travesty including the appeal of the swan's figure.

The fact that liking is determined at least as much by the delicate or otherwise interesting design that is imprinted on the institution rather than the appeal of the travesty when it comes to shenanigans with travesty of small institutions of purpose may, in conjunction with the stated conflict, be the reason why the impression of ludicrousness does not easily emerge, even if the travesty has a character that is far removed from the purpose. The ludicrousness, however, may

enter the visual arts because they can depict the ludicrous relations or events of life or strong exaggerations (in caricatures).

Like this, e.g., a small image of Biard⁷⁹ in a ludicrous way depicts the welcoming that awaits a traveler when he exits a Rhine steamer, how at least 10 to 12 bunch- and bag carriers share the travel securities and lead him with his female companion to the hotel. Two beefy blokes carry a light backpack on a heavy rod over their shoulders, another drives an etui and an umbrella on a wheelbarrow to which two assistants have hitched themselves up to.

Among others, leaflets are full of such ludicrous depictions to which, of course, explanations are a crucial addition.

Even music does not completely lack the ability to provoke laughter. At least I remember that the virtuoso violinist Wasiliewski once performed a piece in a circle of friends that did not produce anything but laughter because it was in a way composed according to the principle of young cats' jumps.

On a side note, the following remarks on the way in which the body reacts to the impression of ludicrousness compared to impressions of the opposite nature. Laughter consists of a jerky or intermittent exhalation, sobbing of a correspondingly jerky inhalation. A sudden joy, however, that we encounter with an impression that its source is a sustainable one, does not lead us as well to laugh than to freeze in place in a state of hesitant exhalation, as I think, as I imagine myself having won the lottery, whereas one stares at the source of a sudden scare with hesitant inhalation. When one suddenly realizes that one was scared without reason, the scare diffuses into laughter, and thus the state of inhalation jumps with one jerk to exhalation.

⁷⁹ Discussed in *Kunstbl.* 1844. No. 88.

XVIII. On taste

1) Terminology

Things are the same for the terminology of taste as for all of our general terms; one cannot constrict them, or they will escape the constriction to all sides; however, there usually remains a common core. And thus, the common core for the term taste is that it is a setup of the soul to immediately like or dislike someone or something that does not need contemplation to be elicited. One sees the object and without knowing and asking why, we like or dislike it; that is a matter of taste. And if someone asks nonetheless why or why not, and one does not know why, one considers it to be sufficient to say that it is a matter of taste.

Taste in this sense is a subjective addition to the objective conditions of liking and disliking. The thing must have a feature to be possibly liked or disliked; but if the person does not have the fitting setup, he does not like or dislike it; with a different setup, one can like what the other dislikes, and thus we talk of *different* tastes as different people like or dislike different things.

Insofar aesthetic is concerned with objects and relations of immediate liking or disliking, and calls beautiful or non-beautiful in the broadest sense possible that which has the capacity to be immediately liked or disliked, the theory of taste is equivalent to aesthetics, is taste the ability to find things appealing in such a way, and it is a matter of taste what one finds beautiful or not beautiful. Insofar, however, the term aesthetics in a *narrower* sense is limited to objects and relations of higher liking and disliking, one tends to relate the term taste to them in an equivalent way, too, and e.g., will not count the liking or disliking of something good- or bad-tasting as a matter of taste in a narrow sense despite the fact that the term taste is borrowed from there, will not call a good-taster a man of good taste. Yet, some relations that apply to taste in the narrower and higher sense are more pragmatically explained with lower ones.

In a very broad sense, the term taste just like beauty or non-beauty is not only applied to liking and disliking of relations in the external world but also to such of the internal world, and so one does say: It is not to my taste to worry much about things, to first think for a long time, etc.; in the narrow sense, however, one relates taste just like beautiful and non-beautiful only to liking and disliking of things and relations that make an impression on us from the external world.

Insofar one distinguishes intellectual and emotional judgments based on the fact that one is conscious about the reasons for the judgment for the former, not for the latter, judgments about whether something is beautiful or non-beautiful according to taste, as well as those according to conscience about whether something is just or unjust, belong to emotional judgments. There must, of course, be reasons for the judgment everywhere; but they can lie in an internal institution whose effect, but not development or operation, one is conscious about. Now, a more frequent intellectual investigation of the demands that things make to be liked or disliked can contribute something to the institution based on which we later like or dislike them even without thinking; but this is only one means to educate taste about which we will talk about more later. No matter how it emerged and how it is formed, if taste is otherwise well-trained, it is so extraordinarily valuable because it immediately delivers the result of a thousand good reasons that intellect can let us find even without searching for those reasons.

Insofar taste immediately tells us what is beautiful and what is non-beautiful, and conscience what is just and what is unjust, taste has a similar importance for aesthetics as conscience for morals. Whether they always objectively say the right thing is an open question for both, but we will not consider this one here where we first deal with terminological conditions.

So far, we have only talked of taste in a subjective sense; however, one also applies the term taste to objects to describe the way in which they appeal to the subjective taste, like when one talks about the specific taste that prevails in architecture, furniture, clothes.

The following has to be said about distinctions that one can make regarding the term taste.

The most important distinction that needs to be made is the one between a *good* and a *bad* or *right* and *non-right* taste, according to which people like and dislike what comely *shall* be liked or disliked or the opposite. Immediately, this raises the question about this ought. We will get to this below; first, one can make do with the usual term shall.

Further, one can distinguish a *finer* and *rougher*, *higher* and *lower*, *one-sided* and *versatile* taste and different *directions* of taste, depending on whether the person is able to be aesthetically affected by finer or rougher, higher or lower, fewer or more, such or such conditions and relations of things.

One cannot say in general that a fine and high taste at the same time necessarily is more right of between; because even though the conditions of those coincide ever so often, this is not always the case. Thus, the over-educated has often a finer and higher but therefore not necessarily a more right of better taste which we will get back to. A versatile taste is even less certainly a good one as it can rather be bad in all directions; whereas a too rough, too low, too one-sided taste is, of course, also not good.

There is not necessarily a link between fineness and height of taste either. It is per se only a matter of fine, not high, taste if someone enjoys the fine execution of a painting, the fine modulation of a piece of music as well as the relation between the fine things that one calls fine; but it can hereby well be that the sensitivity does not exceed the individual fine relations, does

not rise up to the highest and last relations that permeate the whole and connect the whole, and thus despite the subtlety of the sensation does not reach great heights; whereas conversely, when it comes to sensitivity for the relations of great masses, as they e.g., reach great heights in the artworks of so-called high style, but therefore forfeits the subtlety of sensation in the individual case. Art accommodates this distinction since artworks of fine execution are generally not at the same time works of high style and vice versa; and while one cannot say either that a conjunction of the fine and high is possible at all, they do not coincide often in either subject nor object, and trying to join them comes with a but. This would give occasion to digress; but we first want to exclusively talk about the term taste.

While taste in and by itself can be good or bad, fine or rough, taste *itself* has a connotation of the former rather than the latter sense, thus one means, of one says that someone has taste, that he has a relatively right and fine one, in this narrower sense one does not need taste equivalent to taste as it should be.

The meaning of the adjectives *tasteful*, *tasteless* is associated with this narrower meaning of taste; at the same time, language use has its whims. One talks about tasteless people as such who lack good taste, why not also about tasteful ones as such that do have it. We do not have a suitable adjective for this at all; because *tactful* relates rather to manners than sensation.

Natural and artistic beauty is preferably the object of higher and finer taste; but nobody will call a landscape or a historical painting mainly tasteful or tasteless; whereas clothes, furniture, decorations, full toiletries or room furnishings are most generously given those adjectives. The placement of a painting or a statue that oneself may want to call beautiful but not tasteful in a suitable or unsuitable environment may be called tasteful or tasteless; at the same time, it always remains true that the *judgment* of the painting, the statue as beautiful or non-

beautiful according to their immediate impression that they can make on the whole remains a matter of taste. The meaning as an adjective relating to the liked and disliked objects thus follows the one as a noun with regard to the subjects not up to the objects of higher liking.

If language had evolved systematically, adjectives would better align with nouns; but our terms have not evolved like that and thus *language* could not do so either.

One considers the highest or absolutely obvious level of tastelessness *vulgar*, something that completely falls off the right taste.

2) Dispute of taste

It is an old saying that there is no accounting for taste; meanwhile, people do try to account for it, there is nothing people dispute more than taste⁸⁰; thus, one must be able to account for taste. And not only individuals dispute taste, even nations and times, or if they do not dispute it because they are too far apart from one another, at least the directions of their tastes dispute with each other because they are usually as different from each other as the nations and times are distant from each other. But even those that are close in time and location, scientific and religious beliefs, the best friends in all other matters usually do dispute taste. And the aestheticians and art critics who would need to judge the dispute are the ones who dispute the most because they also dispute the aspects and reasons of the judgment.

Let us now take a look at a particularly striking example of disputing taste purely objectively, in part to evoke a sense for the size of the existing differences in taste, in part to find a starting point for future discussion. Specifically, first an example from the area of fashion, an area that casts doubt on whether taste obeys any rules or laws whatsoever. Because even though

⁸⁰ *Translator's note:* In German, the idiom literally states "One cannot dispute taste"

it gives itself a new rule with every new fashion trend, it is only to mock at the old one and to fall prey to the mockery of the later one.

Probably the most tasteless thing that exists seems to be a wig and its slightly newer representatives, powder, braid, hair caps, that transform the head itself into a sort of wig. How different is a not too long gone time compared to this. I have myself still heard old people talk about the impression of misery, non-culturedness, even rawness, they used to get from a head without coiffure or braid. A person without, that did not look like anything. It was my father-in-law here in Leipzig, Rathsaubeister Volkmann, the first who dared to appear without braid at a festive occasion, namely the defense of his doctoral thesis, and his friend and opponent, who later became a famous philosopher, Gottfried Hermann, accompanied him on this venture that he would not have felt up to alone. Also, it almost cost him his entry to the council; because to think of a father of the city without braid meant almost thinking of the controller of a ship without rudder. Yet, coiffure and braid were basically only the last offshoots of the formerly world-dominating wig; however, through it, and its somehow polar trail, impressions were formerly made that could almost make us regret that these pieces are now made fun of, that once heightened the dignity of people upwards as much as the other elongated it backwards and downwards. We were thus robbed of one source of sublime impressions. Indeed, a great alonge wig undoubtedly made a more sublime impression than the Dome of Cologne which did not make any exactly because the wig made such a great one and thus remained unfinished. But it is almost no exaggeration today that the wig made a greater one in the past than the Dome of Cologne now. I remember to have read that a child when its father was paid a visit by a councilman who wore an enormous wig asked afterwards with shy deference that this must have been God. It could not think of the highest being without the greatest wig and thus inferred

conversely the highest being from the greatest wig. Thus, being in awe of a wig had already taken roots in the youngest souls.

Also, these things were not the same as the dress coat today which is just as commonly theoretically discarded as it had been practically worn in society and that one has not even today managed to shrug off completely. Rather, the taste for such things had been deemed so decisive that even representatives of taste advocated it. If one read what an artist, who has himself written an analysis of the beautiful and has anyhow written it according to the taste of his time, Hogarth says about it⁸¹.

“The full-bottom wig, like the lion’s mane, hath something noble in it, and adds not only dignity, but sagacity to the countenance...” and: “The judge’s robes have an awful dignity given them by the quantity of their contents, and when the train is held up, there is a noble waving line descending from the shoulders of the judge to the hand of his train-bearer. So when the train is gently thrown aside, it generally falls into a great variety of folds, which again employ the eye, and fix its attention.”

One sees, Hogarth conceives of the wig and trail from a truly idealistic point of view. Also, the wig entered the arts from this viewpoint. When the dress coat had been of greater prestige than it is nowadays, one would have shied away from depicting someone in a dress coat in a family painting, even more so in a monumental painting; one wore and wears it in a way in contradiction to current taste. Conversely, one can assert that, as I understand from an expert depiction, “that there are no public family paintings and no male portrait on the cover page of any book from the sixties and seventies of the 17th century until pretty late in the next decade that

⁸¹ *Translator’s note:* Fechner here cites the translation “Zergliederung der Schönheit” by Mylius, p. 12. Here, the original text is shown.

does not show them wearing a wig; the man ought then to have been portrayed in a night cap, which does occur;” because the night cap, too, played, as a compendious extract of the wig, a completely different role than nowadays.

Let us consider for once, a noble man with wig or coiffure, broad-tailed dress coat, floral vest, short scarlet trousers, big buckled shoes, and a woman on either side with high attachments on their head, fake beauty marks in their face, lace corset, crinoline, high heels, would once appear in the ancient Athens or Rome on the market and walk through the crowds; what kind of impression would that have made? One may think an unstoppable laughter would have emerged. That would have happened on our market. I rather think that a general dread would have emerged because one would have thought to watch the appearance of two creepy juggernauts from an unreasonable world like no human phantasy, no human intellect could make them up. Yet, formerly even the Greek and Roman kings, heroes, and senators had to accept the fact that they appeared on the theater stage in only slightly milder costumes in the taste-setting France. Taste demanded them so much that not even the commonly accepted principle of mimicry of nature by the arts could break it, one much rather viewed it as the necessary idealization of nature through the arts.

Alas, clothes, fashion items in general, are undoubtedly lower objects of taste. But when people wore braid and wig, literally everybody, even the highest objects of taste, wore braid or wig which is the source of the expressions braid- and wig-taste, braid- or wig-period. And during the time when the Greek garb and the Roman toga were worn, everything matched these garments, too.

Thus, here we have two time periods and people that in a way did not agree about anything regarding taste. Just like differences in taste generally do not assert themselves in

isolation, and all examples that were given here actually ought to represent a broader context of such. With this, let us switch from fashion to art but let us content ourselves with shorter notes on this infinite field.

I shall talk about examples from the *visual* arts. Think about, e.g., how the taste of ancient times was completely lost in the early middle ages and only renewed itself in the so-called Renaissance, after some ups and downs, during which Bernini counted more than the old ones, so to say celebrated a new reincarnation in Winckelmann, like the Canovian softness and pretension celebrated a new victory against the old ones, and like Apollo who was so much adored by Winckelmann now has to cope with the fact that he has been put on the second place.

Our *musical* taste is neither the taste of other nations nor is our current musical taste the taste of past times, the music of the future, however, is already here with much fanfare to announce the victory over the current one. Only an excerpt from a historical essay about music shall find space here that I, as someone who does not understand music, found especially interesting⁸².

“It is unremarkable that it seems trivial that when it comes to harmony, many things that were surprising opposites for our ancestors do in contrast not surprise us at all. But that conjunctions of harmonies sound completely wrong and silly to the ear of one time period that sounded beautiful and natural to the ear of a different time, that is indeed a puzzling fact. Even the shrill and unprepared dissonances that we now often consider very effective were deemed ear-piercing 100 years ago. Even more. The dreadful series of quarts of Guido von Arezzo from the 11th century are so aversive to our ears that a well-trained singer needs the greatest willpower to let such conjunctions of harmonies out of his throat at all. And yet, they must have sounded

⁸² Augsb. Allg. Zeit. 1852 Beil. Zu No. 29. P. 458

beautiful and natural to the medieval ear! Even dogs that quietly listen to modern series of thirds and sixths start to howl miserably when one plays the barbaric series of quarts of the Guidonian diaphonies to them! This historically established change of the musical ear is indeed a mystery.”

In addition to this, the author also shows how the tuning of the orchestra, the tempo, etc. were changed according to time and location.

Without dwelling any longer in thus, I add an example from frozen music, as one of the brothers Schlegel has famously called *architecture*, to the example from music proper; an example that, if the previous one has already seemed incredible, will seem even more incredible since it shows our architectural taste being turned on its head.

In our just like in ancient architecture, it is considered self-evident that columns, pillars only support part of a building, not, like the legs carry the body of an animal, that they have to burden themselves with the entire building; and it is just as self-evident that they taper off towards the top rather than the bottom. Indeed, it would appear like a matter of completely screwed taste to see a building completely hovering above the ground resting on columns and pillars as if it would shy away from touching what it should rather completely ground itself on and to see the thicker, also heavier, part of columns and pillars turned upwards rather than downwards. Both absurdities, however, are united in British Bencoolen’s architecture on the island Sumatra as I understand from a description. There, the floor of the houses does not rest on the ground but on 8 feet tall pillars, such that one can walk underneath the floor as well as the ceiling, and these pillars are altogether thicker on the top than on the bottom. At the same time, the inhabitants do not only consider them as objects of use but truly as ones of taste as evident from the fact that they craft them cleanly and decorate their upper parts in a similar way as we decorate the capitals of our columns. Their eye and sense of beauty or taste has adapted itself to

the relations of their buildings just like our taste has to the relations that occur around us; and if we laugh about their stilt-footed houses, they will on the contrary think of our houses as beings whose legs were cut off and now lie flat on the ground.

One asks: how can one explain such a lapse of taste? It will be explained not only in the following but it can also not be justified as a lapse; precisely because it is so instructive, I have brought it up. Only one last example regarding the aesthetic notion of nature.

That this was a very different one for the elders than for us is easily derived from the fact that they did not have landscape paintings in the same sense as we do despite their otherwise so highly developed art. One did know to appreciate laughing, blooming, well farmed landscapes that are rich in transitions from forest to mountain to river, especially beach areas of sea and ocean, and one preferred to build there, but did not set them in a sentimental relation to nature, was not as refined in modulating the aesthetic enjoyment of nature, did not yet travel to beautiful sceneries just because of the beauty of the landscape. The overall aesthetic impression of the landscape was undoubtedly closer to the sensual than it is for us, without having been merely sensual, while some details in nature, specifically groves, springs, rivers, due to their mythological relation also had gained a higher aesthetic meaning for the elders than for us.

The difference between the aesthetic notion of sublime and wild-romantic landscapes is the most peculiar one between ancient and our times. For such landscapes, one may say, ancient times had a complete lack of taste; and if one now jokingly says about some dog breeds that they are the more beautiful the uglier they are, the elders would have seriously said that about our taste for such landscapes, we find them the more beautiful the uglier they are. We now consider landscapes like the Bernese Oberland, the valley of Chamouni, all of the higher alps, a source of sublime stimulation, they attract thousands of travelers each year, and one probably does not hear

a greater waste of exaggerated exclamations in all idioms of language than there, whereby a person from Berlin only looks suspiciously at the one from Leipzig because none finds the dialect of the other sublime enough for the sublimity of the scenery and each one wants to enjoy the sublime loneliness alone. This would have been easily achieved in the past because travelers fled such regions in the past if they were not forced to make their way through them and they only left the impression of a terrible vision in memory. Interestingly, the taste of the ancient Greeks and Romans was in this regard completely in line with our braid- and wig period for which it is informative to read the explanations of Friedländer in the second part of his depictions from the Roman history of morality. He quotes travel descriptions in which the alps of Salzburg and Tyrol, the Scottish Highlands as deprived of all adornment and beauty, the Märkian sand deserts and the Luneburg Death are all summarized under the same category and in the same sentence and were contrasted with the lovely laughing regions that one could enjoy. Yes, how little did it confirm to the style of the previous century to care about the noble nature of the alps as proven by the example of Klopstock, the noble Klopstock, who ignored it during a longer stay in Switzerland.

For the elders, the same was true for regions like the Campagna surrounding Rome that is now such a popular landscape motif. The elders would have gotten the impression of a rural and also the one of a scenic wasteland and of desolation in its current state. Now, our artists and art enthusiasts already mourn in advance that after Rome had been taken by the Piedmontese the Campagna will sooner or later be cultivated and thus lose this scenic charm; the elders would have been able to view this mourning as a sign of our savaged taste and accused us of not yet having moved out the barbarian completely despite having learned much from them and that our raw nature would still show itself in our raw taste for nature.

Enough examples that I have diligently assembled from all fields to which taste can be applied at all, the fields of fashion, art, and nature. We see the diversity of taste extend so far everywhere that it must be hard for those that stand at the extremes to understand the possibility of the other extreme, yes to even believe in it. And what variations there are between these extremes! It ought to be interesting, if one had colors for it, to depict the infinite variety of shades of taste in context on a board for the eye; while, of course, this summary painting of taste might seem like the most tasteless thing there is.

In addition to the great diversity of taste, to touch on this here, too, there is great uncertainty regarding taste. If one looks at the visitors of an art museum or an art exhibition, one finds that not most of them are greatly embarrassed about whether they should like this or that. Such an undecidedness does not occur regarding the famous masters; everyone knows that they have to like Raphael, Michel Angelo, Titian, Albrecht Dürer, the Dutch genre paintings, from contemporary artists, above all Cornelius; once one knows what one should like, however, and this is what connoisseurs are for, to tell us that, we soon start to really like it because most taste is like most belief a planted one, a granted one; we will get to this below. And thus, most judgments of taste with regard to art are only re-judgments according to judgments, often prejudices, of few connoisseurs that dominate smaller or larger circles of society. Yet, when it comes to pictures of newer or less known masters, the clue of the name is missing, and one sadly has, when one stands cluelessly in front of the new picture, not always a connoisseur in front or behind oneself whose judgment one could overhear. The judgment of the connoisseur becomes uncertain if the name becomes uncertain, too. Recently, an example has occurred with a famous painting that, when its artist changed from a known to an unknown one, the formerly unanimous

taste of all connoisseurs got completely confused and some of them then renounced their admiration of the picture completely.

What is the reason, one may ask, for this great diversity on the one hand and for the uncertainty on the other hand that share the field of taste? Beauty shall have absolute validity after all, why does it not show? It shall charm people; why does this charm so often not work? And what will finally resolve the dispute about taste and alleviate the uncertainty? Is every taste equal, and are there no decisive criteria for distinguishing a better one from a worse one? This is indeed what one wants to say if one says: there's no accounting for taste; one wants to say: the dispute about taste cannot be decided.

With regard to an explanation of differences in taste, one can take a different, higher stand. To take the highest one possible, one can say: The entire evolution of the human intellect is influenced by an idea, namely in the highest and final instance the Godly and absolute idea, and all differences in taste are only complementary and demanding, moments that replace and override each other, links, steps, that the highest idea of taste affects, develops in, shows itself in, without being able to exhaust itself in any single mode of appearance. Every lower step, however, has to make room for a higher one than one can see based on the preconditions and precursors, the entirety of all steps naturally and finally manifests itself as the one that has shown itself as the highest idea to the corresponding representative. Since we are well informed by Schelling, Hegel, and their successors about the potential, steps and self-suspension that the idea has to go through to fulfill itself as the highest one; this path has no other difficulty but to accommodate experience with the pre-drawn schema, and, if it does not want to be accommodated, to accordingly change the philosophical absolute power. With this, we have generated absolute insight into the development of all differences in taste. Whereby one only has

to regret that this insight is hampered only by the mythical character of the absolute idea because of which some philosophers will always remain who do not expect a common clarity from the idea and themselves.

One takes a significantly lower stand, but therefore a more accessible one for the common intellect, if one says: the diversity of taste depends on one hand on the innate diversity of human nature, on the other hand on the diversity of the environments in which people grow up and the different ways in which they are raised, and are in their general direction linked to the diversity of the entire intellectual culture. One can pragmatically trace this along general lines through moments that span entire people and time periods and show how the development of individual differences in taste are subordinated to and classed with this. It remains a high and beautiful task that is one for culture and art history to solve.

Finally, one can ask about the last psychological levers that give direction to the taste of each individual and that only show their effect on the differences in taste of entire time periods and people on the grand scheme and context; and as one does not easily condescend to their observation in culture and art history, I want to continue my own observations about these last levers instead of repeating what one can find there.

Objective and subjective causes of differences in taste meet where the objects of taste in general present themselves from different sides. Depending on predisposition, life conditions, education the attention of one will be caught more by one side, the attention of another from another side and depending on whether it is a rather appealing or unappealing one, the liking or disliking of the object is primarily determined by it. Thus, one pays attention almost exclusively to the composition, and he will like the picture if it is sufficient in this regard, no matter what the color scheme is; for the other, in contrast, liking is primarily determined by the color scheme;

one pays more attention to the nature of the content, another more to the way in which it is expressed, etc. In brief, the diversity of taste depends partially on its one-sidedness insofar the sides can take different directions.

Regarding the *decision* between contending tastes, the main question is, who shall be the judge? Intuition? But the dispute of taste is just a dispute of intuitions; thus, it cannot be decided by intuition. Intellect? It does succeed in stating criteria according to which something is beautiful, and thus it will be easy to justify or discard the taste according to whether it makes it *appear* beautiful or non-beautiful, i.e., makes it liked or not liked. But sadly, these criteria are so much debated among aestheticians, so volatile, undetermined or float in such philosophical heights that one can justify the trail and wig with it just as well as the Greek garment; one only needs to pick and turn the principle accordingly. – We do in general prefer the flowing, curved to the straight stiff aesthetically; Hogarth has even declared the line of beauty to be wave-shaped, Winckelmann to be elliptical, Herder to be hovering between straight and curved, and how often does one hear nowadays that a figure is praised for the beautiful flow of its shape. The wig seems ideally suited to fulfill all these demands at once, and if we add the Herbart-Zimmermann principle, according to which the big pleases next to the small, we will have to see the most perfect beauty in a wig. Why do we nonetheless discard the wig and prefer the stiff hat, despite all the faults we find with it, to the half wavy, half-elliptical wig whose curls fall just so that they unite straight and curved which, in short, presents the most beautiful flow of shapes. – According to some, beauty is the Godly idea that expresses itself on earth and appears to the senses. But toads and spiders are Godly creatures, too, why do and should we like them less than the lily and the rose; and why should the wig, as grandiose coat for the head, be less ideal than the coat over the shoulders that stands in such high esteem in ideal depictions. The wig is in the end only

idealized hair. – According to some others, that is most beautiful which stems from a much freer play of phantasy and can inspire it. However, who would deny that phantasy could play much more freely with the old haircuts, tower-like and garden-like head decorations than with our current hair; and that generally the garb of the time of Louis XIV and XV was much superior in this regard to the current and definitely the ancient garments that restricted phantasy to the utterly pre-determined way of appropriateness and purposefulness. – According to some, beauty shall depict the idea and the laws of the organic only in its purest expression, the shape of the columns, the entire relations of buildings, their beauty that exceeds the serviceable purpose is only due to the memory of the organic building. However, the law of all higher organic buildings is to rest completely on a foundation of columns, and all organic supporting columns are thicker at the top than at the bottom; why do we not want to accept this on the Bencoolenian buildings. – We find the series of fifths and sixths of Hucbald and Guido von Arezzo and altogether the music of African⁸³ and Chinese people hideous; but we can see it as a lapse of taste as it is much rather *us* who only later deviated from their taste that was initiated by nature. – The most arid glacier regions appear to be the most sublime thing there is to us, to the elders they appeared to be the dreariest thing there is. Yet, as we otherwise see patterns of taste in the elders, as Winckelmann has even made an article of belief from them, what would lead us to make an exception here. – In brief, no principle wants to keep making sense, neither the one of in themselves beautiful shapes, nor of the idea, nor of the phantasy, nor of the organic design, nor of naturality, nor of belief in the absolute perfection of ancient taste. If one wants even more principles, one can add the one of perfection of the sensory appearance, the one of disinterested

⁸³ *Translator's note:* Fechner used the derogatory term “Neger” here, as was still common in Germany at the time which may or may not refer to more people than the African ones.

pleasure or of purposefulness without purpose, and many more; but the former are already more than enough.

Of course, the way in which I have talked about all these principles is most superficial; and it could not be otherwise because a more profound and deeper discussion would have demanded taking more steps back than would be appropriate here; and thus, it cannot be hard for any representative of any one of these principles to convict me of superficiality and to turn or interpret his principle in such a way that the wig, the series of fourths and fifths, the Bencoolenian taste in buildings, etc., do appear hideous in their view and all that that is according to the current taste and especially the taste of the representative of the given principle appears indeed beautiful in its view; yet, it only depends on a skillful turn and interpretation that will always follow the existing taste rather than the other way around. We have seen this in Hogarth and can see it in the judges of taste of all times.

I am no aesthetic savior either to revoke this state of affairs; rather, I am myself of the opinion that one cannot find a principle that enables us to decide the dispute about taste in *all* cases, but we can find one that does denote the aspect that has to be disputed clearly enough and does lead in cases that are not too complex truly lead to a decision albeit only with more or less certainty. We will only discuss this, however, after the different means of taste education, that are at the same time reasons for its diversity, have been taken into consideration.

3) Predisposition, education of taste

A person's taste is innate according to his predisposition, evolved according to his education, and the kind of evolution is co-determined by the original predisposition but by no means solely determined by it. In brief, taste is the product of the original predisposition and educational influences and taste differs according to the differences between them.

Du to their innate setup, all humans are relatively equally affected by the simplest sensory stimulations and simplest relations. Almost any child finds a sweet taste pleasing, every brute people likes red the best of all colors, the least educated eye will like the symmetrical figure more than an irregular tangle of features. However, on this common basis taste finds innate inner conditions of different freedom, height and direction of development. Women are on average predisposed to have a finer but less high taste than men, the European a finer as well as higher one than the African, the French and the Italian a different direction of taste than the German and the English. Even though the educational influences differ according to differences in gender, race and nationality, too, they have developed themselves partially, insofar people educate themselves, from the innate predisposition while the influences of the natural environment contain moments that *together* gain influence on the predisposition and the education.

As important as predisposition is as starting point of further development, one often puts too much weight on it when one views taste like conscience lightly as something that is a priori and ready-made given to a person or as something that develops without intervention from the child's unconsciousness and good taste merely as an especially lucky gift. However, taste is indeed always only completed by education and can turn out very differently in goodness, height, subtlety, direction depending on the diversity of the individual influences.

The means for educating taste are hard to bring under one common aspect but can, like people altogether, roughly be classified into one of the following categories that can, not always, but to some extent be distinguished:

- 1) Transfer from others
- 2) Own considerations

- 3) Habituation and blunting
- 4) Training
- 5) Association

Let us limit ourselves to the observation of those in relation to the main aspects while psychology has to elaborate more deeply, education, cultural history, ethnology further than will happen here.

One. It is a fact that the explicit liking or disliking of others co-determines our own liking or disliking or can determine it from the start, the more easily so, the less we are determined from another side, and the more definitive the power of others is present in us. Like this, taste is transferred from the older ones to children until their own taste gains strength and so the taste of art schools is influenced by the teachers and comrades; and if a taste in some regard dominates an entire time period, an entire people, transfer along with habituation will make the main contribution to it.

Transfer can occur partially due to others making their reasons for liking or disliking known that only need highlighting to have their success, in short, due to indoctrination; partially due to liking or disliking of others it plants itself in us by means of its declaration by causing a kind of contagion that most easily affects the passive or yet indifferent nature, especially of those that are used to submit. The psychological reason for this transmission may still need explanation and clarification; yet it has to be acknowledged as a fact. One might think that an originally innate, imitative instinct extends from actions to feelings and thus to pleasure and displeasure that others *express* when looking at this or that, luring our own pleasure and displeasure or taking it into consideration, while I do not want to see the only reason it this, that, once one knows what should be liked, and one adheres in this respect to those that one thinks are smarter, as long as

one does not find oneself smart enough, pleasure emerges easily for no other reason but that overall what shall be, pleases us. Everyone appreciates good taste as an advantage that he ought to have and thus the drive to achieve this advantage elicits an automatic disposition in this direction. Moreover, everyone is free to fulfill the wish for a more thorough clarification.

Two. No less than foreign indoctrination, repeated own considerations can make the appealing or unappealing meaning of things familiar enough to in the future make us automatically like or dislike something. Instead of being geared to it by others, we can gear ourselves to it. Thus, we see the taste of the art connoisseur and of the philosophical aesthetician often rather determined by their art principles than vice versa.

Three. By virtue of so-called habituation, a person can grow to like or even find positive appeal in those things that he disliked in the beginning after permanent or often repeated exposure, and start to demand and need things that he liked to begin with, without him needing those for well-being, but even the omission of those things that are by themselves indifferent may after habituation start to feel displeasurable. It is a kind of inner adaptation of the organism to a stimulus that is gradually elicited by the effect of the stimulus itself.

However, the laws of habituation are complicated by the ones of *blunting*, *oversaturation*, *over exposure* and partially stand in conflict with them. Accordingly, the stronger an impression is and the more often it occurs, its effect is blunted, and each stimulus can be increased so much and be repeated so often that the limits within which adaptation to it exists in the above sense can be crossed. This is why habituation to pleasure stimuli in general is not associated with an increase of pleasure gain and rather reveals itself as displeasure upon their removal; this is why one in a way clings to habits and yet wants to be freshly excited beyond the borders of habituation; this is why too intense and too often repeated impressions can elicit

weariness, oversaturation, paralysis. Various relations spring from this and it would go too far to follow those; it may suffice here to remind ourselves of the most general aspects that they subordinate themselves to.

Now, other circumstances, relations permeate every time period, every class, every gender and age in certain repetitions; like this, they cause different directions of habituation and therewith also other determinants of taste as far as it depends on habituation.

Four. We were reminded above that innately, people are affected by the simplest stimuli if not in a completely equal at least in a pretty equal way. Just like the stimulation by lower and rougher impressions is blunted by repeatedly occupying oneself with them, there appears for those that are sensitive to the more subtle and higher impressions the need for occupation with such that start to gradually make impressions of even subtler determinations and higher relations that did not start out making one while at the same the aesthetic impression of the rougher determinants and lower relations fades to the background.

Thus, the ungainly taste of spiritus and sweetness gradually recedes for the wine expert and instead he becomes more sensitive to the finer determinants of taste; the gourmet does not care about dumplings anymore that draw double the crowds in public cafeterias but instead appreciates the right blend of a small dumpling better. Like this, Rumohr became a poet of culinary taste. What does apply to sensuous taste here does just as well apply to the taste in higher fields. It is in this regard that the taste of the higher educated ones and educated times and people mainly differs from the one of the child, the farmer, the raw times, and nation. Liking of harsh contrast, shrill red, colorfully painted pictorial broadsheet, the colorful doll fades into the background with adult education and finer and higher relations, that do not move the undeveloped taste at all, start to determine the main impression. Finally, an educated person

demands of every work that he shall like that all of its relations are connected via one highest relation, an idea, that the child and the savage cannot grasp at all.

It is the same for music as for the visual arts. The ear of the roughest people likes the noisiest music that moves with the simplest changes best that affects their senses the most; the child that comes back from a fair likes the blaring of his little trumpet better than a Beethoven sonata; but even the music expert of the past liked the simpler melodic and harmonic series, that so to say presented enjoyment on a silver plate, better than such that let one draw a higher enjoyment from farther out-branching and thus higher climbing relations and the resolution of crucial disharmonies. However, when one starts to like them, those simple tone series cease to satisfy, seem insignificant, boring, do not occupy one anymore and thus one does not like them anymore. Where in the past series of octaves, fifths, fourths seemed appealing, series of thirds and sixths were avoided, one can explain this with the fact that octaves, fifths, fourths are the simplest possible, in themselves graspable tone relations that by themselves are most consonant. As long as one has not yet been as trained in understanding musical relations as one is now, a replication of the appealing impression of the *individual* consonances produces a heightened effect which had not yet, as now, been outweighed by a disliking for their monotone repetition. In short, the repetition of the appealing outweighed the disliking for repetition.

Five. According to the differences in the circumstances under which people live and the differences in the times that they live in, experiences associate different things to the same or the same with different things whereby something can appear appealing to one and unappealing to another. Habituation and environment here usually go hand in hand or take it as their starting point.

Fashion provides the most striking examples of this. Let us recall the wig example. How again did past times take a fancy to them? The impression that it makes based on its mere shape and color wants to say so much more than nothing, and how could one have become used to it without any reason for habituation. One says: the wig was invented to cover the bald head of a king. If a farmer instead of a king had covered his bald head with it, it would have never become fashionable; yet, something royal was associated with the wig; and even if it was the case that the environment only imitated him out of flattery to begin with, the impression of nobility, dignity, richness of their wearers from then on started to be associated with its sight and to radiate from the circle of courtiers further and further beyond their circles. In the beginning, wigs only had a modest size that gave them their first purpose and then they grew as external sign of greatness, dignity, like a seed, once it has taken a certain direction, continues to grow up to certain limits; and with it grew its aesthetic impression. And we saw that this impression escalated into the impression of the Godly for a child. In and by itself, a wig has nothing Godly; it can only owe it to association. Afterwards, habituation and transfer contributed to secure this, but could not have elicited it from the start without association. And thus, one can maybe say that in general most changes of taste finally depend on reasons that do not belong to the field of taste at all but via mediation by association enter this field and stabilize and propagate due to habituation and transfer.

The Chinese have linked the impression of nobility, richness, dignity of their wearers in a similar way to the clubfeet of their women, the large bellies and the long nails of their mandarins. The Chinese has already become so familiar with these associations that he partially gauges the deference that he shows to noble men according to the size of their belly or even builds his idols with a large belly; in short, a large belly has become the ideal shape whose sight

evokes a feeling of power and greatness, yes, if the belly exceeds worldly limits, even a feeling of Godly transcendence. The slenderness of Apollo of Belvedere would only seem like sparseness to him; it would completely automatically evoke the imagination he saw someone of lower status on front of him who does not have enough richness, power or status to comfortably retire and nurse his belly; he would only be able to find a person in it who eagerly runs after his occupation because the Chinese himself does not run for other reasons.

As much as the taste of an individual is in general influenced by the dominant taste, it does happen often enough that such that are further removed from the art world start to stand in stark contrast to the current art taste due to occasions and associations that are unrelated and occur in their lives. The Sistine Madonna of Dresden, this most beautiful picture in the world, shall give us a few examples of this in the following intermission.

A military man said after a visit to the Dresden gallery that the Madonna had only made the impression of a drunk farm girl. Of course, he had so far only seen farm girls with naked feet and bare heads, and probably saw the expression of elevation over the worldly only as a consequence of being drunk. – In front of the same picture, Dr. B who had become famous through his popular medical writing was asked about his impression of the picture. Fixating the child, he said: “Dilated pupils! Has worms, needs to take pills.” His life habits let him see only a child suffering from worms in Christ’s child. – I heard another doctor I know say about the angles at the bottom edge: if his children would act up so churlishly, he would push them with his arms on the table; and a small English woman said about the same angels that they probably had not had a governess.

4) Principles of good or right taste

Undoubtedly, one can find an explanation for the development of any taste under the categories above, however, it does of course not suffice to have explained its genesis to also have justified it if we do not want to declare anything developed and thus any taste legitimate. And what is it, finally, that lets us accept one and reject the other taste, generally lets us distinguish a worse from a better one?

Basically, this aspect is a simply one, almost self-evident; only its applications is most often difficult. The benchmark for the quality of taste is only just the general benchmark for quality, i.e., it is not merely about whether something is immediately liked or disliked, gives pleasure or displeasure in its presence, that is the fact of taste, but whether it is good that it is liked or disliked, i.e., whether the well-being, the happiness, in a higher sense the salvation of humanity as a whole gains more than it loses through such a kind of liking or disliking because this is the standard by which the quality, the value of things is judged. Of course, every liking in general contributes to well-being and has to weigh in on the judgment of every taste because the presence along with the consequences has to contribute equally to the measure of quality; but how often is the present or selfish pleasure outweighed by the disadvantageous consequences as a whole or appears in a bad context; thus, when judging the quality of a taste one also needs to take into consideration the consequences of its existence and of its development, in short, one always has to ask whether something good results from this and that taste.

The one who remains impassive about the sources of pleasure that lie in nature and art or receives less pleasure from things that can give more pleasure, brings a pleasure gap or a pleasure loss into the world given equal consequences and contexts. That is an error of taste. But this is often reversed when taking the consequences into consideration. One seeks to possess what one likes, produce it, seek it, and tries to convince others to share his opinion. One cannot

like some things at all without a more valuable fruitful setup, education, mood of the soul compared to another and this can lead to a more valuable or less valuable setup of the external world. What reason recognizes as the best on a whole shall always immediately appear to feelings as such and elicit the according drives and moods.

Be it an object of fashion, art or nature, one will always be able to look at it from the point of view whether liking it is good or not good with regard to the relations above, and, insofar we can judge it, taste will accordingly accept or reject it, prefer one taste to the other or disfavor it.

There are countless cases in which we find such an assessment too difficult to give a decisive result. Then, the principle does not achieve anything but making us wise enough to refrain from judgment. And this wisdom and humbleness has completely merged with our feeling itself if it so often does not dare to decide, we cannot say whether we like something or not while we do know and feel that it is an object to be liked or disliked. But in some cases, this judgement according to the benchmark principle of quality is easy, at least made with relative certainty, and in any case, an assessment has to be made according to it, every dispute has to be based on it, if one wants to dispute.

When the Chinese like crippled feet on their women, large bellies on their high officials and idols, one wants to doubt whether this taste is just as immediately pleasurable to them as the opposite one is for us; but one has to call their taste worse than ours and worse in general because a taste that finds enjoyment in the unhealthy, the disadvantageous, that connects the imagination of dignity and superiority with sensuous abundance and heaviness does not lead to good consequences and is not associated with a good meaning. All immoral depictions are all the more of bad taste. One or another may like them, even grant them as much pleasure as moral

depictions grant to moral people; but it is not good that he likes them, and this is why we call his taste a bad taste. People shall not build their taste in such a way that it gives rise to disadvantages for the healthy and purposeful lifestyle and altogether for morality, and he can build it in such a way that this is not the case. Not only does one have to condemn any taste that burdens itself with this guilt but also any one that becomes possible through such a guilt because this cannot be the case without it getting stronger.

Good taste has to reject everything inappropriate, false, internally wrong along with everything immoral, unhealthy, for a twofold reason that it is not good for the soul to like the contradictory of a kind that is not good for the world, put up with it; because sooner or later, if not in the individual case but in the general order of the moral and the intellectual world, falsehood and the internal contradiction will turn into a disadvantage for the internal or external well-being of humankind.

In all these cases, the decision about taste preference seems easy; but it is not always as easy. If I should, e.g., decide whether the wig or our current stiff hat, whether the braid on the head in the past century or the two tails of the tailcoat in the current century are more or less tasteful, I would not dare to do it. How much more complex and difficult to balance are the considerations in general when it comes to decide in higher areas of taste which kind of sentiment is the most valuable on the whole. Not that the principle would completely betray us in those higher areas, we will be able to obtain much decisive things from it; but a main advantage of the principle will always be to teach us humbleness of judgment.

In all the countless cases in general where conflicts between different aesthetic considerations arise, it will indeed be easy to reject extreme one-sidedness and a preference for obviously subordinate consideration above superior ones as against good taste; but it will not

only be impossible to exactly determine the point of best weighting between them, it will also be necessary to allow a certain breadth or freedom in it as far as is tolerable for a good taste, without being able to determine the limits of this freedom exactly. One will always be able to argue about this without deciding and caution about thinking of one's own subjective feeling as the solely decisive one will be valuable.

Such caution, however, becomes an aesthetic duty due to the observation, one, that everyone's taste has only been able to evolve under certain temporal and local conditions, and according to whose peculiarities it was liable to special transfer conditions, yet also that different things truly fit different temporal and local conditions and thus different things can be in line with a right taste. Let an earlier mentioned example speak to this.

As eccentric and absurd the Bencoolen's architectural taste may seem, its development can well be explained by the principle of association as it can be justified by our principle of judgment of taste according to its quality, and in this case the justification is almost automatically given with the explanation.

The way in which one constructs in Bencoolen is indeed, as will be shown immediately, the most appropriate for Bencoolen's conditions, thus the best one. A feeling for this purposefulness has associated itself with the sight of their buildings for the Bencoolenians, fortified by habituation and transfer, and thus contributes just as much to making them seem beautiful to them as purposefulness contributes via association for us. If they wanted to construct like we do, it would be just as absurd, and their taste that has adjusted itself to call it just as absurd as if we would want to build like they do. Each taste must adapt itself to only let those things appear appealing that fulfill the purpose that they are destined to fulfill.

First, considering the raise of the buildings above the ground, this is justified by Bencoolenians more by the purpose motif than we can show for most of the setups of our houses. Primarily, this setup brings the advantage in the hot climate of Bencoolen that one can, if one walks underneath the houses, constantly remains in the shade which in other cities in hotter climate needs to be accomplished with a great narrowness of the street with great discomfort for traffic. Furthermore, as most residences in this country lie on rivers or lakes that frequently overflow, the houses are protected by their raising against the disadvantages of floods. Finally, they are like this also protected from attacks of wild animals, among which especially the tiger shall be often there due to which, as I remember to have read, it is almost viewed as a normal life event to be eaten by a tiger by Bencoolenians. Thus, what we would need to dislike as tasteless ideas if it would be realized in our country, because it would not serve any purpose, thus not create any pleasurable association, and must be disliked even in Bencoolen itself if we were not raised in Bencoolen, will get a completely different meaning for the inhabitants of Bencoolen themselves. For them, their houses are at the same time umbrellas for which the pillars form the sticks and not only residences on the ground but at the same time sanctuaries that raise them above the evil that threatens them from the ground; and those things that contribute to fulfill these purposes of the house also contribute to fill them with pleasure from them and are right in contributing to it.

Just like the raising of the houses by pillars, their shape has very simply emerged as the itself simplest way to fulfill natural purpose conditions and the Greek column is in this regard no more justified than the Bencoolenian pillar. In Bencoolen, earthquakes are very frequent, the stone building is thus impossible; the houses are light wooden houses; and in short, the buildings there are not about *basing* heavy masses on the ground but about *pinning* light masses into the

ground, just as one pins a light object to a firmly standing one with needles such that it is not shaken off by tremors. The needles are thus substituted by pillars that one rams into the ground; however, pillars can only be thinner at their bottom than at the top by their nature.

What we have thus done when judging the Bencoolenian architectural taste, we should in fact do everywhere where a judgment is made about the taste of foreign times and nations, we should empathize with the conditions of time and space to see whether the taste, that may not seem justified for our conditions, is not exactly that for the conditions of the different time, the different location.

Yet, a taste that is justified by the current conditions insofar it demands that which is most appropriate given those conditions can still contradict the demands of higher taste insofar as the conditions themselves are not justified and then a conflict that is often hard to decide can happen about how much the closer and thus more urgent or the higher more general demands of taste have to be satisfied.

In any case, the highest demand of good taste above all, changing according to time, location and special circumstances, remains effective: to let nothing happen that contradicts the most general principles of human prospering, and thus nothing that contradicts the physical and mental health, religiosity, morality or logical consistency. And accordingly, it can be the case that the taste of entire time periods or nations can in this regard be claimed bad; and the generality of a taste of a time period or nation does not yet establish its goodness.

One can, e.g., say this about the taste of Orientals for bombastic pictures in poetry. Undoubtedly, one would only need other educational influences to let that, which in this regard overgrows moderation and meaning, grow rich and yet beautiful.

Furthermore, it can also be the case that not only the conditions, in which a people lives, are justifying ones but also the taste for such conditions can be a fully justified one, indeed not better for them; and that the taste of that people can be appraised lower, be it that it grants less opportunity to immediately satisfy the aesthetic feeling, be it that it is not equally valuable under equal circumstances that taste adapts to; however, every taste can only be judged in the context of the conditions under which it exists.

In this sense, we cannot deny that the inhabitants of Bencoolen have the right to live in Bencoolen and adjust their architectural taste to the conditions of Bencoolen, just as much as we cannot deny the Greeks the right to live in Greece and adapt it according to the conditions of their country; yet, one may consider that the Greek architectural taste not only opens up more possibilities to immediately satisfy the aesthetic feeling than the Bencoolenian one, but is also rooted in the conditions and that they mutually support and retain that which altogether allow a more fruitful development and conduct of life. Then, it will have to be regarded higher without greater justification. This will have to be all the more valid in relation to the architectural taste of the Greenlander and the inhabitants of the Tierra del Fuego.

That the goodness of taste does not *necessarily* coincide with the subtlety and height of the taste has been noted earlier in general. It can easily happen that the liking of subtler determinations and higher relations, insofar it can always only develop at the cost of liking if less subtle and high ones, is costlier in this regard than it creates profit and additionally puts the individual in mismatching conditions for the people and things that are not high and fine enough. One then has that which one rather reprimands than praises as over-refinement, over-education of taste.

In contrast, one will have to accordingly call a child's taste who likes his colorful pictorial broadsheet more than a painting by Raphael rather a low-level taste than a bad taste, even though language use does not always adhere to this congruity. After all, it would not be of use if the child would, on the contrary, liked the Raphael better than his pictorial broadsheet, because such *premature* development does not agree with a *fruitful* development; one would have to view it as an over-educated taste for the child level. Only for an adult, who makes the claim to stand at the height of education of his time and nation, one would need to view the childish taste as a bad taste, since, of course, the goodness of someone's taste who according to age, status and nationality belongs to a higher and finer level of education also needs to have a taste that matches this in height and refinement. The goodness of taste here does to some extent grow with its height and refinement while it can beyond that decrease again through over-education and over-refinement.

Taste as understood in the objective sense can be justified already in a given time period, of a given breadth *to some extent* by the fact that it is another than the taste of a past time period or the adjacent space. Because humans need, so as not to become apathetic regarding the given sources of appeal, their change; and if one thus wants to prefer the ancient taste in visual arts, architecture, art industry in general to another, one would still need to grant temporal and spatial deviation from it that, even though less advantageous all else being equal, would still only become temporally and spatially more advantageous due to the change with the ancient. Meanwhile, the application of this principle demands great caution and is limited by a counter-acting principle.

In general, the conditions, that a taste has to set itself in relation to, change, automatically or according to time and location, such that hereby the change of taste's demands occur

automatically, too, that satisfy the needs of the change without considering it independently. Thus, the need for change can only be crucial insofar as the remaining conditions that determine the demands of taste leave the choice between perseveration and change open, or insofar the advantages that present different directions of taste to different sides shall be brought to attention in turns. Thus, an architectural taste for pointed arches or for circular arches each has its advantages and merits; one satisfies both and at the same time fulfills the need for change by not preferring one of them one-sidedly. Like this, even the Chinese architectural taste will be able to find its place. However, no need for change could justify an architectural style, if only temporarily or locally, that contradicts the conditions of durability and altogether purposefulness.

A very general limitation of the above principle is already evident in the fact that one shall never change from something good to something bad and thus it is more specifically and directly constrained by the following, downright opposing but only seemingly contradictory principle: a taste that dominates a certain time or expanse can justify itself *only to some extent* by confirming to the taste of past times or adjacent spaces. But how does this principle agree with the one above? First, the need for change of impressions only asserts itself according to the subjective setup of the individual when a certain amount of preservation is exceeded; second, however, neighboring times and rooms preserve each other objectively always whereby common demands on taste are posed.

As both principles have to be balanced in every special case, it depends on the subjective and objective conditions of the case, and one can only state the rule according to our most general principle, can accommodate the conflict of the two principles, by exploiting the advantages of both preservation as well as change to the greatest extent, thus by proceeding from one to another only according to an emerging overweight.

After all, there is a single principle of judgment of a taste's goodness above all that we have touched on earlier that alone is completely and always resounding in which all principles come together, as long as they are compelling, and that decides their conflict as far as they do not concur; however, all are only compelling to some extent and do not concur everywhere. It is only that it shares the disadvantage of so many, by themselves compelling, principles that it is easier to claim than to apply because it demands a trade-off for which we lack the knowledge about the right weights. This principle is linked to the basic relation between beauty and goodness and is, in short, basically self-evident and thus seemingly trivial:

The best taste is the one that on the whole results in the best for humankind; the better thing for humankind is, however, that which is in the interest of its temporal and presumably eternal well-being.